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Economists cannot claim that market failure can be corrected sim-
ply by showing that the optimal outcome in a model of social-welfare
maximizing entity divorced from any real political process will out-
perform the market. Avinash Dixit, “The Making of Economic
Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective,” 1996, p. XV.
1.1 Introduction
This thesis analyzes the interactions between economic and political forces in
shaping the regulatory process. By means of various empirical models and
different data bases, I develop an approach that bridges between the political
economy and the industrial economic traditions, with the purpose of providing
new empirical tools and ideas for analysing the political economy of regula-
tion, as well as robust results that stimulate a renewed debate on this topic.
On the one hand, I use the data and empirical analysis with the purpose of
testing predictions stemming from the existing theory. On the other hand, by
pointing out the existence of robust empirical relationships, my findings open
new questions, which still deserve a convincing answer from a theoretical point
of view.
The purpose of my approach is to fill the evident gap in the empirical
literature on the positive theory of regulation. Even though a few studies exist,
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which empirically analyze the determinants of different regulatory policies,
almost no attempt has been made to develop more complex and complete
econometric models that are able to explain and analyze the regulatory process
as a whole. In particular, to the best of my knowledge, there is almost no
empirical study that endogenizes both the firms’ and policy maker’s (regulator
or government) behaviors.1 This endogenization is a prerequisite in order to
explicitly consider the interactions among the product market and the political
arena where regulatory decisions are made, which is one of the contributions
of this thesis. In different methodological steps, I consequently develop various
empirical approaches, which allow me to shed light on the complex processes
staying behind regulatory policy. Applying these models to the data, I provide
strong empirical support to the thesis that the interactions between markets
and politics play a central role in determining economic policy.
Methodologically, this thesis makes use of different econometric approaches.
In the first part, which is more in line with the political economy tradition,
I estimate one-equation reduced-form models for policy making. The aim is
to analyze the process that leads to entry deregulation on a cross-section of
countries in order to generate some robust stylized facts. This can then be use-
ful for a better understanding of the institutional factors that drive regulatory
intervention and, at the same time, can work as a guide to deeper theoretical
research. In the second part of the thesis, I mainly concentrate on firms’ be-
havior in a regulated industry, thus staying closer to the industrial economic
tradition. Although the theoretical work in this field has not yet derived com-
plete models of firms’ strategic behavior in the product market, lobbying, and
regulation, from which a structural approach can be derived, I develop and
estimate empirical models built as systems of simultaneous equations, which
are partially theoretically based. The advantage of this methodology is its flex-
ibility, which allows to explicitly focus on particular aspects of the interactions
among firms and between firms and policy makers.
In this thesis, I develop two new databases by merging information from
various sources. The first database focuses on the deregulation of the mobile
1The only exceptions are Cadot, Röller and Stephan (2000) and Stephan (2002).
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telecommunications industry in OECD countries during the 1990’s. Specific
data on regulatory policy and institutions and on market structure stemming
from different OECD data banks are merged with information about the mem-
ber states’ political and institutional environments. The political side of the
data is particularly rich and covers institutional details (such as the electoral
system, the regime type, and other measures of a country’s degree of con-
sensus), the governments’ and legislatures’ compositions, and their political
orientation as expressed by the parties’ programmatic positions. Especially
the latter data, which are elaborated from a newly published database built
up from political scientists taking part in the European Consortium for Polit-
ical Research, constitute a unique source of information since they are based
on the direct analysis of the political parties’ programs and not on estimates
or proxies generated by the econometrician.
The second database is over the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry
during the second half of the 1980’s. A unique set of information on market
characteristics form its basis and has been kindly made available by Phil Parker
and Lars-Hendrik Röller. In the second essay, I enhance it with information
stemming form the Book of the States and the U.S. Statistical Abstract, which
deals with the states’ regulatory policy and political and regulatory environ-
ments. In the third essay, together with Astrid Jung, we rearrange the data
used for the previous work and add additional political variables, as well as in-
formation about firms’ lobbying expenditures as expressed by their campaign
contributions, which were provided by the Center of Responsive Politics. The
development of these databases is one of the contributions of my work that has
been already exploited in this thesis, yet it will be the basis for future research
on the political economy of regulation.
The purpose of this introduction is to present a unifying framework that
encompasses the processes that shape economic policy determination in gen-
eral (and not only regulation), in which I will position my studies and related
literature. I will point out which relationships and actors seem to be crucial
in order to understand such processes. Doing this, I shall first give a frame of
reference that bridges the many different approaches stemming from the po-
litical economy as well as industrial economic traditions. Second, I relate the
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literature on the politics of regulation to the more advanced literature devel-
oped in other fields of economic research. Finally, I explain my contributions
with respect to the existing theoretical and empirical studies.
1.2 A Unifying Framework
Figure 1.1 provides a graphical representation of the processes leading to eco-
nomic policy’s determination. In this section, I will highlight the main rela-
tionships among the actors represented in the figure and, in the next sections, I
will discuss at length the literature related to my study and the open questions
answered by my work.
Figure 1.1: The Framework of Economic Policy Determination
As a starting point, I assume that the states’ “political, institutional, and
legal constraints” are exogenous factors, i.e. they do not respond to policy
changes. The electoral rule or the regime type, for example, are only very
seldom subject to revisions in contrast to the economic policies which are de-
termined in the short or medium run. Political institutions, which can be
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considered as the “rules of the game” or the framework (1) for the policy
making process, are important because they determine how political represen-
tation is chosen and also because they shape agents’ incentive to participate
in the political process. The notion that the political constitution may influ-
ence policy decisions, an idea that has been most notably developed in the
political science literature under the label “comparative politics,” has only re-
cently attracted the interest of economists. This approach consists of building
policy formation models - generally adopting the electoral competition frame-
work - under different assumptions about the institutions in place. Different
equilibrium outcomes can then be derived, which hinge on different institu-
tional details, and can be compared in order to determine how such features
influence policy decisions (Pommerehne, 1990; Austen-Smith, 2000; Persson
and Tabellini, 1999; 2001, Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 2000; Lizzeri and
Persico, 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al., 2001; and Besley, 2000).2
Four main actors, which can be divided in two subgroups that interact
with each other, operate within the framework: the policy maker and the
market. The government and the bureaucrats belong to the policy maker,
while consumers and firms are the agents operating in the market. One of the
central ideas of this thesis is the need to explicitly consider the interactions
among these subjects in order to correctly understand the causes and effects
of policy.
The government, which is selected through the electoral process, chooses
the policy that influences the firms’ behavior constituting the first channels
through which the market and policy maker are interrelated (relation (2)).
The bureaucrats are agents to whom the government might delegate (relation
(5)) the power to make some of the policy decisions. The consumers take part
in the political process through their voting behavior (relation (4))- and, less
intensively, through their lobbying activities - and to the market game through
2Persson and Tabellini (1999) and (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2001) have also
empirically tested the predictions derived from their theoretical models. They showed that
the regime type (presidential vs. parliamentary) and the electoral system (majoritarian vs.
proportional) strongly influence fiscal policy and, in particular, the size of government and
the composition of public spending.
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their consumption choices. Finally, the firms strategically interact with each
other as well as with consumers in the product market (relation (6)), while they
participate in the political process through their lobbying activities (relation
(3)). The elections and the lobbying process constitute the second channel
through which the market and policy maker are linked.
In modern representative democracies the government is elected according
to the rules given by the constitution.3 The first important mechanism for
policy determination, which establishes who must decide on policy, is the elec-
toral game (Downs, 1957). In the modern political economy literature, the
electoral competition framework has become the milestone upon which most
models are built in order to guarantee a solid microeconomic foundation (see
Persson and Tabellini, 2000 for a very clear presentation).
The second important element in the policy making process is how deci-
sions are made. The politicians/governments have two options: they either
make the policy themselves, or delegate this policy decision to third parties,
namely bureaucrats or agencies. The delegation process designs the bureau-
cratic institutions, whose characteristics - such as transparency, accountability
and independence - affect the bureaucrats’ policy choices by shaping their in-
centives and instruments (Baron, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1991 and 1993;
Laffont, 1996; Persson et al., 1997; Estache and Martimort, 1998; Laffont and
Martimort, 1999; Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2000; Besley and Coate,
2000). In this research, I will assume that these institutions are exogenous
and concentrate on how their design may influence the policy making process.
Independently of whether the policy is directly made by the government
or delegated to bureaucrats, the policy makers interact with other actors: the
voters and the private interest groups or lobbies. The policy decision is the
result of an optimization problem. Politicians or bureaucrats, who in the
modern political economy tradition also are self interested agents, maximize
3One strong simplification that I make in the work that follows is to consider the “gov-
ernment” as a unique body, neglecting the existence of different levels in the decision making
process: the legislative, executive, and jurisdictional powers. See Levy and Spiller (1996) for
an interesting case-study analysis of institutions’ role in shaping the regulatory environment
and policies.
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a function where different arguments play a role. On the one hand, they
care about being in power, and therefore choose policies in order to achieve
consensus in their constituency, which would bolster their re-election prospects
(Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Besley and Coate, 1997; and more in general
Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Thus, electoral competition considerations shape
their objective function and thus the chosen policy. On the other hand, interest
groups influence the policy maker through the lobbying process, i.e. through
campaign contributions, information transmission, corruption, and bribery.
Therefore, selfish politicians value in their utility function the private benefits
that they would get if they implemented the policies that are preferred by
the interest groups (Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and 1996; Helpman and
Persson, 2001; and Besleyand Coate, 2001).4
The interactions among these agents lead to the policy choice, which in-
fluences the market outcome. This thesis analyzes this process by means of
empirical analyses. The main point that I make in this work is the need to ex-
plicitly consider the simultaneity between policy decision and market outcome.
The idea behind this consideration is that, because policy strongly influences
the market outcome, the actors who play the market game are those actors who
mostly have an interest to influence the policies that determine the environ-
ment where they operate.5 Policy endogeneity and the simultaneity between
politics and market are important issues to account for, since neglecting them
may lead to inconsistent and biased estimates of both the determinants and
the effects of economic policy. I provide strong empirical evidence to support
this view.
In the following section, I will deal more in depth with the literature related
to my thesis. I will order this literature according to the relationships presented
4See also Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a general
treatment of these approaches.
5Baron (2001) points out the importance of considering firms’ “non market” strategies”
beside their market strategies, in order to fully understand their behavior. Non market
strategies - i.e. all those which are not directly chosen in the market game - are in fact
used by firms in order to improve their performance. Also see Baron (1999) for a more
specific model of firms’ lobbying activities and De Figuero and Tiller (2001) for an empirical
analysis.
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in Figure 1.1 and contrast the existing results with my findings.
1.3 Related Literature
Over the last decades, the literature on industrial organization has thoroughly
dealt with a normative analysis of regulation both from the theoretical as
well as from the empirical point of view. The analysis has focused on how
regulation might influence the market outcome, the market structure, and, in
general, firms’ behavior in the market place.
Generally speaking, this strand of the literature considers the policy de-
cision as exogenous and assumes that regulation exists in order to alleviate
the negative effects of market failures. Following the “welfare economics” tra-
dition, is postulated the existence of a benevolent government (or regulator)
that maximizes a “total welfare function” and must decide upon the optimal
regulatory instruments in a world where imperfect information among agents
constrains the available choices’ set to the public authority (see Baron and
Myerson, 1982 and Laffont and Tirole, 1993 as prominent examples). If the
agents are selfish and there exist asymmetries in the information between the
politicians (the principal) and the bureaucrats (the agents), or between the
regulator (principal) and the regulated firms (agents), then the structures of
the regulatory process, i.e. the division of powers among different agencies, the
scope of regulation, the way the bureaucrats are chosen, the way they make
their decisions, and the dynamic and design of this process are fundamental
elements to understand not only how regulatory decisions are made but also
how they impact the market outcome.6 The literature following this kind of
approach exploded at the beginning of the 1980’s, mainly around the so called
“Toulouse School,” and has produced an enormous amount of theoretical but
also empirical contributions. In particular, the applied literature has dealt
6In this thesis I will not deal with the informational issues, which deserve a much deeper
empirical analysis. However, my work connects, at least marginally, to this literature since
I will explicitly consider the way in which the bureaucratic institutional design, i.e. the
contract written by the politicians in order to influence and monitor the bureaucrats’ actions,
influences policy determination.
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with the analysis of the effects of regulatory decisions on market outcome.7 If
we want to position this literature in the framework presented above, these
studies analyzed the relation (3), i.e. the delegation process, the relation (2),
i.e. policy incidence and, more precisely, how policy choice influences firms’
behavior in the product market (relation (6)), but it did not consider how the
political system shapes policy choices.8
The main critique of this approach is the lack of a positive analysis of the
regulatory process. In particular, without considering that regulation is the
result of a political process, in which the market-agents also take part, thus
without considering its endogeneity, one cannot correctly determine the effect
of such policy decisions. This point is strongly supported by my empirical
results.
The political economy literature, on the other hand, has dealt with the
development of models that explain the process of policy formation. In par-
ticular, following the so called “public choice critique to welfare economics”
(see for instance Buchanan and Tullok, 1962 and, more recently, Besley and
Coate, 2000a), the newest theoretical approaches criticize the assumption of a
benevolent social planner that maximizes total welfare. Their starting point
is an elected government that maximizes a utility function that may or may
not contain consumer and producer surpluses, but where the selfish politicians
also value the money/utility that they receive from interest groups.9
Since the end of the 1950’s, many contributions have analyzed the role of
political competition (Downs, 1957), the private interests of particular groups
in society (Stigler, 1971 ; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1983), the role of politicians
and voters’ ideology (Kalt and Zuppan, 1984; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995;
Poole and Rosenthal, 1997), the role of political institutions (Persson, Roland,
7See Joskow and Rose (1989) and Winston (1993) for excellent surveys.
8Only recently the “agency approach” has been adopted to explain the positive side of
the regulatory policy. See for instance Laffont (1996) and (1999).
9The presence of the total welfare in the utility function maximized by the politicians
is not exogenously assumed as a sign of government’s benevolence but rather motivated by
electoral competition arguments. Politicians care about the aggregate welfare because this
will increase their probability of being reelected. This literature, thus, give a microfoundation
to the governments’ utility function (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
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and Tabellini, 1997; Persson and Tabellini, 1999; 2001, and Persson 2001)
and the role of transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; Dixit, 1996; Estache and
Martimort, 1998). In the political economy tradition the role of the state and
of political actors is then the core of the analysis, whereas the role of the market
and its interactions with the political process are not really considered. Thus,
the political economy literature explored the relations (3) and (4) represented
in Figure 1.1, i.e. the electoral game and the lobbying process as well as the
relations (1) and (5), i.e. the institutional and political determinants of policy
formation.
In this thesis, I shall bridge between these two traditions and show the
relevance of considering their interrelation. On the one hand, I will model the
firms’ strategic behavior in the product market assuming that the regulatory
policy influences firms’ interaction by shaping their operative environment.
On the other hand, I will also consider that regulation is the endogenous
outcome of a complex political process, where the institutional agents - such
as governments and bureaucrats - and the institutional rules play a central
role. The link between policy determination and policy incidence consists of
considering the firm not only as a production but also as a political entity.
Firms operate in the product market but also in the political arena, where
they behave strategically in order to influence the design of the environment
where they operate.
In what follows I will present a more precise review of the literature.
Starting from the positive analysis of regulation as proposed by the “Chicago
School”, I will point out its main pitfalls and present possible solution to them,
which arise from a generalization of the results stemming from the new political
economy literature. I will then discuss in more detail the empirical approaches
to economic regulation and the main results derived by this literature and
point out the uncovered gap that my research wants to fill. Throughout the
review I will briefly point out why this literature is relevant to my work and
position my contributions in the larger framework of the existing studies.
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1.3.1 Regulation and Political Economy
A positive approach to the study of regulation, which refuses the existence of
a benevolent regulator, has been developed following the work of the “Chicago
School” that elaborated the so called “private interest paradigm” (Stigler,
1971; Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976; and Becker, 1983).10 Unlike the norma-
tive approach, this theory assumes that regulation, as well as other forms of
governmental intervention, are simple redistributive processes among differ-
ent groups in society. Thus, regulation exists because, through the regulatory
process, some rents are generated and the selfish agents interact in order to
distribute these rents among themselves (Becker, 1985). The private interest
or economic theory of regulation then constitutes a theory for the demand
of political intervention. The different groups in society ask for specific poli-
cies that preserve their interests. One of the main critiques concerning this
approach is that it fails to successfully model the supply side for market in-
tervention, namely the role of the entire political process and those subjects
who decide upon policies. The political body is seen as a kind of “black box”
through which the demand for policy intervention is transformed in policy
prescriptions. Formal micropolitical models of the supply side of policy in-
tervention, which should overcome the above mentioned pitfall, i.e. why and
how are politicians influenced by interest groups, have been developed only
recently in other fields of economic research, more notably public finance and
trade theory (Grossman and Helpman, 1994 and 1996; Persson et al. 1997;
and Besley and Coate, 2001).11 Instead, there exists almost no microfounded
model in the regulation literature, which formally questions the role of the re-
lation between politicians and voters as the main mechanism to explain policy
determination, and the role of lobbying groups in such a mechanism.12 One of
the main challenges of the new political economy literature has been to build
general equilibrium models of policy formation with a strong microfoundation
10See Romer and Rosenthal (1987), Noll (1989), and Baron (1995) for very clear surveys
of the modern positive theory of economic regulation.
11The two recent books by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman
(2001) provide excellent guidance to the literature on modern political economy.
12The very few exceptions are Faulhaber, (1997) and Trillas, (2000).
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in order to explain the political process behind economic policy. The common
assumption is that rational and selfish agents, who maximize their objective
functions, strategically interact in the product as well as political markets.
The observed policy is then the equilibrium outcome of a well specified non-
cooperative strategic game built on primitive assumptions about the agents’
preferences and about their political as well as economic behavior (Persson
and Tabellini, 2000).
Of particular interest for my thesis is the analysis of special-interest politics
recently developed by the political economy literature. The study of the role of
pressure groups dates back at least to the theory of collective action developed
by Olson (1965) and later to the work of Becker (1983 and 1985) on interest
groups competition. More recently, this approach has also found a rigorous
microfoundation for the rent seeking activity of interest groups or lobbies in
the model by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a).13 They developed a common
agency model (see also Bernheim and Whinston, 1986b) where the lobbying
process is represented as a menu auction and lobbyists make bids to politicians
contingent on their future policy choice.14 One of the most interesting results
coming from this model, which is in line with the optimistic Chicago School’s
view of policy determination, is that the equilibrium policy outcome can be
efficient also in the presence of selfish individuals, if each group in the society
is equally represented in the political process.
The basic tool developed by Bernheim and Whinston has been applied by
several authors in order to develop policy formation’s models. One prominent
example is Grossman and Helpman (1994), who used the menu auction ap-
proach to explain the structure of trade protection. They showed that interest
groups may have a strong influence on the policy outcome and, in particu-
lar, that the competition intensity among groups determines their preferences
over the policy outcomes.15 Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and
13An alternative approach, which dates back to Tullock (1967) and (1980), Krueger (1974),
and Posner (1975) models the lobbying process as a contest. In the so called “rent-seeking”
literature, individuals spend resources in order to increase the probability of winning a
prespecified contested rent. See Nitzan (1994) for a very clear survey of the literature.
14See also Dixit et al. (1997) for an extension.
15See also Besley and Coate (2001) who analyzed the relationship between lobbying activi-
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Bandyopadhyay (2000) empirically tested this theory and found that it seems
to explain the observed trade barriers’ structure much better than other more
traditional trade theories did.16
One problem with this approach is that the existence of pressure groups
has been exogenously assumed. Since Olson (1965), though, it has been rec-
ognized that, because lobbying activities can be considered a public good for
the agents taking part in the group, there exists a coordination problem in the
lobby formation: Which are the selfish agents’ individual incentives to partic-
ipate in a pressure group? Even though these individuals might realize their
common interest - like for instance a favorable regulatory environment - they
will, as a group, only achieve the optimal result if a mechanism that deters
the free-riding behavior is available. Recently, several contributions have ac-
counted for endogenous lobbying formation (e.g. Mitra, 1999). Some of these
studies modeled the decision to form a group in a repeated game setup and
analyzed the enforcement mechanisms, which could lead to cooperation in the
political market (Pecorino, 1998 and 2001; Hillman et al., 2001, Damania and
Fredriksson, 2000; and Ludema, 2001). The empirical literature, however, is
still extremely scarce and much less progressed than the theoretical.17
In this thesis, I will make extensive use of the newest theoretical results to
motivate and guide my empirical analysis, even though I will not structurally
test any of the previously cited works. Particularly, I will address several of the
questions arising from the lobbying literature. First, I will empirically enquire
whether firms’ lobbying activity has an influence on policy determination. I
will show that lobbying strongly affects regulatory decisions, eventually having
distorsive effects on the economy with respect to the outcome generated by a
ties and electoral process. Their main result is that the lobbying process does not necessarily
strongly influence policy outcome, but that policy decisions may become inefficient because
of the coordination problem faced by the lobbyists and because of other distortions implied
by the lobbying activities.
16Also see Cadot et al. (1999) for an empirical analysis on the political economy of
infrastructure investments, which uses the Bernheim’s and Whinston’s approach as well.
17See Potters and Sloof (1996) for an excellent review of the empirical literature on
interest groups, and Potters and Van Winden (1996) for a survey on different theoretical
approaches to model interest groups activities.
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benevolent social welfare maximizing regulator. Furthermore, together with
Astrid Jung we will also ask whether firms’ product market behavior affects
their decision to form a lobby, thus explicitly addressing the free-riding problem
in lobbying formation. We will show that our empirical analysis supports
this thesis and that firms’s behavior in the product and political markets are
strongly interrelated.
1.3.2 Empirical Analyses of Regulation
There exist a huge body of empirical literature in the industrial organization
tradition that analyzed, over the last decades, the effects of different forms of
regulation and deregulation on the market outcome.18 In this Section, I will
only concentrate on a small number of contributions which are particularly
relevant for my study.
Winston (1993) provides a general overview of the analysis of the deregu-
latory process that took place in various sectors of the U.S. economy starting
from the early 1980’s. The main approach of the analyzed studies used the in-
formation generated by differently regulated industries to identify regulation’s
effects by contrasting the outcome of regulated and non-regulated markets. As
a general result, it seems that deregulation has produced some positive welfare
effects for the U.S. economy.19
Kriedel, Sappington and Weisman (1996) is a survey of the papers that
analyzed the U.S. telecommunications industry and, in particular, the effects
of the historical policy change from rate of return to incentive regulation. In the
1980’s, incentive regulation was seen as a major reform towards a more efficient
tool for policy making. Even though there is evidence that this regulatory
regime’s change had beneficial effects for firms’ productivity and innovation
speed as well as on the penetration rate of telecommunications services, there
18As a general reference, Joskow and Rose (1989) have thoroughly surveyed the literature
over the effects of regulation on prices, cost structure, firms’ efficiency, products’ quality,
and income distribution.
19See for instance Morris and Winston, (1986) and (1991) for the airline industry, Levin
(1981) for the railroad industry, Crandall (1991) for the telecommunications industry, and
Hazlett, (1996) for the cable television industry.
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is no strong evidence supporting the fact that incentive regulation leads to
lower prices for consumers and to a cost reduction for telecommunications
services (Mathios and Rogers, 1989, Kaestner and Kahn, 1990), even though
these latter factors were mentioned as the main reasons for this regulatory
reform.
Yet, these studies have not asked why the regulatory reform happened and
which were the forces driving it.20 To put it differently, the political economy of
the regulatory reform only attracted a very marginal interest in the empirical
literature. The following quotation from Joskow and Rose (1989, p. 1498)
makes clear the need for a more accurate analysis of the political economy of
regulation:
[..] This tells us simply that regulation has effects on various eco-
nomic variables, that these effects have distributional impacts that
create constituent interests, and that groups representing diverse
interests respond in the political arena. Interest group politics is
not, however, per se inconsistent with a “public interest” view of
regulation (whatever that means) or with competing “private in-
terests” theories. The work on the political economy of regulation
must inevitably be carefully related to the effects of economic reg-
ulation and the way economic regulation is accomplished. The
politics and economics of regulation are intertwined in a complex
way. Further effort to fold more traditional analysis of the effects
of economic regulation into analyses of the political economy of
regulation seems essential.
Over the last decade, the interest for the political economy arguments that
underlie the regulatory process has slightly increased, but the produced em-
pirical evidence is still extremely scarce. Some authors have attempted to em-
pirically analyze the determinates of particular regulatory decisions. Mainly,
they concentrated on the analysis of a single industry and used data from the
20As stressed by Noll (1989) and Peltzman (1989) the political economy of regulation and
deregulation might be different. Thus, to assume that the regulatory status is exogenous
can have an impact on the estimates of the (de)regulation’s effects.
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U.S., since the cross sectional variation in policies among the federal states
provides a sort of “natural experiment,” which allows one to capture the ef-
fects of different regulatory regimes (e.g. Teske, 1991; Kaserman et al., 1993;
Donald and Sappington, 1995 and 1997; and Kroszner and Strahan, 1999).21
However, these studies consider only one aspect of the regulatory process,
namely the determinants of regulation, without questioning how the effects of
regulation may also affect regulatory decisions. As I will make clear in this
thesis, the interplay between economic and political forces and the process
that leads to a particular regulatory policy decisions are elements that should
simultaneously be considered in order to correctly estimate the effects of such a
policy.22 From the methodological point of view, this means leaving the typical
approach of estimating one equation, and to address the simultaneity issue,
i.e. the modelling of the regulatory process as a whole by using simultaneous
equations systems.
1.4 Structure of the Thesis and Main Results
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first chapter, which constitutes the
first part, I present a cross sectional comparison of the deregulation process
for the digital mobile telecommunications industry in OECD countries during
the 1990’s. The adopted approach is purposely “reduced-form” and consists
of the estimation of a single policy equation. The focus is on the explanation
of the regulatory policy determination, mainly from an institutional point of
view and is more in line with the political economy approach. I concentrate
on the ability of different political systems to produce policy changes as ex-
pressed by a reform of the regulatory policy, while the role of the market and
of firms’ strategic behavior is left aside. Merging several data bases, I test var-
ious predictions stemming from different strands of the literature. I analyze
the role of political institutions (Persson and Tabellini, 1999 and 2001), gov-
ernment’s types and ideological positions (Kalt and Zuppan, 1984 and Alesina
21Also, see Djankow et al. (2000) for an interesting cross-sectional empirical analysis of
the political and economic determinants of entry regulation across country.
22On this point see also Besley and Case (2000) and Duso and Röller (2001).
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and Rosenthal, 1995), industry and consumer private interests (Stigler, 1971;
Posner, 1974; Peltzman, 1976), as well as the regulatory environment (Laffont
and Tirole, 1990 and 1991) in shaping the regulatory policy. I find strong evi-
dence that all these sets of variables help to explain some degree of variability
in the observed liberalization patterns among countries. Yet, political and reg-
ulatory institutions and the pressure from strong incumbent firms are found
to be the most important factors. While, on the one hand, these results were
expected since they reflect the stylized facts partially observed in other fields
of economic research, they must, on the other hand, be considered as new find-
ings for the literature on regulation, which devoted until now only marginal
attention to these topics. Beyond their empirical relevance, my results stress
the need of a more accurate theoretical discussion that is still missing.
In the second part of the thesis, which comprises Chapters 3 and 4 and
constitutes the most original contribution of my study, I focus on the firm’s role
and strategic behavior. The core of the analysis is on the interaction between
the market and its political environment. In order to explicitly consider this
relation, the econometric approach is more sophisticated and requires the use
and estimation of simultaneous systems of multiple equations. Both studies
reported in these chapters analyze the U.S. mobile telecommunications market
during the second half of the 1980’s, which presents a unique market structure
and regulatory environment.
In the third chapter, I concentrate on the interaction between the mar-
ket players and the political system. I consider that firms’ lobbying activities
which are aimed at obtaining a particular regulatory status, might generate a
simultaneity problem between the effects and the determinants of regulatory
decisions. Hence, I explicitly model this two-way causality, and empirically
test this model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. I find strong
support for this approach: Regulatory choice should be considered endoge-
nous. Accounting for the simultaneity bias, I show that regulation, whenever
it actually took place, was not particularly effective in the sense that it did not
reduce significantly cellular tariffs. However, I found that it would have been
more effective if applied in those markets which had not been regulated. To
explain this result, I show that firms’ lobbying activities on regulatory choice
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have been successful, so that firms were able to avoid regulation in those mar-
kets where it would have had a clearer impact on prices. From the political
economy side, I also provide evidence that the probability of price regulation
was higher, ceteris paribus, when the regulator was directly elected by the
citizens, the state’s governor came from the Republican Party, the government
was politically stable, and when the regulation’s opportunity costs were low.
While the result that the regulatory and political environment are significant
determinants of the choice for a regulatory regime was observed in other em-
pirical researches (Teske, 1991; Donald and Sappington, 1995 and 1997), to
the best of my knowledge there does not exist any paper, which makes the
point of regulation endogeneity as proposed in this thesis. In fact, the adopted
approach allows to build measures of the firms’ private interests and to observe
their effects on policy decision. Furthermore, I point out that the measurement
of policy incidence is substantially different when regulation’s endogeneity is
taken into account. This result is of enormous practical importance, since
policy conclusions from analyses that treat regulation as endogenous may be
extremely misleading.
The fourth chapter, which is a joint work with Astrid Jung, focuses on the
strategic choice made by the firms in different markets (Baron 1999 and 2001).
We make the point that firms’ behave strategically not only in the product
market, but also in the political market, and investigate the relationship be-
tween firms’ lobbying expenditures and product market collusion (Damania
and Fredriksson, 2000 and Ludema, 2001). We develop an empirical approach
which allows us to structurally estimate the market interactions and to si-
multaneously account for the endogeneity of lobbying decisions. Measuring
firms’ political activity as the amount of campaign contributions by the mo-
bile telecommunications industry, we find a significant negative relationship
between the strength of collusion in the product market and firms lobbying
expenditures: A collusive conduct decreases political activities, while higher
rent seeking efforts increase competition in the product market. The interpre-
tation is that market collusion eases interest group formation and reduces the
competitors’ conflict with regard to policy choices, thereby limiting the politi-
cians’ ability to extract rents from the firms. Even if there is some empirical
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evidence that industry concentration has an impact on firms’ decisions to form
a group or not (Pittman, 1988 ; Zardkhooi, 1985; Grier, Munger, and Roberts,
1991), we are not aware of any empirical study which analyzed the relation-
ship between collusion and lobbying decisions. We believe that the strong and
robust empirical relationship observed in our results is an important step in
understanding firms’ behaviors, which should stimulate further theoretical as
well as empirical research.
Overall, the methodological contribution of this thesis is to explicitly model
the endogeneity of the political market in the analysis of regulatory processes.
The development of two new and rich databases, which allow for the empir-
ical implementation of the simultaneity between the product market and the
political arena, must be considered a further contribution of this work. The
need for high quality data in this field of applied research is, in fact, enor-
mous, and these new datasets constitute without any doubt an excellent basis
for the development of further research on the political economy of regulation.
The empirical findings reported in this work strongly support the proposed
approach: Regulation must be regarded as endogenous. The role of political
forces and institutions must be taken into account in the positive analysis of
regulation as well as of other forms of economic policy. The firms do interact in
the product and political markets and must be considered not only a produc-
tive but also a political entity. The theoretical and empirical research in the
field of industrial organization must confront itself with this robust evidence
and propose new tools to deal with it. Still, this thesis must be considered
only as a first step towards a more ambitious research program, which should
be the basis for the political economy of industrial policy.
Part I
The Political Economy of
Deregulation: The Role of the
State
Chapter 2
On the Politics of the
Regulatory Reform:
Econometric Evidence from the
OECD Countries
“Economic deregulation [...] is one of the most important experi-
ments in economic policy of my time.” Winston (1993, p.1262)
“[T]he allocation of entry rights will be based in part on political
considerations - a politically determined division of the rents - as
well as economic efficiency.” Noll (1989, p.1274)
2.1 Introduction
In the past 20 years, the majority of industrialized countries have experienced
an era of deregulation. Many industries, which for decades were guided by
the state’s hand, have been opened up to competition. Especially in the so
called network industries - such as the telecommunications, airline, post, and
electricity industries - the market structure and regulatory instruments have
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been widely reformed.1 On the one hand, governments have tried to implement
more competitive market structures through the liberalization of entry and
the privatization of the typically state owned incumbent operators, while on
the other hand, following the developments in the economic literature, new
regulatory designs were introduced with the aim of improving the effectiveness
and efficiency of governmental intervention in the market.2
The speed, timing, and extent of these reforms among OECD countries,
however, have been remarkably different. Why did some countries liberalize
more and quicker? What have been the determinants of such reforms? I
will answer these questions by analyzing some new data on the regulatory
reform undertaken during the 1990’s in the OECD countries. The analysis
that I will propose is essentially positive and descriptive, but I acknowledge
that a deeper understanding of the process underlying the regulatory reform is
essential for a correct understanding of the effects of such reform, since effects
and determinants of regulation should be simultaneously considered.3
According to the “public interest” view of public policy, one should observe
regulation because market failures generate inefficiencies, which could be al-
leviated through benevolent governmental intervention.4 Following the path
breaking contribution by Stigler (1971), many scholars criticized this approach
as unrealistic, and questioned the appropriateness of assuming a benevolent
government. The alternative view interprets that regulation is essentially a
redistributive process among self interested subjects who want to gain specific
benefits by means of governmental intervention.
1See for instance Bergman et al. (1998), a report on the development of European
deregulation especially concerning the telecommunications industry. For a survey on the
history of deregulation see Winston (1993) and Chang (1997).
2As Winston (1993) pointed out, the role of economic research in the field of regulation
has been crucial. He noted (p.1263): “deregulation would never have occurred if economists
- especially microeconomists - had not generally supported it through their research.”
3See Duso and Röller (2001) and Chapter 3 of this thesis for a deeper analysis of this
point.
4The ‘welfare economics’ approach to government intervention is essentially normative,
but it would entail a positive theory of government under particularly strong assumptions
such as complete information and the absence of transaction costs (Noll, 1989).
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Although some contributions have exploited the role of different political
factors in shaping the regulatory policy, a well defined micropolitically founded
theory of regulation has not yet been fully developed. Nevertheless, there
exists a new and fast growing literature on the political microfoundation of
economic policy - what Persson and Tabellini (2000) call political economics -
which is closely related to and shall be helpful when trying to reach a deeper
understanding of the politics of regulatory policy.5 During the 1990’s, plenty
of political economy models have been developed, each focusing on particular
issues of the “political game” with the aim of determining how different factors
influence economic policy. The role of political institutions, the governments’
types and viability, the politicians’ ideological and programmatic positions, the
private interest and lobbying activities by pressure groups, and the regulatory
agencies’ institutional design have been analyzed.
Following this renewed theoretical interest, the empirical literature on the
politics of economic policy has found a new impulse as well, but it still remains
at its infancy. In this chapter I provide a comprehensive glance at new data
on international regulation, thereby contributing to the debate on the politics
of the regulatory reform by offering some new and robust stylized facts. I
adopt a reduced form empirical approach to explain the cross-sectional and
time-series variation in the degree of liberalization and regulation of the mo-
bile telecommunications industry of the OECD countries during the 1990’s.
Merging different data bases, I empirically analyze predictions stemming from
a rather heterogenous literature, aiming at “testing” which of these approaches
can better explain the observed regularities. I uncovered a number of stylized
facts about the (de)regulation of the mobile telecommunications industry. I
show that majoritarian countries, countries with more accountable regulators,
and countries with right-wing governments liberalized more, whereas countries
with proportional electoral systems or consensus-type of democracies, with a
presidential regime, with coalition rather than one-party governments, and
with a strong incumbent firm liberalized less.
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of the
5Also, see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a microfoundation of economic policy.
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related literature. In Section 3, I give a theoretical framework for my analysis
by introducing political and economic factors, which have been proposed as
explanatory variables for regulatory policy. Section 4 deals with the description
of the database obtained by merging many different sources. In Section 5, I
develop the main econometric model and discuss some methodological issues.
I present the results in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7, where I present
summary remarks and suggest directions for future research.
2.2 Related Literature
The starting point for reviewing the literature on the political economy of
regulation is the private interest view also known as the economic theory of
regulation (Stigler, 1971). This approach stresses the role of interest groups
in determining governmental intervention. Regulation is seen as a political
process, whose structure has not been formally modeled, in which specific in-
terests express their demand for political intervention as a way of redistributing
rents to themselves.6 The presence of market failures generates these rents,
and their distribution among the different represented subjects depends on
their relative strength (Peltzman, 1976).7 The consequent redistribution can
be efficient if all interests are equally represented (Becker, 1983).8 This theory
predicts that different groups in the population should try to “capture” the
6Stigler’s definition of economic regulation was quite broad, essentially including all gov-
ernmental economic acts.
7The original Stiglerian approach was a one-way capture theory: industry interests are
the sole ones to be represented in the political outcome. Peltzman (1976) went beyond
this simple capture theory, and stressed the role of the regulator as the institution that
mediates between consumers’ and producers’ interests. Finally, Becker (1983) extends this
dichotomous trade-off to the case of competition among interest groups.
8Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) formalized the lobbying process through an agency
framework, in which the represented interests placed bids contingent on their favorable
policy outcome. This model was applied in several studies to explain economic policy. For
instance, Grossman and Helpman (1994) analyzed trade protection in such a framework; the
predictions of their model have been very successfully supported by the empirical evidence
(Goldberg and Maggi, 1999 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000).
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agency.9 Therefore, one should expect to observe variables related to these
interest groups’ strength, size, and organization to significantly influence the
observed regulatory pattern.10
The economic theory of regulation suffers however from several pitfalls. The
first problem concerns its failure to model the political process through which
private interests are materialized in particular policy prescriptions. Essentially,
the supply side of regulation is taken as exogenous, like a black box through
which the demand for regulation is transformed into outcome. Yet, the supply
side of the regulation market, namely the entire public sector policy-making
technology (politicians, governments, legislators, regulatory agencies, courts,
etc.), must be considered in a micropolitically founded theory of governmen-
tal intervention, since these actors create, shape, and monitor the regulatory
process.11
Recently, a new theoretical and empirical literature in economics has dealt
with the analysis of the role of political institutions in shaping economic pol-
icy.12 For instance, it has been shown theoretically as well as empirically that
the regime type and the electoral rules not only shape a government’s size and
expenditures (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 1999 and 2001; Milesi-Ferretti et al.,
2001), but also the tax rate and income distribution (Austen-Smith, 2000).
In this study, I apply this kind of thinking to regulatory policy, because the
rational of the aforementioned literature, namely that the conflict redistribu-
tion among different interested agents (and thus the policy’s determination)
depends on political institutions, should also hold for the regulatory govern-
mental interventions, even if a well specified theoretical model has not been
9See Laffont and Tirole (1991) and (1993) for a theory of regulatory capture. Their focus
is, however, on the optimal agency design in a world with asymmetric information.
10For empirical analyses of interest groups’ pressure on regulatory decisions see Kroszner
and Strahan (1999) and the third chapter of this thesis. Also see Potters and Sloof (1996)
for an excellent survey of the empirical literature on interest groups’ influence.
11The political theory of economic policy recently proposed by Laffont (1999), which is
based on the well developed incentive or principal-agent theory, may be seen as a possible
way to formalize the supply side of regulation.
12Political scientists have thoroughly analyzed political institutions’s role in shaping policy
formation. See for instance Lijphart (1999).
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developed yet.
The second pitfall of the private interest theory of regulation is that it
has been very successful in explaining regulatory intervention but, as many
authors pointed out (e.g. Peltzman, 1989 and Noll, 1989), has failed to ex-
plain the deregulation process, a phenomenon that, from the 1980’s onwards,
has been widely observed in many industries and countries. One possible al-
ternative approach, which has been stressed in political science, is that the
ideological position of the policy makers also matters for policy determination
(e.g. Kalt and Zuppan, 1984; Hibbs, 1987a and 1987b; Poole and Rosenthal,
1993; Alesina 1987; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995; Cusack, 1997; Irwin and
Kroszner, 1999): Politicians make their choices according to their political
preferences, because they care for the policy outcome itself. Although it may
be problematic to consider the ideological position of politicians and voters as
an exogenous determinant of economic policy (Poole and Rosenthal, 1993), I
am interested in analyzing whether there exists any kind of relationship among
these issues.
Finally, the private interest theory of regulation, by implicitly assuming
that the regulator is a mere and neutral reflection of the political process gen-
erated by the legislator, denies the agency problem entailed in this relationship.
However, as the following quote from Noll (1989, p.1255) points out, the or-
ganization of the regulatory process is surely an important factor to account
for:
“Regardless of the motives of political actors, an essential ingredi-
ent to a theory of regulatory policy when the Coase theorem fails
[i.e. when there are imperfect information and transaction costs]
is how political officials control agencies. Whether the aim of reg-
ulation is to maximize efficiency or to transfer wealth to a special
interest, politicians face a principal-agent problem in trying to as-
sure reasonable bureaucratic compliance with the objectives behind
a legislative mandate.”
This agency problem behind the regulatory structure has been thoroughly
analyzed in the literature (e.g. Baron, 1988; Spiller, 1990; Laffont and Ti-
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role, 1990 and 1991; Laffont, 1996 and 1999; Laffont and Martimort, 1999).13
Among other elements this view stresses that the independence, accountabil-
ity, and transparency of the regulatory process are important factors, which
could help to explain the role of the agency relations between the different
subjects (Neven et al., 1993).
At this point, I have predictions coming from a rather heterogenous lit-
erature that have dealt, in the last 30 years, with the intriguing topic of the
politics of regulation or, more generally, of economic policy. The contribution
of this study is to take some of these predictions to an empirical test, using a
particularly suitable and new data set.
There are two recent papers, which are very closely related to my approach
both in their motivation and in their econometric analysis. Djankov et al.
(2001) analyzed the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 75 countries.
Their analysis concentrated on the bureaucratic requirements that a firm has to
accomplish in order to set up a new business. They contrasted the predictions
from different theoretical approaches and tested them on new data collected
by the World Bank. The main results of the paper are that the public interest
view of regulation is rejected by the data, the Stiglerian Approach finds some
support, whereas a “tollbooth view” of economic policy - where regulation
is pursued for the benefits of politicians and bureaucrats (De Soto, 1990) -
seems to explain the cross-sectional variation in the costs and time necessary
to start-up a new business much better.
Li et al. (2001) is a cross-sectional empirical analysis of the political econ-
omy of privatization and competition, which uses a new data set from the
telecommunications sector built from different sources like the World Bank,
Pyramid, and the ITU (International Telecommunications Union). They also
adopted a reduced form approach based on a generalized private-interest frame-
work, and concentrating on the role that interest groups have in shaping the
regulatory process. This theory seems to receive reasonably strong support
from the data. Furthermore, since the data set contains many countries, they
could contrast the experiences in democratic vs. non-democratic countries, in
13Fiorina (1982) proposed an alternative approach to the delegation of regualtory author-
ity based on the uncertainty about costs and benefits of regulation.
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order to assess the role of democracy in shaping private interests’ ability to
influence the policy reform.
Both studies, which surely are an important step in filling the lack of em-
pirical research on the political economy of the regulatory reform, do not in-
vestigate the role of political and regulatory institutions.14 As stressed by
other authors (Noll, 2001; Levy and Spiller, 1996) institutions in place and the
rules governing the decision making process play a crucial role in that they
constrain the set of policy choices, and thus, determine the outcome of the
reform process (McCubbins et al., 1989).
Also relevant for my research are a set of recent OECD working papers
(Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000; Gonec et al., 2000 ; and Nicoletti, 2001). While
they are closely related to this work because part of the data they use are
also used in this work, they differ in their aim, since they analyze the effects
rather than the determinants of regulatory reform.15 The main message of
these studies is that the observed reforms of the regulatory environment could
contribute substantially to improve economic performance, but that a large
scope for further reform exists. This study will build a counterpart to these
studies based on the political economy view, as a first step of a more ambitious
research program in which determinants and effects of regulatory reforms are
being simultaneously analyzed.16
One last comment is to be made at this point. The term regulation has
been intentionally used rather generally during this introductory discussion. In
the following sections, I shall be more precise about what I mean by regulatory
reform, especially when describing the data. However, what I am attempting
here is to think in quite general terms about the politics of the regulatory
process, which entails regulation, re-regulation, and also deregulation. I be-
lieve, in fact, that a political economy theory of regulation should be able to
encompass all these processes.
14Pryor (2002) is another empirical analysis of governmental regulation in OECD coun-
tries.
15See Gruber and Verboven (2001) on the effects of entry and standard regulations on the
evolution of cellular markets.
16Duso and Röller (2001) is a first step in this direction.
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2.3 Theoretical Motivation
The approach taken in this Chapter consists of the estimation of reduced form
relationships with a descriptive aim. I will not structurally test one particular
theory, but rather I want to ask, looking at new data, whether different sets
of political variables systematically influenced the regulatory process under-
taken in the mobile telecommunications industry during the 1990’s in most
of the OECD countries. I am looking for some stylized facts that help me
to understand which political factors drove this reform process. In this sec-
tion, I present a theoretical background and derive testable hypotheses for the
empirical analysis.
2.3.1 Regulation, Institutions, and the Government
Political scientists have focused on the analysis of the role of political insti-
tutions in shaping political phenomena. Recently, this “comparative policy
approach” has also been used in economics in order to analyze the role of
political institutions in shaping economic policy.17 As noted by Austin-Smith
(2000, p.1257):
“[..] political “institutions matter” because the institutional dif-
ferences are reflected in differences in the incentives of political
agents to appeal to particular groups of voters who typically have
distinct economic opportunities and, therefore, distinct preferences
over economic policy.”
Persson and Tabellini (1999) and (2001), Persson (2001) and Milesi-Ferretti
et al. (2001) have theoretically and empirically analyzed whether the electoral
17The comparative policy approach is positive and aims at comparing different equilibrium
outcomes derived under different assumptions about the political institutions in place, which
are considered to constitute the exogenous “rules of the game.” Differently, the approach
taken by Laffont (1999) is normative and aims at endogenising the institutional details, under
the assumption that a “benevolent dictator” exists, who optimally designs institutions under
imperfect information.
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rule and regime type influence fiscal policy and public spending. Their empir-
ical findings, which are mainly based on their theoretical results, suggest that
political institutions shape economic policy.
Yet no developed theoretical model suggests a systematic microfounded
relationship between regulatory intensity and the institutions in place, even
though some political models of regulation have already stressed the impor-
tance of the decision making’s structure and, in particular, the agency prob-
lem between different government and bureaucracy levels.18 I believe that
some new empirical evidence, such as stylized facts, will help in deepening
the understanding of these phenomena, and perhaps will stimulate a renewed
theoretical discussion on this topic.
One characteristic of the telecommunications industry is that the range of
users covers almost the entire population. This could imply that the regulation
of utilities is a policy that might interest a large base of voters, hence it might
be considered to be a broad policy program. While this seems to be plausible
for the wireline telecommunications industry, it may be much less true for
the cellular telecommunications industry, especially in its early phase, during
which cellular services were still not extensively adopted. There are then some
specific groups of the population - namely business people and young people -
which mostly benefit from a competitive mobile telecommunications industry.
In the empirical analysis, I concentrate on the mobile telecommunications’
entry regulation or liberalization, thus I assume that this kind of policy is
perceived to be a targeted policy.
From the theoretical literature mentioned above, I borrow the idea that
countries with majoritarian elections should be expected to implement more
specific and targeted policies. This is because smaller districts, which are
generally associated with this kind of electoral rule, foster more competition
to capture the support of particular voters. This prediction should also be
reinforced by the fact that politicians internalize less of the positive effects
18See Levy and Spiller (1996) for an interesting but less formal analysis of the impact
of political and social institutions on regulatory structure and performance. Also, see Noll
(2001) on the politics of regulatory reform in developing countries, and Laffont and Tirole
(1990) and (1991) for more formal theoretical analyses.
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of a broad program, since the electoral districts in majoritarian elections are
smaller. My first prediction is that in the mobile telecommunications industry
one should observe more liberalization in majoritarian than in parliamentarian
regimes.
It is harder to make a clear cut prediction for the second kind of institu-
tional detail: the regime type. One of the major differences among different
regime types concerns the separation of powers. Presidential regimes are usu-
ally associated with a strong division of power between parliament and govern-
ment. In presidential regimes the government is normally more accountable
and can less easily abuse its power (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 1997). An
implication of this is that in a presidential regime, since there is a relatively
less stable majority of legislators that pursue the interests of the majority of
voters, the opposing interests of smaller minorities may compete with each
other, leading as a result to the choice of broader programs (Persson, 2001).
Stretching this conclusion perhaps too much, I would then expect to observe
less liberalization in the mobile phone market in presidential regimes.
Hypothesis 1 If mobile telecommunications’ entry liberalization is perceived
as a targeted policy program, countries with majoritarian elections should
liberalize more, whereas presidential regimes should liberalize less.
However, one should be cautious when extending the predictions stemming
from the model developed in public finance to the regulatory reform case.
First, because, as we saw, it is difficult to assess how targeted this policy
intervention should be considered, and second, because I cannot be sure that
the mechanisms driving the results in the public finance models also hold in a
political economy model of regulation.
Since the dichotomous representation - majoritarian vs. proportional elec-
tions and presidential vs. parliamentary regimes - seems to be too simplistic
to account for the enormous variety of a country’s formal and informal institu-
tions, and in order to improve the quality of the analysis, I will also use other
measures for political institutions. In his influential study on democracy, Arend
Lijphart (1999) showed that democracy’s typologies can be reduced to a clear
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two-dimensional pattern along two institutional dimensions: the executive-
party dimension and the federal-unitary dimension.19 Both indexes show how
majoritarian and consensual countries are along the two chosen dimensions,
which account for the division of powers between government and parliament
(executive-party) and between different governments’s levels (federal-unitary).
Compared to the previously presented institutional dummies, these two new
variables are a metric measure of richer information for institutions.
In this case, I do not have a microfounded model, which predicts how these
institutional details affect policy.20 Yet, there exists a number of contibutions
in the political science literature, which stress the role of veto players in influ-
encing policy reform. In particular, Tsebelis (1995) showed that the potential
of policy change decreases with the number of veto players.21 Since more ma-
joritarian regimes in Lijphart’s sense face less veto players in both dimensions,
the prediction should be that majoritarian democracies along those dimensions
should be better able than consensual democracies to implement policy reform.
Hypothesis 2 More majoritarian democracies along the executive-party and
the federal-unitary dimensions are expected to be more effective than con-
sensual democracies in implementing policy reform.
A second kind of institutional variable that one can consider is related to
the government’s type. This institutional detail is of course related to the
electoral system as well as to the regime type of which it is a by-product. Nev-
ertheless, one still can analyze whether they have a direct impact on regulatory
policy. I consider two different government types: one-party vs. coalition gov-
19The two indexes were obtained by aggregating information from ten different political
dimensions by means of factor analysis. We refer interested readers to Lijphart’s book for a
very clear and deep analysis.
20Lijphart (1999) showed that these measures of consensus democracy have a significant
impact on many macroeconomic performance variables. In particular, he showed that con-
sensus democracies have done better than majoritarian democracies, especially with regard
to the control of inflation.
21He also showed that the potential for policy change decreases with the incongruence
and internal coehesion of veto players. An interesting empirical analysis of the veto players’
theory is provided in Tsebelis (1999) .
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ernments.22 Moreover, I want to observe whether the government’s political
support and the opposition’s fractionalization play a role in shaping the eco-
nomic policy. In fact whether a government is viable, i.e. able to effectively
govern and implement policies that depart from the status quo, also depends
upon the composition of the legislature, and in particular on how strongly the
government is supported by the legislature.23 I can than state the following
claim:
Hypothesis 3 Coalition governments are expected to push the regulatory re-
form and the liberalization process less than one-party government.
2.3.2 Ideology and Partisan Politics
In the partisan politics tradition, politicians or political parties choose their
policies not only in order to be reelected like in the electoral competition mod-
els, but rather because they care about the policy outcome as well. This
implies that the platforms of the different politicians may not converge to the
median voter’s preferred policy, and may instead be driven by partisan pref-
erences, which should represent the interests of their constituencies (Alesina
and Rosenthal, 1995).
Although many scholars argue that in modern industrialized countries
ideology has lost its role in shaping policy, there exists some evidence that
partisanship matters, although it is not always clear how it matters. Poole
and Rosenthal (1993) showed that roll call voting in the U.S. Congress is
22As Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) stressed, the dichotomy “one party vs. coalition govern-
ment” in parliamentary democracies parallels the idea of “unified vs. divided government”
in presidential systems. The division of power can be used by voters to assure a modera-
tion of the government’s policy. Moreover, coalition governments, having more veto players,
should face a more persistent status quo bias (Alesina and Drazen 1991) .
23As we already mentioned, according to the existing empirical evidence, regulatory policy
seems to have a great degree of inertia (Joskow and Rose, 1989 and Faure-Grimaud and
Martimort, 2000). Regulatory policy seems, in fact, to react only to major political shocks
rather than to changes in economic factors. The departure from the status quo may be, for
this kind of policy, even more difficult than for others.
2.3. Theoretical Motivation 34
very well explained by ideology as expressed by the unidimensional “liberal-
conservative” measure and, furthermore, that such dimension is intertempo-
rally stable.24 Rosenthal and Romer (1987) gave some examples of how this
unidimensional measure of ideology is well in line with the Congress’ voting
behavior on specific regulatory issues. Extending these arguments to a cross-
sectional comparison across countries, I argue that the “right-left” dimension
should also explain regulatory patterns in OECD countries.25
Hypothesis 4 I expect to observe that left-wing governments tend to liberalize
less than right-wing governments.26
Yet, one legitimate question is whether the right-left dimension is a suffi-
cient statistic for the parties’/governments’ ideological position on particular
issues, or whether information about the programmatic position on these par-
ticular issues does a better job in explaining policy variation. In my case, I can
use some interesting measures of the governments’ programmatic position on
issues such as regulation and welfare state limitation, and hence analyze how
the right-left variable’s significance level varies after inserting such measures
as regressors. In a sense, this is a test of the explanatory power of the right-left
synthetic measure.
2.3.3 Private Interests
The private interests theory of regulation stresses the role of competition
among interest groups in shaping economic policy. If all parties are equally
24As Romer and Rosenthal (1987, p.111) pointed out: “[...] ideology is a dimension on
which are projected the myriad issue dimensions of politics. It is a remarkable fact that a
single dimension, with considerable stability, characterizes voting in the U.S. congress. [...]
voting in a manner consistent with ideological location may well be consistent with close
attention to constituents interest”.
25As Thomas Cusack (1997) points out, “Lower income groups and labor in general [i.e.,
the “left”] are seen as favoring a large and active state. This is a state heavily engaged in
regulating the market and using public finance to equalize the outcomes of market opera-
tions.”
26On the other hand, one could expect right-wing governments, which should be more
“pro-business”, to regulate entry more heavily in order to protect the interests of those
firms, which are already in the market.
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represented, the tougher this competition is, the more efficient the policy out-
come should be. Generally, though, the industry has more intense and better
organized interests than, for instance, consumers, who are also affected by reg-
ulatory reforms and whose interests are often opposite to those of the industry
(more competition to foster lower prices, higher quality, and more product
diversity). Consumers, in fact, face the typical free rider problem in group for-
mation (Olson, 1965), hence their lobbying activity might be less effective than
the lobbying by telecommunication firms that already operate in the market,
which are few and whose interests are more aligned. Among firms, though,
there can also be strong differences. Incumbents should be more interested in
protecting their market from new entry, calling for a tougher entry regulation.
On the contrary, potential entrants should lobby to lower entry barriers and
to push forward the liberalization process.
In this chapter, I will analyze this kind of mechanism, at least partially.
the expectation is that the higher the incumbents’ market share, the more re-
sources it should spend in order to slow down the liberalization process. These
firms have in fact much to loose in a liberalized environment. On the other
hand, when the industry profits are high, then the entrant firms’ lobbying in-
tensity should be higher, since the gain from lobbying - i.e., the possibility
to enter a profitable market - is higher.27 Finally, from the consumers’ side,
I use the “active” population, i.e. the population between 15 and 64 years,
as a proxy for the consumers’ interests. Relative to the entire population,
adolescents and people in the labor force, in fact, would gain from a liberal-
ization of the mobile industry. The reason is that liberalization should imply
a more competitive environment with lower prices and these groups are the
main potential users.
Hypothesis 5 Countries are more likely to liberalize when the incumbent’s
market share is low, industry profits are high, and the proportion of “ac-
tive” population is high.
27This is by no means a perfect measure for potential entrant’s interests, since high profits
are also in the interest of the incumbent firm. However, one can hope to capture the former
when controlling for another measure of the incumbent’s interests, such as its market share.
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2.3.4 Regulatory Institutional Environment
The regulatory institutions in place are the result of a delegation process in-
volving politicians and bureaucrats. As already mentioned, this relationship
has been widely analyzed in the theoretical literature. Nevertheless there is lit-
tle empirical evidence helping to evaluate this theories. The government writes
contracts that should entail the “right” incentives for bureaucrats to operate
efficiently. This analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this chapter. I will
assume that the institutions that result from these contracts shape economic
policy decision.28
One problem in this specific case is that regulatory institutions in telecom-
munications have been partially reformed during the sample period, and sec-
torial authorities were created to handle the liberalization and privatization
processes. In my approach, instead, I assume that regulatory institutions re-
mained constant during the sample period, since the information contained in
the OECD database does not follow their temporal evolution, but rather gives
a picture of them around the end of the sample. Nevertheless, I think that
it is useful to incorporate these variables in this study, in order to stimulate
the discussion, but keeping in mind that a deeper and more careful analysis is
needed.
There are essentially two main regulatory agency’s characteristics, which
have been pointed out as particularly important for explaining their ability
to implement regulatory policy: their independence and accountability. The
argument about regulator’s independence from the political power that ap-
pointed it is that such independence should help to ease the regulatory capture
problem (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). First, a more independent regulator should
face a less severe time inconsistency problem, because it is less concerned with
electoral cycle considerations. Second, a more independent regulator should
more likely purse the general interest, because it is less dependent on a captured
government. The argument behind the idea to keep agencies more accountable
28The theory of regulatory capture proposed by Laffont and Tirole (1993) stresses the role
of the regulatory environment in shaping interest groups’ ability to influence the regulatory
policy. Regulatory institutions should then be designed in order to minimize the possibility
of regulatory failure.
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is that this accountability should “counterbalance the natural inequality in the
ability of different interest groups to influence regulatory practice, including
the well-known tendency for consumer interests to be less well organized than
those of producers” (Neven et al.,. 1993). If this is true, then one should
expect to observe a more pronounced liberalization pattern in those countries
where the agencies were more independent and more accountable.
Hypothesis 6 Countries are more likely to liberalize when their regulatory
authorities are more independent and more accountable.
2.3.5 Demographic and Economic Controls
I control for specific demographic and economic characteristics, which are sup-
posed to constitute a source of observable heterogeneity among countries, such
as the population level and the income per capita. Indeed, a correlation be-
tween higher income per capita, good government, and lower need for regula-
tion is likely to exists.29
In general, I make these controls in order to account for the country’s
demographic and economic conditions, which may shape the economic policy
decision (Besley and Case, 2000). Furthermore, one can think of these controls
as accounting for the differences in the market conditions among countries. For
example, I expect that small countries - such as Luxembourg - do not have
a competitive market structure, because they constitute a natural monopoly
since potential demand is very small. Finally, I also control for a time trend,
which should capture the market evolution and technological change. These
have been important elements for determining the development of the mobile
telecommunications industry and its regulation.
2.4 The Data
Our data set, merged from different databases, constitutes an unique source
of information for analyzing the politics of regulation. On the one hand, it
29See Djakanov et al. (2001). A reason for this could be that richer countries may deal
better with market failures than poorer.
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contains information about the regulatory process, market structure, and reg-
ulatory environment in OECD countries; while on the other hand it has infor-
mation on these countries’ institutional and political environment.
The regulatory variables are taken from a database on international reg-
ulation recently published by the OECD (see Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2000;
Gonec et al., 2000; and Nicoletti, 2001). The database consists of primary
data, provided mainly by means of ad hoc questionnaires and existing OECD
publications. Furthermore, some indicators were estimated to facilitate the
use of the detailed aggregated data and to allow comparisons between coun-
tries with different regulatory systems. The primary data consist of qualitative
information (such as binary answers, multiple choice answers or answers pro-
viding more detailed information about regulatory provisions) as well as quan-
titative information (such as number of licenses, market shares and industry
performances). Additionally, there are general reports about the regulatory
environment in and around 1998.
Figure 2.1 displays two indexes on the regulatory intensity in the fixed line
and mobile telecommunications industries developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti
(2000), which were calculated aggregating different information through a fac-
tor analysis and represent an average over the period 1991-1997.30 So, for
instance, the UK presents the lowest regulatory intensity in the wireline and
the mobile telecommunications industries. On the other extreme, Turkey and
Switzerland regulate the most.
The most interesting element, which emerges from the previous figure, is
the high level of heterogeneity in the regulatory processes among OECD coun-
tries. Figure 2.2 plots the index on regulatory intensity in the mobile telecom-
munications industry and the degree of liberalization of the digital mobile
telecommunications industry.31
30The “0” means high regulatory intensity while “1” means low regulatory burdens. The
regulatory index for the mobile industry aggregates information about the international-
ization, the liberalization and market structure of the domestic mobile telecommunications
market, while the regulatory index for the fixed telephony considers also the state ownership
of the PTO. We are very grateful to Giuseppe Nicoletti for sharing his data.
31In the figure the time average of the variable DIGITLIB is represented for each country.
This variable takes value 1 if the market is a monopoly, 2 if it is a duopoly, and 3 if the
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Figure 2.1: Regulatory Intensity in the Wireline and Mobile Telecommunica-
tions Industries
Also in this case, one observes a great deal of heterogeneity among coun-
tries, with the UK on the top-right corner (competitive industry with low
regulatory intensity) and Switzerland on the bottom-left corner (monopoly
and high regulatory intensity).
Moreover, looking at Figure 2.3, which plots the time evolution of the
cross-sectional average of the degree of liberalization between 1991 and 1997,
one also observes variability in the time dimension, which suggests that the
deregulation and liberalization of the telecommunications industry was an on-
going process during the sample period. I aim to explain both sources of
variability in observed policy.
The second database that I use, which is the main source for the “political
side” of the data, has been developed by the Institutions and Social Change’ s
Unit of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). The origi-
nal data base was first built by the Manifesto Research Group of the European
market is more competitive (3 or more firms).
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Figure 2.2: Degree of Entry Liberalization and Regulatory Intensity in the
Mobile Telecommuncations Industry.
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and was later developed at the
WZB in the so-called “Comparative Manifestos Project” (CMP). In this data-
set, various aspects of the party and governmental system are examined on the
basis of quantitative content analyses of party manifestos and government dec-
larations. The original collection includes 2,359 manifestos from 614 different
parties in 461 national elections between 1945 and 1999. This originates from
52 countries, including all OECD countries with the exception of Korea and 24
central and eastern European countries (see Budge et al., 2001). Furthermore,
these original data have been extended to cover information about the elected
governments during the sample period. This information, which has been de-
rived from Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (1998), has been subsequently
extended and corrected at the WZB.32
Our data on political institutions is based on two sources. On the one
hand, I use two dummy variables developed by Persson and Tabellini (1999),
32I am particularly grateful to Andrea Volkens for kindly providing me with this data.
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Figure 2.3: Time Evolution of Entry Liberalization in the Digital Mobile
Telecommunications Industry
which take value one for countries with majoritarian elections (MAJOR)
and presidential regimes (PRES).33 On the other hand I use the two indexes
(EXEC PAR and FED UNIT) developed by Arend Lijphart (1999) that
I presented in the previous section. These indexes are a metric measure of
the institutional details and, particularly, expressive of how majoritarian or
consensual each country is along the two chosen policy dimensions. The dis-
tribution of countries along these two dimensions is graphically represented in
Figure 2.4.
For instance, the U.S. is consensual in the federal-unitary dimension (“[..]
strong federalism and judicial review, a rigid constitution, an independent cen-
tral bank, and a bicameral parliament albeit of only medium strength”) and
majoritarian in the executives-parties dimension (“ [...] dominant one party
cabinets, a roughly two-and-a-third party system, plurality election and inter-
33We thank Guido Tabellini for allowing us to use this data.
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Figure 2.4: The Two-Dimensional Conceptual Map of Democracy
est group pluralism”), whereas the U.K. is very majoritarian and Switzerland
very consensual in both dimensions.34
Finally, from the OECD statistical compendium I collected information
about the countries’ demographic and economic conditions. Since the different
data sets span different time periods and cover different countries I found a
“minimum common denominator” in the merging procedure. The final data
set covers 24 OECD countries in the time period 1991-1997. In Table 2.1 I
briefly define the main variables and their sources, while Table 2.2 presents
the summary statistics for these variables.
Some first facts emerge. The different branches of the telecommunications
industry have very different regulatory patterns. The wireline, which is an
older industry with a long public monopoly history, had a higher degree of
state control (FIXREG) than the mobile industry (MOBREG), which is
instead a young, dynamic, and quickly developing industry.35 The more pre-
34The quotations are from Lijphart (1999) p. 249.
35The two indexes take value 0 for high regulatory intensity and value 1 for low regulatory
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cise measure of entry liberalization in the digital mobile telecommunications
industry (DIGITLIB) indicates that, in the sample period, cellular markets
were on the average duopoly markets. On average, the incumbent firm had
63% market shares (SH MD1). The state’s ownership share in the incum-
bent telecommunications operator in the mobile industry (SH INCMO) was
on average 57%. In the sample period and across countries the average mobile
industry revenues per-year (REV MOB) were equal to 10 thousand billion
U.S. dollars.
In the sample, 25% of the countries had majoritarian elections (MAJ), but
only 9% had a presidential regime (PRES). The other two institutional vari-
ables indicate that the average country was more consensual in the executive-
party (EXEC PAR) than in the federal-unitary (FED UNIT) dimension.
The governments represented in the final data set were mostly coalition
governments (GOV COAL in 57% of the observations) with 1.97 member
parties on the average (COALSIZ) and an average center-right wing (RILE)
orientation.36 The average government had 55% of the seats in the legislature
(PSEAT G), and were opposed by more than 4 parties (OPP PAR). The
two variables related to the parties’ programmatic position concerning specific
policy questions - pro regulation (PRO REG) and favorable to welfare state
limitation (WELF LIM) - represent, in percent value, how often a sentence
relative to a particular policy area was mentioned in the party’s program.37
So, for instance, pro-regulation statements constitute, on average, 1.77% of
the government’s program, whereas pro-welfare state limitation statements
represent only 0.44% of the government’s program.
The head of the regulatory authority had in 66% of the cases a definite office
term of office (TERM DEF), was in 29% of the cases appointed by the prime
intensity.
36See Budge et al. (2001) for a precise description of how this variable was constructed.
The variable takes values in the range -50 (extreme left) and + 50 (extreme right). See
Figure 2.5 for a graphical representation. For coalition governments, all the considered
measures are a weighted average of the same measure for all parties in the government’s
coalition. The adopted weight is the percentage seats in parliament held by each party.
37See Budge et al. (2001) for a more precise definition and motivation. The raw data
include 56 categories grouped in 7 broader policy areas.
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Figure 2.5: Government’s Position on the Right-Left Dimension
minister (APP GOV), in 17% of the cases by the president (APP PRES)
and in the rest of the cases by the sectorial minister. Finally, the regulatory
authority was in 67% of the cases financed, at least partially, through industry
fees (FIN IND), had a report duty (REP YES) in 75% of the cases (25% to
the legislature and 50% to the minister), and in 70% of the case their decisions
could not be overturned by any other political institution (OVER NO).
2.5 The Empirical Methodology
The general form of the equation that I estimate is the following:
policyit = α + βt + γ1Cit + γ2Xit + εit (2.1)
where α is a constant term, βt is a time trend, Cit is a vector of demographic
controls, and Xit is a vector of exogenous political variables. I will use different
sets of exogenous variables in order to observe how much of the cross-section
and time-series variation in the observed policy can be accounted for by each
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of these sets.
Cross-sectional regressions
As a first step, I analyze the cross-sectional variability in regulatory inten-
sity. For this first set of regressions I can thus use the index for the mobile
telephony developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000), which is a richer and
more informative measure of the regulatory environment. I perform a cross-
sectional regression, where I collapse all variables towards their mean value (a
bar over the variables means that I took their time average):38
policyi = α + γ1Ci + γ2Xi + εi (2.2)
I perform two robustness tests: the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedas-
ticity and the Ramsey RESET test for omitted variables.39 Although I have
very few observation (24 countries in the sample), I will observe whether some
first qualitative results emerge, which can later be compared to the findings
obtained with more correct panel methods. The advantage of this approach
is that it allows me to concentrate on the analysis of cross-sectional variation
only.
Panel Regressions
As I already acknowledged, the database allows me to use panel methods
to account for unobserved heterogeneity. This approach should lead to more
accurate estimates for the effects of political-economic variables on policy out-
come. Unfortunately, the indicators developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000)
are averaged over the sample period and, therefore, do not present time varia-
tion and cannot be used in panel regressions. I therefore use a second variable
related to the degree of liberalization and of entry liberalization in the digital
mobile telecommunications industry (DIGITLIB) as a dependent variable.
This takes value 1 if the market is a monopoly, 2 if it is a duopoly, and 3 if the
market is more competitive (3 or more firms).40 This ordered variable can be
38This is the so called between estimator, it is not particularly efficient, since it discards
all the over-time information of the data.
39For a description see STATA manual vol. 3 p. 97.
40Unfortunately, the information about the number of firms is not available in the
database. The right censoring problem could therefore not be overcomed.
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seen as the observable counterpart of a continuous latent variable, which can
be thought of as the “intensity of entry liberalization,” or as the utility derived
by the policy maker by implementing one of the mentioned market structures.
One could estimate such a model as a linear regression model, denying the
ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and in this way implicitly assum-
ing that the intervals between adjacent categories are of equal length. This
would imply a potential bias in the coefficients’ estimates that could be very
strong. The appropriate method to estimate a model with an ordinal depen-
dent variable is the so called ordered probit model.41 Furthermore, because
of the panel nature of the sample, I estimate the ordered probit model with
country random effects, where it is assumed that the error term is constituted
by two components, a country specific term ui, and a white noise error term
εit:







τ0 ≤ policy∗it < τ1
τ1 ≤ policy∗it < τ2
τ2 ≤ policy∗it < τ3
. (2.3)
Where policy∗it is the latent variable, policyit is the observed categorical
variable, and the τ ′s are the so called thresholds, which determine the length
of each category and which will also be estimated.42
For the panel specifications, I adopt as a measure of fit the Mc Fadden’s





41The ordered probit model assumes that the error term is normally distributed. See Long
(1997) for a very clear presentation of ordinal regression models. See also Maddala (1987)
for further discussion.
42I used LIMDEP to estimate the ordered probit model with random effects. The identi-
fication assumption in this case is that τ1 = 0 and the model is estimated with a constant.
See Limdep Users’ Manual (1998).
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where ln L̂ (Mβ) is the log-likelihood function for the model with regres-
sors, while ln L̂ (Mα) is the log-likelihood function for the model with just the
intercept.
2.6 Results
In this section, I summarize the results. The main aim of this study is to find
robust stylized facts about the political economy of the regulatory process. I
intentionally adopt a reduced form approach, although I recognize that it has
potential pitfalls, especially concerning the interpretation of the coefficients’
estimates. Nevertheless, I am confident that this analysis can contribute to
the debate on the politics of regulation, because the empirical evidence is still
very scarce.
2.6.1 Cross-sectional Regressions
Table 2.2 is the starting point. It reports the results of the cross-sectional
regressions, where the dependent variable is the regulation intensity index in
the mobile telecommunications industry (MOBREG) developed by Boylaud
and Nicoletti (2000). Following the presentation in the previous section, I
regress different sets of dependent variables separately, in order to understand
how much each of those sets contributes to an explanation of the cross-sectional
variability in the regulatory policy. Since the number of observations is quite
small, I choose to adopt parsimonious specifications.
The first set of political variables that I consider relates to the country’s po-
litical institutions. In this case, I only use the institutional dummies taken from
Persson and Tabellini (1999). These political institutions’ measures are highly
significant and have the expected sign. In particular, the degree of deregu-
lation is higher in countries with a majoritarian election rule (MAJ), while
the presidential regime type implies a tougher regulatory policy (PRES).43
43We also run the same regression using the metric measures of institutions. Both mea-
sures are significant and, as expected, more majoritarian countries in both the executive-
parties (EXEC PAR) and federal-unitary (FED UNIT) dimensions were better able to
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Among the control variables, only population is significant. This specification
had a very high explanatory power (Adj. R2 = 0.5248), meaning that more
than 50% of the variation in regulatory intensity among countries can be ex-
plained by these simple measures of their political constitution. Both the null
hypotheses of homoskedasticity and no omitted variables were not rejected,
which gives me confidence about the estimates’ reliability.
The second set of political variables that I use is also related to institu-
tional details, and particularly to the government type and viability. I contrast
one-party (GOV1P) to coalition governments (GOVCOAL), and I further
control for the cohesiveness of the coalition governments, as expressed by the
number of parties in the coalition (COALSIZ), for the government’s sup-
port in the legislature (PSEAT GO), and for opposition’s fractionalization
(OPP PART).44 In this case, the political variables are almost not signifi-
cant. The only significant term is the percentage seats in the legislature held
by the government parties, which is negative. The Adjusted R-squared is much
lower than in the previous specification and the F-test fails, meaning that this
specification was bad.
I then test the role of the government’s ideological position, using three
different measures. First, I use the synthetic indicator for the government’s
right-left position (RILE). This variable, which was created by Laver and
Budge (1992) and tested several times by political scientists, is a synthetic
measure for the overall political position of the considered party.45 All other
things being equal, the government’s position in the right-left dimension does
not play a significant role in explaining regulatory intensity.46 To better un-
implement the liberalization process in the mobile telecommunications industry. We then
run the model with the four variables together, the results remain practically unchanged
and the fit of the regression increases significantly (Adj. R2 = 0.6578). In this latter case,
however, the heteroskedasticity test fails. These results can be obtained from the author
upon request.
44For identification, we suppress the GOV1P dummy since we estimate the model with
a constant.
45For coalition governments, the considered measure is a weighted average of the same
measure for all parties in the government’s coalition. The adopted weight is the percentage
seats in parliament held by each party.
46Note that this stays true also if we regress the regualtory intensity on the controls and
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derstand how strong the ideological position concerning some specific issues is
transformed in effective policy - once the parties came to power - I use two fur-
ther variables, which are related to the government’s attitude towards regula-
tion (PRO REG) and towards the welfare state’s limitation (WELF LIM).
Both variables have the expected sign, but only the pro-welfare limitations
position is significant at the 10% level: Governments formed by parties which
were programmatically in favor of welfare state’s limitations liberalized more.
Sign and significance of the demographic controls are similar to the previous
specifications. Also this last specification has a quite high explanatory power
(Adj. R2 = 0.5058), even though the regression seems to be badly specified
since the F test fails. Both the heteroskedasticity and the Ramsey tests accept
the null hypotheses.
I then regress the dependent variable on a set of variables, which should
capture the private interests theory’s arguments. While, on the one hand, I
proxy the incumbent firms’ interest by using their market share (SH MD1),
on the other hand I proxy potential entrants’ interests by using the log of
industry revenues (log(REV MOB)). Finally, I use the population between
15 and 64 years (ACTPOP) to proxy for the consumers’ interests. Only
the proxy for the incumbent’s interests results significant at the 1% level: a
strong incumbent achieved a less liberalized environment. The variable that
proxies for consumers’ interests - i.e., the “active” population - has the ex-
pected positive sign, but it is not significant. The variable that proxies for
the potential entrants’ interests is not significant as well, but it presented the
negative sign.47 The fact that both these variables are not significant is not
unexpected. For consumers, as well as for potential entrants, it is much more
difficult than for an incumbent firm to organize their interests because of the
well known free riding problem in lobby formation. Furthermore, potential
RILE alone. However, it should also be mentioned that the use of such a measure in the
cross sectional regression may be problematic, since we averaged the position of different
governments along the time dimension.
47Since high revenues are also in the interest of incumbent firms, one can think that
the coefficient’s estimate is not significant because the opposite actions of incumbents and
entrants counterbalanced.
2.6. Results 50
entrants might have found it more difficult to lobby effectively, since they were
endowed with less resources than the incumbent firm. This specification per-
forms extremely well, explaining more than 70% of the variability in regulatory
intensity (Adj. R2 = 0.7306). The proposed specification tests accept both the
null hypotheses.
Finally, I analyze the role of regulatory institutions. I already mentioned
that the measures for the regulator’s independence and accountability are quite
simple, nevertheless, it is worth trying to see whether these agency’s charac-
teristics influence regulatory patterns. I proxy regulator’s independence by a
dummy equal to one if the regulator’s decision could not be overturned by any
other political institutions (OVER NO), and regulator’s accountability by a
dummy equal to one if the agency must report either to the parliament or to
the sectorial minister (REP YES). Surprisingly, I find a negative and statis-
tically significant (5% significance level) relationship between the measure of
regulator’s independence and the intensity of regulation: a more independent
regulator adopted a more restrictive regulatory policy. In contrast, regulator’s
accountability has a positive, though not significant, impact on regulatory in-
tensity. This specification performs much worse than the previous ones (Adj.
R2 = 0.3221) but, as I pointed out, this can be due to the used measures of
regulatory institutions rather than to theoretical reasons. In this case, in fact,
both the omitted variable and the heteroskedasticity tests fail.
2.6.2 Panel Regressions
Next, I perform panel regressions, which should enable me to make more pre-
cise and accurate predictions, since they allow me to control for unobserved
heterogeneity across observations. In this case, however, I cannot use the
synthetic index developed by Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001) as the dependent
variable, because it does not entail the temporal dimension. As I already men-
tioned, I use in this case DIGITLIB as the dependent variable, which is an
ordered variable that describes the degree of market liberalization. A precise
comparison with the previous results is not possible since the dependent vari-
able is different. However, I can still compare whether the significance and
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the direction of the coefficients’ estimates are consistent with the previous es-
timations.48 Moreover, I must keep in mind that in this case I also capture
the additional variation in the dependent variable along the time dimension.
For this reason, I also introduce a time index (TIME IND) to account for
temporal changes in the market.49 Since the ordered regression model is non
linear in the outcome probabilities, the interpretation of coefficients’ size is not
straightforward. Hence, I concentrate the analysis on the sign and significance
of coefficients.50
Table 2.3 reports the results for the specifications in which I use politi-
cal institutions as the explanatory variables. Among the control variables,
only the time trend appear to have a significant and positive effect, which
means that there was a general tendency towards liberalization during the
1990’s.51 Population has a positive but less significant impact on cellular mar-
kets’ liberalization, while the income pro capita has no significant impact on
the liberalization process. The positive sign of the population coefficient was
expected, since in larger countries the potential users of mobile services are
more, therefore a more competitive market structure is sustainable.
Turning to the variables related to political institutions, some of them are
highly significant. This fact broadly confirms the previously obtained results,
48The two variables - MOBREG and DIGITLIB - are, in fact, strongly positive corre-
lated (the correaltion coefficient is 0.7024).
49We do not estimate the model with time fixed effects because the dependent variable
presents little variation in the time dimension. The use of years dummies leads, in fact, to
problems in the convergence of the estimates.
50In order to make clear predictions on the coefficients’ size, one should considered the
fully standardized coefficients. In this case the effect of the independent variables on the
latent dependent variable can be indicate in its original unit of measure. Predictions will
then be in terms of standard deviation increases, which are anyway difficult to give a
economic sense.
51This was expected. Starting from the 1980’s, an “era of deregulation” has started
in most of the industrialized countries, following the idea that state intervention cannot
enhance market efficiency. Since then public utilities, and telecommunications in particular,
have been widely deregulated and liberalized. Moreover, as we mentioned, the time trend
should also capture the positive effect of technological change, which might have made the
implementation of a more competitive market structure possible.
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yet some differences emerge. The two institutional dummies have the expected
sign: countries with majoritarian elections liberalized more, whereas countries
with presidential regimes liberalized less. However, the presidential dummy
is never significant. In the second specification, when I use the two institu-
tional indexes alone, both of them are highly significant and have the expected
negative sign: the need for consensus in both institutional dimensions made
policy change more difficult. The fit of the regression, though, decreases if
compared to the first specification. Finally, I propose a third specification
where all the institutional measures are simultaneously used and only two of
them stay significant. The majoritarian dummy and the index of consensus in
the federal-unitary dimension are still highly significant and have the expected
signs. Both effects are stronger if compared to the previous specifications. The
presidential dummy and the executive-party dimension’s index have instead
the expected signs, but are not significant. In all specifications, the standard
deviation of the random effects (SIGMA) is highly significant, which indicates
that this econometric approach is appropriate, since unobserved heterogeneity
among countries matters. Concerning the measure of fit, the first specifica-
tion is the best and explain almost 43% of the observed cross-sectional and
temporal variation in the observed policy. Yet, a direct comparison with the
cross-sectional regressions is difficult because the dependent variables differ.
Nevertheless, I can point out that political institutions explain much of the of
the cross-sectional variation in the liberalization process, but they seem to be
less able to explain its temporal variability.52
Table 2.4 displays the results of the specifications where I use the gov-
ernment’s type and its viability as the independent variables. Differently to
the cross-sectional regressions, I find evidence here that coalition governments
have a strong and significant negative impact on the degree of entry liberaliza-
tion. However, when I control for the government’s support in the parliament
and for the number of opposition parties, also the size of the coalition has a
52Also, we performed a likelihood ratio test between specifications in order to test whether
the model of specification 1 and specification 2 are nested in the model of specification 3. We
reject the null hypothesis that the constraints imposed to the second specification are true
at the 1% significance level, while we accepted the null in the case of the first specification.
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positive impact on the industry’s liberalization. If, on the one hand, this result
seems to support the idea that veto players may impede policy reform because
coalition governments liberalized less, on the other, it is less clear why larger
coalitions should have been able to liberalize more.53 The differences observed
between cross-sectional and panel regressions might suggest that the govern-
ment’s type is more important for explaining the variability along the time
dimension, i.e. the speed of the liberalization process, than the cross-sectional
differences in the degree of entry regulation. Again, the random effects’ stan-
dard deviation is highly significant, supporting my empirical approach. Both
specifications show that the government’s type could account for about 40%
of the variability in the deregulation of entry.
Table 2.5 reports the results for the regressions of the degree of liberal-
ization on ideological variables. First, I use the simple right-left position as
a regressor. It is positive and significant at the 1% level, which means that,
during the sample period, right-wing governments tended to liberalize more,
as expected. I then use the two variables related to the more specific posi-
tions pro-regulation and pro-welfare state limitation, which are also significant
at the 1% significant level. As expected, if the government announced to be
pro-regulation it liberalized less, whereas if it announced to be pro-welfare-
state-limitations it liberalized more. When I use the three measures simulta-
neously, however, only the programmatic position pro-regulation is significant
and presents the expected negative sign. Looking at the pseudo R-squared,
the second specification is the one which better performs, explaining almost
46% of the variability.54
I then turn to the private interests theory of regulation. Table 2.6 displays
the results for three different specifications. Because of the lack of information
on market shares and industry’s revenues, I must discard some observations.
53Actually, Keefer (2001) proves that the favor to special interests can decrease with
the number of veto players, if governments are formed by veto players from the group of
veto players, who are most harmed by favors to special interests. This could be a possible
explanation for our finding.
54Again we perform the likelihood test in which we pair-wise compare the richest speci-
fication to the other two specifications. The first specification is nested in the third, while
this is not the case for the second specification.
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The first is a parsimonious specification, in which I insert one variable for
each of the interests in place: the incumbent, the potential entrants, and
the consumers. The results reflect the expectations, at least partially. First,
the degree of entry liberalization is significantly lower when the incumbent’s
market share is larger. The interpretation is that the incentive to lobby and
the lobbying effectiveness should increase with the incumbent’s strength in the
market, since its benefits from a concentrated industry structure are higher
when its market share is bigger. The coefficient’s estimate of the proxy for
potential entrants’ interests (industry revenues) is negative, but it is significant
only in the first specification, while the coefficient’s estimate of the proxy for
consumers interests (active population) have the expected positive sign, but is
not significant in any specification. Also this result was somehow expected. As
I already acknowledged, both the potential entrants and the consumers face the
typical free-rider problem in the creation of a lobby group, which can prevent
them to effectively lobby the regulator. The measure of fit of this specification
is comparable to the pseudo R-squared of the previous regressions. About 40%
of policy variability is explained by the used regressors.
In the second specification, I insert a dummy equal to one if the regulatory
agency is, at least partially, financed through industry fees. The coefficient’s
estimate for the incumbent’s market share stay negative and significant. Also
the new variable’s coefficient is negative and highly significant. The inter-
pretation is that a regulator that is financed by the industry may be more
easily captured. Finally, I also controlled for the state’s ownership share in
the incumbent firm.55 Also in this specification the estimated coefficient for
the measure of the incumbent’s private interests is negative and highly sig-
nificant. Although these results seem to strongly support the private interest
theory, one should take them cautiously. This is because to consider market
structure’s variables as exogenous may generate biased estimates, since the
regulatory policy influences market structure. Therefore a two way causality
55It is worthwhile to mention that this variable can be endogenous. In fact, the telecommu-
nications incumbent operator was privatized in the same period during which the industry
was liberalized. Both processes have to be considered as part of the regulatory reform
undertaken in the industry (OECD, 2000).
2.6. Results 55
between determinants and effects of regulation may exists, which should be
accounted for.56
Finally, I analyze the role of regulatory institutions. In this case I also es-
timate three different specifications. In Table 2.7, I report my findings. From
the first specification it emerges that the adopted measures of the regulator’s
accountability has a positive, large, and very significant (1% level) impact on
entry liberalization, while the measure for the regulator’s independence is not
significant.57 When I turn to the second specification, in which I insert two
dummies to control for the regulator’s appointment method (equal to one if the
regulator was appointed by the government or by the president respectively)
I observe that these are positive and statistically very significant. While the
result is difficult to interpret, it suggests that more precise measures of the
regulator’s independence should be developed. The regulator’s appointment
method, in fact, plays a crucial role in determining its independence degree.
Finally, I control for a measure of the regulator’s term of office. I use a dummy
equal to one if the term of office is definite, which should also be a measure
of regulator’s independence. With a guaranteed term of office, in fact, the
regulator can exercise its mandate without being subject to the possibility of
being replaced by politicians responding to different interests. Interestingly,
controlling for this variable increases the significance of all other measures.
Moreover, both the new measure and the previously used independence’s mea-
sure (OVER NO) are highly significant and negative: a more independent
regulator liberalized less. In all specifications, the pseudo R-squared is slightly
higher than in the previous models, which suggests that the role of regulatory
institutions is crucial to understand the regulatory process. Again I must ac-
knowledge, however, that also in this case there might exist an endogeneity
problem, since regulatory institutions were reformed in the same period during
which the telecommunications industry was liberalized.
How can I compare the obtained results? The first comparison can be done
56See Chapter 3 of this thesis and Duso and Röller (2001).
57We divide the REP YES dummy in two further dummies: REP LEG=1 if the report
duty is towards the legislative, and REP MIN=1 if the report duty is towards the sectorial
minister.
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looking at the goodness of fit of the proposed models. I partially did this in the
previous discussion. Differently than in the cross-sectional estimations, I do
not observe marked differences in the pseudo R-squared among specifications.
The best specifications, according to this measure of fit, are those related to
political and regulatory institutions, which explain between 40% and 45% of
the variability in the entry policy.
In order to perform a sort of specification test, I also estimate some mixed
specifications, in which I insert the different sets of variables simultaneously,
but using only those variables that have been found significant in the previ-
ous estimations. Table 2.8 displays my findings. In the first specification I
use only political variables: the institutional measures, the government’s type,
and its ideological position are considered. The previously observed stylized
facts stay true also in this richer specification at high significance levels. I then
simultaneously use the variables related to the political and regulatory insti-
tutions. Qualitatively and quantitatively the results remain in this case also
unchanged and parallel the findings previously observed. Also using political
institutions and private interests variables together (specification 3), or regu-
latory institutions and private interest variables (specification 4) together, or
all variables together (specification 5) does not affect the flavor of my results,
even though some differences in the significance levels of the used variables can
be observed.58 Also in this case, I can stress that all sets of variables could
help in disentangling policy variation.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I empirically analyzed the political economy of regulatory re-
form in the mobile telecommunications industry in 24 OECD countries during
the 1990’s. After giving an overview of the literature on the political economy
of economic policy, I identified some theoretical predictions that I would expect
to be observed in the data. This exercise had the aim of producing some ro-
58In particular, using political institutions and private interest variables simultaneously
reduce the significance of our coefficients’ estimates.
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bust stylized facts, which could help in developing new theoretical tools for the
analysis of the political economy of regulation. A unique data set, obtained by
merging different data sources, was developed, which allows for a time-series
and cross-sectional analysis of the politics of the regulatory reform.
Different strands of literature were surveyed, in order to obtain the most
general view about the economic and political factors that shape economic
policy. First, I asked what is the role of the state’s politicalconstitution - as
expressed by the electoral rule, the regime type, and by two other synthetic
measures of political institutions - in shaping the regulatory policy. Second, I
asked what is the role of the governments’ types, concentrating on the political
viability that the different governments’ types may have. Third, I analyzed
the role of ideology and partisanship: a synthetic measure of the government’s
overall right-left position, and two other measures relative to specific pro-
grammatic positions were considered. Fourth, the effects of industry’s private
interests were analyzed in the spirit of the Chicago School’s approach to reg-
ulation. And finally, I considered some regulatory authorities’ characteristics,
in order to analyze whether the regulatory institutions in place also shape the
liberalization process.
Concerning the empirical specifications, I adopted different econometric
techniques. As a starting point I performed some cross-sectional regressions
and then moved to a more accurate analysis of the liberalization process using
panel techniques. Some of the observed results found a motivation in the exist-
ing theory, but I stressed the strong need for more specific and microfounded
theoretical models, able to cover the different approaches taken in this study.
Some robust findings emerged out of this study. The first robust result was
that political institutions also matter for the regulatory policy. In particular,
countries with majoritarian elections liberalized the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry substantially more than countries with proportional elections.
The regime type seems instead to have had a less pronounced impact, yet I
observed a week negative relationship between liberalization and presidential
regimes. Finally, the more accurate metric indexes of institutions showed that
countries that were more majoritarian on the federal-unitary dimension and,
to a smaller extent, on the executive-party dimension have been better able
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to produce policy changes in the form of entry liberalization in the mobile
telecommunications market.
The government’s type was also observed to be a relatively important fac-
tor that explained the liberalization variability among countries. In particular,
these findings suggested that coalition governments slowed down the liberal-
ization process, but, surprisingly, that this effect was declining the larger the
coalition. The government’s ideological position played only a minor role. This
can be partially explained by the fact that, during the sample period, there
was a generalized tendency in the entire political spectrum to consider entry
deregulation as a “good” policy. My suggestion is that ideology might have
been important for explaining how fast the process was developed. The over-
all right-left position was not particularly significant, however I found some
weak evidence that right wing governments were, as expected, more favorable
to deregulation and liberalization. More interestingly, the goverments’ posi-
tion in favor of the state intervention in the economy was at least partially
fulfilled in the realized policy: governments that claimed to be pro-regulation
liberalized less.
I found strong evidence that the incumbent’s private interests were reflected
in the liberalization patterns. Strong incumbents were able to limit the extent
of entry liberalization, protecting the rent stemming from a highly concen-
trated and highly profitable industry. I acknowledged however, that it would
be necessary to directly assess the simultaneity between firms’ market behavior
and policy decision, when testing the private interest theory of regulation, in
order to avoid possible endogeneity problems.
Finally, regulatory institutions played a crucial role. Regulator’s account-
ability, in particular, was a factor that helped the liberalization of entry in the
mobile telecommunications industry. The results about the role of regulator’s
independence were not clear cut, even though it appeared that the regulator’s
independence also shaped the policy decision, yet more in the direction of a
less liberalized environment. However, I stressed that some more accurate
measures of the regulatory institutions would be necessary to carefully ana-
lyze these important issues. In this study, I gave a first glance at the data and
found some results, which cannot be fully explained by the existing theory on
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the political economy of regulation. I acknowledged the need for some micro-
founded models, which can more clearly predict why and how political and
regulatory institutions - as well as the influence of pressure groups - matter
for regulatory policy. Furthermore, it would also be interesting to have some
model on how the forces which shape the regulatory process interact among
each other, even though about this point I still do not have any empirical evi-
dence. While the development of such models is a challenging theoretical issue
per se, I also think that it could be very helpful for empirical analysis, since it
would help in the development of clear cut empirical tests.
This work reached the, perhaps obvious, conclusion that politics also mat-
ter for this kind of industrial policy. One promising extension of our approach
is the development of a political model of industrial policy, where policy de-
termination and policy incidence are simultaneously considered (see Duso and
Röller, 2001). This seems to me to be a challenging research field both for




Countries Aus, Aut, Bel, Can, Den, Fin, Fra, Ger, Gre, Ice, Ire, Ita, Jap,
Lux, Net, NZ, Nor, Por, Spa, Swe, Swi, Tur, UK, USA
POP Total Population in 100.000 OECD statistical
ACTPOP Active Population aged between 15 and 64 years in 100.000 compendium
YPC Annual Income Per Capita in 1995 constant thousand US$
MAJOR Dummy =1 if the country has a majoritarian election system Persson and Tabellini (1999)
PRES Dummy =1 if the country has a presidential regime
EXEC PAR Index: consensus in the executive-party dimension Lijphart (1999)
FED UNIT Index: consensus in the federal-unitary dimension
GOV1P Dummy =1 if one-party government Woldendorp (1998)
GOVCOAL Dummy =1 if coalition government
COALSIZ Number of parties in the coalition governments
OPP PAR Number of parties in the opposition
PSEAT GO Percentage seats in the legislature held by government parties
RILE Index: government position on the right-left dimension Budge et al. (2001)
(higher values for right wing parties)
PRO REG Government’s programmatic position: Pro market regulations
(weighted average of government’s parties position)
WELF LIM Government’s programmatic position: Pro welfare state limitation
(weighted average of government’s parties position)
FIXREG Index: Intensity of regulation in the wireline telecommunications industry Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001)
MOBREG Index: Intensity of regulation in the mobile telecommunications industry
DIGITLIB Degree of liberalization in the digital mobile industry OECD Regulation Database
(1=monopoly, 2=duopoly, 3=competition)
SH MD1 Market shares of the incumbent operator (1997)
SH INCMO Share of incumbent operator detained by the state (1997)
REV MOB Annual revenues in the mobile telecommunications industry (1995 US $)
TERM DEF Dummy = 1 if regulator’s term of office is definite
APP GOV Dummy = 1 if regulator is appointed by the prime minister
APP PRES Dummy = 1 if regulator is appointed by the president
FIN IND Dummy = 1 if the regulation authority is financed by industry fees
REP YES Dummy = 1 if the regulatory authority has to report either to the
legislature (REP LEG) or to the minister (REP MIN)
OVER NO Dummy = 1 if the regulator’s decisions cannot be overturned by other institutions
Table 2.1: Variables’ Description
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Cases
POP 483.7358 712.0181 3.8980 2667.9200 168
ACTPOP 321.9546 469.4767 2.6810 1753.5700 168
YPC 19.5914 10.8051 0.1338 43.8045 168
MAJOR 0.2500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 168
PRES 0.0830 0.2772 0.0000 1.0000 168
EXEC PAR 0.2062 1.0123 -1.4700 1.8700 168
FED UNIT 0.1075 1.1564 -1.7700 2.5300 168
GOVCOAL 0.5714 0.4964 0.0000 1.0000 168
GOV1P 0.4226 0.4955 0.0000 1.0000 168
COALSIZ 1.9702 1.1706 1.0000 5.0000 168
OPP PAR 4.1607 2.0248 1.0000 10.0000 168
PSEAT GO 54.8373 12.3712 13.9881 85.6152 168
RILE 1.0036 18.5006 -37.2595 48.7013 168
PRO REG 1.7701 1.5668 0.0000 6.2500 168
WELF LIM 0.4470 0.8881 0.0000 4.200 168
FIXREG 0.4479 0.2331 0.1742 0.8814 168
MOBREG 0.6065 0.2154 0.1590 0.9529 168
DIGITLIB 2.0476 0.8175 1.0000 3.0000 168
SH MD1 62.9000 22.2988 0.0000 100.0000 161
SH INCMO 56.8308 32.4556 0.0000 100.0000 91
REV MOB 0.1E+13 0.7E+13 0.1E+08 0.9E+14 146
TERM DEF 0.6667 0.4728 0.0000 1.0000 168
APP GOV 0.2917 0.4559 0.0000 1.0000 168
APP PRES 0.1667 0.3738 0.0000 1.0000 168
FIN IND 0.6667 0.4728 0.0000 1.0000 168
REP YES 0.7500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 168
REP LEG 0.2500 0.4343 0.0000 1.0000 168
REP MIN 0.5000 0.5015 0.0000 1.0000 168
OVER NO 0.7083 0.4559 0.0000 1.0000 168
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.
Constant -3.2341 0.9394 *** -0.8064 0.7230 -1.7926 1.1150 *
YPC -0.0006 0.0341 -0.0021 0.0392 0.0012 0.0247
POP 0.0008 0.0007 0.0019 0.0011 * -0.0005 0.0024
TIME IND 1.0339 0.2237 *** 0.9886 0.1791 *** 1.0577 0.2731 ***
MAJOR 8.5218 1.8994 *** 12.1643 2.5255 ***
PRES -3.6621 4.7755 -0.4212 5.8852
EXEC PAR -1.6410 0.4109 *** -0.4970 0.9035
FED UNIT -0.9808 0.3836 *** -2.3829 0.9253 ***
Mu(01) 4.9791 0.9188 *** 4.6056 0.7763 *** 4.9582 1.0905 ***
Sigma 4.2509 0.8551 *** 4.7398 0.7971 *** 4.4729 1.3397 ***
N. obs. 168 168 168
Log likelihood -69.8868 -74.5568 -73.6207
Pseudo R2 0.4213 0.3826 0.3904
Chi-squared 146.6302 173.6584 111.5218
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively.
Table 2.4: Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Effects: Political
Institutions
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Specification 1 Specification 2
Coeff St.Err. Coeff St.Err.
Constant -0.6484 0.5205 -1.8984 1.2529
YPC -0.0007 0.0243 -0.0017 0.0266
POP 0.0011 0.0006 * 0.0020 0.0010 *
TIME IND 1.0499 0.2470 *** 1.1527 0.3839 ***
GOVCOAL -3.2626 1.2434 *** -6.6540 2.8610 **
COALSIZ 0.3642 0.2671 1.7623 0.9235 *
PSEAT GO 0.0112 0.0123
OPP PAR 0.0791 0.1319
Mu(01) 4.8461 0.9502 *** 5.5793 1.7723 **
Sigma 4.9484 1.1164 *** 4.9088 1.4133 ***
Obs. 168 168
Log likelihood -73.5973 -72.6033
Pseudo R2 0.3905 0.3988
Chi-squared 168.5929 157.5847
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%,
5%, and 10% significance level respectively.
Table 2.5: Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Effects: Govern-
ments’ Types
2.8. Tables 65
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
CONSTANT -0.1604 0.7566 -1.7350 1.0485 * -0.7505 1.1732
YPC -0.0007 0.0231 0.0014 0.0131 0.0005 0.0069
POP 0.0009 0.0007 0.0002 0.0008 0.0006 0.0011
TIME IND 1.0875 0.2337 *** 1.1229 0.3704 *** 1.3096 0.7203 *
RILE 0.0281 0.0121 ** 0.0181 0.0168
PRO REG -0.5237 0.1658 *** -0.7271 0.3032 ***
WELF LIM 1.2390 0.5131 ** 1.2391 0.7905
Mu(01) 5.3502 0.9540 *** 5.3282 1.4410 *** 6.3057 3.0396 **
Sigma 4.8138 0.9345 *** 6.7647 1.7510 *** 5.2732 2.5727 **
Obs. 168 168 168
Log likelihood -73.5089 -65.2567 -67.2168
Pseudo R2 0.3913 0.4596 0.4434
Chi-squared 177.4725 176.9574 172.8027
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10%
significance level respectively.
Table 2.6: Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Effects: Ideology
and Programmatic Positions
2.8. Tables 66
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
CONSTANT 14.4126 4.2054 *** 12.6041 4.1404 *** 12.0266 5.6756 **
YPC -0.0007 0.0209 -0.0008 0.0482 -0.0007 0.018
POP 0.0010 0.0026 0.0003 0.0029 0.0002 0.0065
TIME IND 1.1187 0.3461 *** 1.1557 0.5064 ** 1.1845 0.3837 ***
SH MD1 -0.1100 0.0283 *** -0.1441 0.0464 *** -0.1207 0.0384 ***
log(REV MOB) -0.4394 0.1890 -0.2021 0.1771 -0.3156 0.2910
ACTPOP 0.0005 0.0037 0.0006 0.0040 0.0014 0.0112
FIN IND -2.1413 1.1814 *** 0.9685 0.9539
SH INCMO 0.0011 0.0010
Mu(01) 4.7650 1.1702 *** 5.2609 1.6245 ** 5.4180 1.4459 ***
Sigma 4.2537 1.0094 *** 4.5580 1.8092 ** 4.9174 1.2013 ***
Obs. 139 139 139
Log likelihood -61.8721 -60.2144 -59.2535
Pseudo R2 0.3804 0.3970 0.4066
Chi-squared 120.6920 121.7747 122.2870
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively.
Table 2.7: Panel Regressions - Ordered Probit with Random Effects: Private
Interests
2.8. Tables 67
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeff. St. Err. Coeff. St. Err.
CONSTANT -6.9842 2.3154 *** -6.5866 3.8273 * -15.2353 4.3514 ***
YPC -0.0029 0.0619 -0.0013 0.0488 -0.0046 0.0854
POP 0.0026 0.0016 * 0.0016 0.0023 0.0042 0.0018 **
TIME IND 1.0531 0.2148 *** 1.0617 0.3480 *** 1.0847 0.3190 ***
REP LEG 6.9991 2.2797 *** 2.7693 1.7634 8.5697 3.4029 **
REP MIN 6.6765 2.0772 *** 6.8230 2.4643 *** 15.2268 4.1670 ***
OVER NO -0.2902 0.7754 -0.7240 1.6595 -4.3335 2.4022 **
APP GOV 3.5282 1.4275 ** 7.1314 3.0020 **
APP PRES 4.7662 1.4327 *** 5.8261 2.5710 **
TERM DEF -0.0094 0.0040 **
Mu(01) 5.0144 0.9222 *** 4.9942 1.3628 *** 5.0983 1.1394 ***
Sigma 4.8900 1.0709 *** 5.1562 1.3399 *** 5.5877 1.7546 ***
Obs. 168 168 168
Log likelihood -67.2545 -67.7132 -65.7883
Pseudo R2 0.4431 0.4393 0.4552
Chi-squared 135.4026 132.2688 118.0623
The dependent variable is DIGITLIB. ***, **,* represents 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level respectively.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Political Economy of Price
Regulation: The Role of the
Firm
Chapter 3
Lobbying and Regulation in a
Political Economy: Evidence
form the U.S. Cellular Industry
“There have been wide differences between commissions and in
their legislative mandates, and changes over time in the political
environment in which they operate [...], however these commissions
become increasingly solicitous and protective of the interests of
the companies they are supposed to regulate, resistant to change,
wedded to the status quo” Kahn (1988) pg. 11 vol. 2.
3.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, economic regulation has attracted great attention among
economists and policy makers, becoming one of the main issues on the polit-
ical agenda. From a positive perspective, much theoretical analysis on the
political economy side has been done since the seminal contribution by Stigler
(1971), and following the tradition initiated by the so called “Chicago School”
(Peltzman, 1976, Posner, 1974, Becker, 1983). This tradition assumes that
the political process and the competition among differently organized interest
groups drive regulatory decisions. In particular, as Stigler suggested, regulated
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industries (firms) might be willing to collaborate in their own regulation, in
order to create or to protect their private interests.
From the empirical point of view, though, there has been little attempt to
analyze these questions in such a broad framework. The large body of existing
empirical literature has focused on the effects of regulation on market outcome,
putting less weight on the process which determines the observed regulatory
regime. However, if firms can influence the regulatory regime under which
they operate, a two way causality between the effects and the determinants
of regulatory decisions has to be accounted for. Studies which neglected this
simultaneity can be seriously biased in their empirical findings.
In this chapter I develop a political economy model of regulation as a first
attempt to empirically study this set of questions. I shall present a reduced
form simultaneous model for firms pricing behavior and price regulatory choice,
which encompasses economic as well as political factors to explain the role
of economic regulation. The main point I will make is methodological: the
endogeneity of regulatory policy, motivated by political economy reasons, has
to be explicitly considered to empirically model the impact of regulation on
prices. Moreover, taking this consideration into account, I want to determine
the (unbiased) impact of price regulation on cellular tariffs using U.S. data
for the second half of the 1980’s. Finally, I am also interested in identifying
the main determinants of regulatory choice, considering variables such as the
firms’ lobbying activity, consumer protection, as well as other political factors.
Because of its particular structure, the U.S. cellular telephone industry
provides a unique environment to analyze the issues mentioned above. On the
one hand, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) divided the U.S.
into precisely defined geographical markets and regulated entry allowing only
two cellular operators in each area. On the other hand, the jurisdiction over
price regulation was left to the individual States, because of the service’s local
nature. Price regulatory decisions have been widely heterogenous across the
different States, providing an exceptional “natural experiment” for studying
the role of regulation on prices as well as on the determinants of regulatory
choice.
There are some other contributions that have empirically analyzed the im-
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pact of regulation on the price level in the U.S. cellular industry. They gen-
erally tested whether exogenous regulatory variables have a significant impact
on prices using a reduced form approach.1 The results they obtained are
contradictory. Ruiz (1995) found that the regulatory variables did not signifi-
cantly explain prices, and concluded that the analysis did not allow any policy
suggestions. Shew (1994) and Hausman (1995) observed that the regulatory
variables were significant and that the sign of the coefficient was positive. This
finding suggests that prices rise with regulation.2 The main explanation has
been that regulation led to higher prices because it facilitated collusion. The
regulatory body, in fact, could have acted as a cartel board which made firms’
pricing strategies common knowledge (Porter, 1983a and 1983b). This infor-
mation dispersion could have made it easier for firms to recognize if someone
had chiseled, making collusion easier to sustain. Another analysis of the ef-
fects of regulation in the U.S. cellular industry is Parker and Röller (1997).
They specified a structural model in order to estimate whether the duopolis-
tic industry structure led to a competitive outcome. The main findings are
that the U.S. cellular industry’s conduct was anticompetitive and that mul-
timarket contact, cross-ownership, and regulation played a role in explaining
this result. All the previous empirical studies may be subject to a significant
misspecification problem (Mathios and Rogers, 1989; Teske, 1991a and 1991b;
and Baron, 1995). If regulated firms have some control over the regulatory
regime under which they operate, then treating regulatory variables as exoge-
nous introduces a selection bias (Heckman, 1976 and 1979). It is therefore
necessary to endogenize regulatory choice, which is one of the contributions of
1Similar analyses, which took the same kind of approach, were performed for the wireline
telecommunications industry as well. See among others Mathios and Rogers (1989), Kaestner
and Kahn (1990), Tardiff and Taylor (1993), and also Kriedel, Sappington and Weisman
(1996) for a survey.
2In fact, Hausman (1995) pointed out that “A possible objection that higher prices may
lead to regulation, thus causing the regulation variable to be jointly endogenous, does not
make economic sense in the cellular context. [...] Nevertheless, I estimated the model using
instrumental variables”. The endogeneity of regulation is, in his view, not determined by




There exists some empirical literature dealing with the endogeneity of reg-
ulatory decisions. The typical approach is to explain the discrete choice among
different regulatory plans using political and economic variables.3 The regula-
tory policy in the U.S. wireline telecommunications industry has been empiri-
cally analyzed, first in a static and then in a dynamic setting by Donald and
Sappington (1995) and (1997) . They found evidence that both the political
as well as the regulatory history were important determinants for the chosen
regulatory regime. Teske (1991a) and (1991b) used a rent-seeking approach
to address more clearly the issue about firms specific “political strategies” to
achieve the desired regulatory environment in the U.S. wireline telecommu-
nications market. In particular he showed that U.S. West, one of the “Baby
Bells,” seemed to have adopted the strategy of avoiding regulators, and aggres-
sively influenced legislators in order to achieve the desired deregulation of the
(wired-line telecommunications) markets in which it operated. Yet, all these
studies, excluding partially the last one, neglected the importance of firms’
strategic behavior in influencing the regulatory game, but rather focused on
the role of the political and regulatory environments.
Empirically, my contribution bridges between these two different approaches,
accounting for the simultaneity between firms’ pricing behavior and regulatory
decisions. This is not merely a question of enhancing the analysis’ complexity,
but rather it is an important qualitative step into the empirical modelling of
the political economy of regulation. The econometric tool that is appropriate
to achieve this goal is an endogenous switching regression model (Maddala
and Nelson (1975); Lee (1978) and (1979)), which is a simultaneous equa-
tions model with a binary qualitative variable (regulatory status) and limited
dependent variables (regulated and non-regulated tariffs).
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I give a description of the
3For another modeling approach see the paper by Kroszner and Strahn (1999) on the
economics and politics of banking deregulation. They contrast private interest theory vs.
public interest theory of regulation and empirically test them on the relaxation of bank
branching restrictions in the U.S. since the 1970’s. For an analysis of the political economy
of price deregulation in the wireline telecommunications industry see Kaserman et al. (1993).
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market analyzing some preliminary statistics. In Section 3, I derive a theo-
retical framework that will be our starting point for the empirical analysis.
Section 4 deals with the empirical specification and the econometric analysis.
I present the main results in Section 5 and close the chapter in Section 6 with
some concluding remarks.
3.2 A Description of the Market and Data
The regulatory environment in the U.S. cellular market is quite unique. The
first regulatory decision, in the late 1970’s, was to split entry and price regula-
tions. Regulatory jurisdiction was assigned to different agencies: the Federal
Government (Federal Communication Commission) kept the right to regu-
late entry through its authority to assign radio spectrum to cellular services
providers. Despite the fact that the magnitude of economies of scale could have
been substantial, the commission’s final decision in 1981 was to allow entry of
two cellular service providers in each area.4 The first (“wireline”) license was
typically awarded to a regional Bell operating company (the RBOC), which
was operating in the same area, and the second (“non-wireline” license) was
assigned mainly to independent companies.5 Reselling of the licences was al-
lowed, the only prohibition being that the same operator may not own both
licences in one area. The process of awarding licences took several years and
some of the non-wireline licences were resold by firms who had won the lottery
but were not really interested in operating in the cellular market. The long
4The FCC divided the country into non-overlapping markets corresponding to the 306
Standard Metropolitan and 428 Rural Statistical Areas (SMSAs and SRSAs respectively).
In this paper we will only concentrate on the former, which are represented in Figure (3.1).
5This decision was controversial. FCC’s main concern was that of the natural monopoly
nature of the industry (this view was also sustained by AT&T), which would suggest to
allow only one firm operating in the market. A different approach was proposed by the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which advocated the awarding of
a higher number of licences (4 or 8). The concern was that, given the uncertainty about
the magnitude of economy of scale, there was the risk of allowing too little entry. The
main point of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ was that the market should determine the
optimal number of firms which can operate efficiently.
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discussion about how the licences should be awarded and the length of time
it took to allocate the licenses,6 led to delays in the introduction of cellular
services which implied high cost to the U.S. economy.7 At the beginning of
the 1990’s in almost all of the SMSAs two operators were able to offer their
services. Regarding the concern about market competitiveness where only two
firms operate, the FCC required cellular operators to offer service at wholesale
prices also to “resellers”. Furthermore, it imposed the prohibition of limiting
the number of resellers in a market. As Shew (1994) pointed out, the positive
effect of reseller competition, at least during this initial industry’s phase, was
limited in many markets.
Even if the entry policy of the FCC raised some doubts in relation to the
effective competitiveness, which could be reached in a duopoly market, and
even though there were some concerns about the fact that wireline companies
had some advantages given by their head-start position, more or less half of
the States decided against the use of price regulation. In only a few States
have cellular tariffs been strictly regulated, whereas in others only loosely reg-
ulated, and in most States they have not been regulated at all. Some States
even adopted some form of a regulatory ban, either at the legislative level or
at the Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) level. This can be accounted for,
for instance, by a general skepticism against price regulation. The lack of in-
formation about costs was one major problem as well, a fact which would have
made an assessment of proposed prices difficult. An alternative explanation,
which will be the core of our analysis, is that many States adopted some form
of regulatory ban, because of the lobbying activity of some firms, whose rent
seeking strategy has been directed to avoid a regulated environment. Shew
(1994) and Ruiz (1995) provide detailed information about the different reg-
ulatory regimes implemented in the individual States. I refer to these papers
6Gruber and Verboven (2001), using OECD data, stress the significant role that the
timing of the licences played in explaining diffusion of cellular services: States which first
granted licences seem to have a fairly long persistent lead.
7The cost was estimated to be about 86 billion dollars (Rohlfs et al., 1991). See also
Hausman (1997) for an estimate of the welfare cost of delaying the introduction of new
services in telecommunications.
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for a deeper analysis. In this work, I will not concentrate on the different
forms of regulation. In this first approach I want to test whether regulation,
in any form, had some clear effect on firms pricing behavior compared to a
non-regulation situation, and to investigate what determines the choice for a
regulatory ban.8
The data stem from different sources and cover the time spanning Decem-
ber 1984 to July 1988.9 The original data set contains information about
service prices, input factor prices, demand variables, and industry structure
variables. The sample contains information about 72 SMSAs. I then enlarged
the original data set to encompass information about the political and reg-
ulatory environment using data from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States, from the Book of the States, and information from the states’ regu-
latory commissions. The summary statistics for the relevant variables, which
are defined in Table 3.1, are presented in Table 3.2. The first column refers to
the full sample, whereas the second and the third refer to the subsamples of
non-regulated and regulated markets, respectively.10
One can observe that prices in regulated markets are, on average, slightly
higher than in non-regulated markets.11 In particular the price p1, referring to
8It is worth noting that different regulatory regimes may have different effects on pricing
behavior. In this paper we will not consider this issue, even though later we will briefly
discuss this point.
9I owe particular thanks to Lars-Hendrik Röller and Phil Parker for providing me with
the main data set. A description of the sources, as well as a deeper analysis of the data, can
be found in their paper (Parker and Röller, 1997). Most variables have yearly frequency,
although some of the prices were collected more than once per year when available.
10Non-regulated markets are those markets where a ban on price regulation was imposed
by legislative or regulatory commission’s action. The regulatory data were courteously
provided by W.B. Shew (see Shew, 1994, Table 4.2). In Table 3.3, I describe the regulatory
variable more in detail.
11The prices of a singular cellular operator are defined, as in Parker and Röller (1997), as
the monthly bill paid for a given level of usage. Normally, cellular operators use nonlinear
prices composed by a fixed fee, a usage fee for the “peak hours”, and a usage fee for the
“off-peak hours”. Moreover, every operator offers different plans related to the intensity of
usage (low, middle, or high usage). The prices reported represent the monthly bill calculated
for different monthy usage times (5, 500, and 3000 minutes) assuming that consumers chose
the least expensive plan.
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“low usage” (monthly usage of 5 minutes), is on the average about 7% higher
in regulated markets, whereas p2 (monthly usage of 500 minutes) is around
2% and p3 (monthly usage of 3000 minutes) 0.5% higher in regulated markets.
However, given the high standard deviation, all price differences are not statis-
tically significant. I do not have firm specific measures for cost, but I can relay
on market specific data. One can not observe large differences among regulated
and non-regulated markets, even though in the former most cost drivers take
slightly higher values. Only ENERGY and PRIME are on the average higher
in non-regulated markets. Significant differences can instead be observed with
regard to the variable POP. In regulated markets population is on the average
much higher (40%) than in non-regulated ones. Also CROSSOWN and MUL-
TIMKT take significantly different values in the two subsamples. In particular
both variables assume higher values in non-regulated markets; a fact which
could suggest that in those markets collusive behavior was more probable.12
ENTRY assumes slightly higher values in regulated markets, meaning that the
incumbent’s lead over the second operator was shorter (LEAD).
Turning to institutional variables, in the sample period the state’s governor
was principally from the Democratic Party (DEM84 and DEM88). However,
between 1984 and 1988, the Republicans gained back many states. Unex-
pectedly, the Democrats were more present in non-regulated (81%) than in
regulated markets (66%) at the beginning of the sample period, but they lost
more states in the regulated subsample (from 81% to 53%) than in the non-
regulated one (from 66% to 64%). Around 58% of the States were politically
stable during the sample period and did not experience a gubernatorial change.
Also, in this case the differences between regulated and non-regulated markets
are consistent: 72% of the States that adopted regulation did not experience a
change in political majority during the sample period, while only 43% in the
non-regulated markets subsample.
Furthermore, I considered variables that are directly related to regula-
12Parker and Röller (1997), in fact, have shown that multimarket contact and crossowner-
ship were among the most important determinants of the industry’s collusive conduct. Also,
see Busse (2000) who, using the data by Parker and Röller, found that multimarket contacts
increase prices by approximately 7-10%.
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tors’ characteristics. In general, one observes more appointed (APPOINT)
than elected (ELECTED) regulators in both the subsamples. However, the
percentage of elected regulators is lower in regulated markets than in non-
regulated ones.13 The number of full-time employees in the State PUC in
1984 (STAFF84) was much larger in States that adopted price regulation.14
Finally, in regulated markets the size of the commission has been significantly
reduced (∆STAFF) during the sample period, whereas it has increased in non-
regulated markets. Notice, however, that the variability was much higher in
the former than in the latter case.
Concluding, there are some institutional differences among regulated and
non-regulated markets, even though not strongly significant, but one needs an
econometric analysis to clearly answer why some markets were regulated and
what were regulation’s effects.
3.3 A Theoretical Framework
In this section, I will present a theoretical background on which I will base the
empirical analysis, and from which I will derive some hypotheses to test. It
will not be a structural but rather a reduced form model. Despite the fact that
this approach lacks a rigorous micro foundation, it has the advantage of being
more general and of not relying on specific functional form’s assumptions.15
One should consider this approach as a first attempt to empirically analyze
the issue, which should help in understanding the economics and politics of
13We would have expected to observe higher values for ELECT in the regulated markets
subsample, under the presumption that elected regulators should be more pro-consumer (see
Besley and Coate (2000)) and therefore should regulate more often. However, as stressed
by Gormley (1981), consumers’ movements seem to be more active in states with appointed
regulators.
14This can be a sign that the cost of regulation was higher in States that did not regulate.
In fact, in those States, the regulatory resources seem to have been more scarce and therefore
the opportunity cost to regulate a new industry might have been higher.
15Recently a micro-founded “common agency” framework based on Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1986) has been developed to study the political determinants of governmental policies.
A path-breaking theoretical application to trade policy is Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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regulation and which could be followed by a more rigorous micro founded
analysis.16
3.3.1 The Regulatory Choice
As a starting point, I assume that the regulatory agency uses a simple rule
to determine whether a market should be regulated or not on the basis of
the regulation’s effect on prices. If regulation is thought to decrease prices
“enough,” then it is adopted. One can think of this rule as representing the
optimality condition for a regulator maximizing an objective function, which
is a weighted sum of total welfare and of its private interests. At the optimum,
the regulator weights regulation’s marginal benefits to its marginal costs. I
then write a reduced form equation, which constitutes the decisional criterion
for the regulator:










+RSCtsα2 +PVtsα3 +RCtsα4 + εts. (3.1)
where [log (p1ts)− log (p0ts)] is the difference between non-regulated and reg-
ulated prices, RSCts is a vector of regulator’s specific characteristics, PVts is
a vector of political variables, and RCts is a measure for the cost of regula-
tion.17 One does not observe the variable R∗ts, which is latent, but rather a
binary variable that indicates whether a market is regulated (Rts = 1) or not
(Rts = 0). One can thus interpret equation (3.1) as a probit model: Market
s will be regulated in time t (and thus one observes Rts = 1) if and only if
R∗ts > 0 and will not be regulated otherwise.
16For a first attempt of a micro-founded model for the political economy of regulation in
a multiprincipal setting see Spiller (1990). A more recent model for access price regulation,
based on the Bernheim’s and Whinston’s approach, has been developed by Trillas (2000).







rts. On the right hand side one has the difference between non-regulated (p0ts) and regulated
(p1ts) prices and, on the left hand side, a maximal price difference accepted by the regulator.
This level rts can be made dependent on variables which should determine a regulator’s
willingness to regulate.
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The coefficient α1 plays a crucial role in the empirical analysis, since it
allows me to identify the role of firms’ lobbying activities vs. consumer protec-
tion. Assuming a benevolent regulator, which principally cares about consumer
surplus (that is the welfare standard adopted in the U.S. antitrust policy), one
would expect to observe a significant and positive value for the coefficient α1:
regulation is more probable when the benefits that it implies in terms of lower
prices are larger.18 On the other hand, one can also assume that the regu-
latory agency is not benevolent but rather self-interested, and that interest
groups, as well as individual firms, can directly influence its decision through
lobbying activity. High prices are in the firms’ interest. Therefore, if firms’
lobbying activities are successful, one should expect a negative coefficient α1:
the probability of regulation should be lower when regulation puts much down-
ward pressure on prices, since lobby intensity against a regulated environment
would be higher.19 The price difference’s coefficient should thus measure the
relative weight that the regulator assigns to firms’ lobbying and to consumers’
protection. In this model I do not explicitly specify what lobbying is; I assume
that it is any action taken by the interest group (e.g. the firm) to influence
regulator’s decision.20
The only measures for regulator specific characteristics that I could use
is whether the regulator was appointed by the state’s governor, or directly
elected. Besley and Coate (2000) give a theoretical rationale for the importance
of this issue and, in particular, they show that elected regulators should be
more “pro-consumer.”21 This would mean that, whenever regulation does
18As long as the consumer surplus is included in the welfare function maximized by the
regulator, the coefficient α1 cannot be negative.
19One can consider the price difference as a measure for the lobbying’s benefits: they are
greater the less effective is regulation and, thus, the smaller the price difference.
20In the theoretical as well empirical literature the role of campaign contributions has
been stressed as a possible mechanism, which allows pressure groups to achieve their desired
policy outcome (see for instance Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In the next chapter I will
also measure firms’ lobbying expenditures by means of their campaign contributions. Yet,
in this model I wanted to develop a procedure, which allows one to identify firms lobbying
activities even when these are not observable.
21See also Smart (1994) for an empirical analysis of the role of regulatory body’s appoint-
ment methods.
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not increase prices, one should observe a positive relationship between the
probability of regulation and the fact of being elected rather than appointed
by politicians.
I insert the political variables as regressors in order to account for different
effects. First, in many states the regulatory ban was imposed at the legisla-
tive level, therefore the governor’s political orientation should account for its
specific preferences in the regulatory policy. Second, the political orientation
of the party in power can be seen, according to Donald and Sappington (1995)
and (1997), as a measure of the political costs of choosing a regulated regime
for the mobile industry. Third, one may want to control for political variables
because the political environment shapes firms’ rent seeking strategy, as shown
by Teske (1991a) .
I also control for regulation’s costs as proxied by the number of full time
employees in the PUC. The main idea is that large PUCs should bare a smaller
opportunity cost for setting up a regulatory regime in a new industry than
smaller ones, for their resources are less scarce. The expectation is thus to
observe higher probability of regulation in states with larger PUCs. Finally, I
also use the change in the PUC’s composition as a regressor, since it should
be more difficult to capture a regulator when the PUC’s composition widely
varies, because of the lack of long standing relationships.
The main problem with the presented approach is that, for each observa-
tion, one observes either the regulated price or the non-regulated one, while
in equation (3.1) one needs to compare both prices for each observation. In
each regime I need a measure for the price which is not observed, i.e. the price
that firms would have chosen if the other regime had prevailed. The adopted
empirical approach shall help to overcome this problem.
3.3.2 Firms Pricing Behavior
Because prices are endogenously chosen by firms, I need to model firms’ pricing
behavior and determine a reduced form price equation. It is a well known result
in the theory of tacit collusion in supergame that the monopoly price can be
part of a tacitly collusive equilibrium outcome for certain conditions on the
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discount factor (Porter, 1983a). The cellular price in market s at time t (pts)
should then be a mark up (µts) over marginal costs (MCts): pts = MCts · µts.
Taking the logarithm of both sides one obtains a linear relation:
logpts = log MCts + log µts. (3.2)
Since one cannot directly observe marginal costs and mark-up, one needs to
model them through an equation. I assume that the marginal cost is a func-
tion of cost drivers (CD) and of firms specific dummies (firmi) which should
capture the possible heterogeneity in firms’ technology:
MCts = f (CDts, firmits) (3.3)
Similarly, I assume that the mark-up depends on the level of demand (Q) and
on vector of market structure variables (MSV ) such as multimarket contact,
cross-ownership, the competitive pressure as generated by the second firm
entering the market, and the status of the wireline/non-wireline pair (Pair jts),
which should capture the argument that some firms’ pairs achieve collusive
agreements easier than others. The mark-up equation is then:
µts = g (Qts, MSVts, Pair jts) (3.4)
Since demand is endogenous I specify an equation, which explains the de-
manded quantity:
Qts = q (pts, DDts) , (3.5)
where DD are demand drivers. Assuming log-linearity and substituting equa-
tions (3.3), (3.4), and (3.5) into equation (3.2), one obtains a reduced form
price equation as follows:
log pts = β0+β1CDts+β2DDts+β3MSVts+β4firmits+β5Pair jts+uts, (3.6)
where uts is an error term. I also expect regulation to have an impact on firms’
pricing behavior, since different regulatory regimes should provide cellular op-
erators with different incentives. To account for the fact that the independent
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variables should have a different impact on prices, depending on which regime
prevails, I specify one reduced form price equation for each regime and allow
coefficients to differ in the two regimes. Furthermore, the adopted econometric
model also involves the use of a correction term in the price equations, which
should account for the selectivity bias that arises from the fact of being in one
particular regime.
3.4 Specification and Empirical Implementa-
tion
As mentioned before, regulated firms often have influence over the regula-
tory regimes under which they operate. I take this issue into account in the
empirical analysis by estimating a model of endogenous switching (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975; Lee, 1978). This is a simultaneous equations model with
a binary qualitative variable for the regulatory status and limited (censored)
dependent variables: the prices. The empirical implementation of the theoret-
ical framework analyzed in the previous Section implies thus the specification
of equation (3.1), and of two price equations like (3.6), one for each of the two
subsamples:
R∗ts = α0 + α1
(
log p0ts − log p1ts
)
+ α2Zts + εts (3.7)
Rts = 1 if R
∗
ts > 0 and Rts = 0 otherwise






ts + u1ts if Rts = 1 (3.8)






ts + u0ts if Rts = 0 (3.9)
Cov (u1ts, u0ts, εts) =
 σ21 ρ10σ1σ0 ρ1σ1σ20 ρ0σ0
1
 . (3.10)
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Where XRts, R = 0, 1, contains cost drivers CDts (OPERATE, ENERGY,
WAGE, RENT, and PRIME) demand drivers DDts (POP and BUSINESS),
and a time trend (T) to control for market growth. Furthermore, I insert some
variables to control for market structure (MSVts): a dummy equal to one
if the second carrier has already entered market s in time t (ENTRY), vari-
ables related to cross-ownership and multimarket contact (CROSSOWN and
MULTIMKT), a variable controlling for the monopolist’s lead over the sec-
ond entrant (LEAD), firm specific dummies (FIRMi) for the major carriers,
and some dummy variables to control for market structure (BELLBELL, IN-
DBELL, and INDIND).22 The vector Zts contains regulator specific variables
RCVts (ELECT and APPOINT), political variables PVts (GOVCHANGE and
DEM), as well as two proxy for the cost of regulation CRts (STAFF and
∆STAFF). Also, I assume that the independent variables’ coefficients in (3.8)
and (3.9) are different, allowing complete interaction in the price equations.
This assumption, which should capture the different incentives faced by firms
in the different regimes, will be tested in the next Section. The error terms are
assumed to be jointly normally distributed, with a variance-covariance matrix
given by (3.10).23
As Heckman (1976) and others pointed out, there exists a selectivity bias
problem that leads to inconsistent parameter estimates when estimating the
price equations separately by OLS, for E [uits |Rts = i ] 6= 0 (i = 0, 1). To
overcome this problem, one needs to correct for the endogeneity of regulation.
Following Lee (1978), one can construct two selectivity bias terms as follows:
22According to Parker and Röller (1997), each of these dummy variables (see the Appendix
for a definition) “signifies the status of the wireline-nonwireline pair.” Note that I do not
insert the dummy BELLIND for identification reasons, because there is a constant term in
the considered price equation. BELLIND represents thus the reference market structure. I
eliminate one firm dummy (CENTEL) for the same reason.
23The terms ρi (i = 0, 1) represent the correlation coefficient between error terms uits
(i = 0, 1) and εst. Note that Cov (uits, εts) = ρiσiσε = ρiσi because σε = 1. Note also that
the correlation between the error terms of the two price equations (ρ12) is not estimable
since each observation comes from one regime. For references see Maddala (1987).
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E [u1ts |R∗ts > 0] = ρ1σ1 [φ (α′zts) /Φ (α′zts)] and
E [u0ts |R∗ts ≤ 0] = ρ0σ0 [−φ (α′zts) / (1− Φ (α′zts))]
for the regulated and non-regulated markets subsamples respectively, where
φ (·) and Φ (·) are respectively the density and the cumulative function of a
standard normal distribution.
The estimation procedure is as follows. Equation (3.7) accounts for the
separation criterium and can be consistently estimated by a probit ML method.
Because one does not observe both prices for each observation, in the first stage
one estimates a reduced form of the probit equation obtained by substituting
(3.8) and (3.9) in (3.7). Once one gets consistent estimates of the α’s, the
terms λ̂1ts = φ (α̂
′zts) /Φ (α̂
′zts) and λ̂0ts = −φ (α̂′zts) / (1− Φ (α̂′zts)) can be
computed using the estimated instead of the real parameters’ values. After
inserting the selectivity bias terms as a control in the pricing schedules, one
can consistently estimate the β, the ρi, and the σi terms by simultaneously
estimating (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9) by FIML (Kenny et al. (1979)). The last step
consists of estimating by ML the structural probit, where the estimated prices
are inserted instead of the real values.
The typical test of selectivity bias is to analyze whether the coefficients of
λits (i = 0, 1) are significantly different from zero. But from the sign and size
of the coefficient estimates one can learn even more, namely how the selectivity
terms influence pricing behavior, since they represent the covariance between
the error terms of the price equations and of the separation criterion. As
Maddala (1987) pointed out, “[...] we ought to observe ρ0 − ρ1 > 0, but the
two covariances can have any sign. It is also important to estimate the mean
values of the dependent variable for the alternative choices.” In my model
this would mean estimating the prices in regulated markets had they not been
regulated and vice versa. In this way I can determine regulation’s effects on
prices.
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3.5 Results and Interpretation
In this section I analyze the results of the full information ML estimation
of the switching regression model. I first present the results concerning the
two pricing relations. In order to enrich the analysis, and to observe whether
regulation had different effects on different cellular tariffs, I will propose differ-
ent specifications in which I use as the dependent variable the three available
price measures. In this way I will also be able to capture the different firms’s
strategies in different market segments.
Table 3.4 reports the coefficients’ estimates for the reduced form price equa-
tion in the subsample of regulated markets, while Table 3.5 reports the results
relative to the non-regulated markets.
Before analyzing in detail the coefficients’ estimates for the other inde-
pendent variables, I want to observe the role of the selection bias in both
subsamples, since this is one of the analysis’ main points. The selectivity
terms’ coefficients are given by the product between ρi and σi, i = 0, 1. In the
regulated markets’ subsample, both ρ1 and σ1 are strongly statistically signif-
icant in all specifications. In particular, the product of the two coefficients is
negative, implying that the fact of being in a regulated market has put some
downward pressure on cellular tariffs. Later I will precisely quantify this effect.
In non-regulated markets the selectivity bias correction’s coefficient is highly
significant as well. Both ρ0 and σ0 are statistically significant in the first and
third specifications, while only the variance σ0 is significant in the second one.
In this case one observes a positive coefficient’s estimate for the selection terms,
which means that a lack of regulation should have increased prices. The sig-
nificance of these terms in both subsamples and in all specifications is the first
compelling result of this analysis: the endogeneity of regulatory choice must
be accounted for. The price estimate that one would obtain without correcting
for selectivity bias, would in fact be inconsistent and biased. Furthermore, by
applying this new methodology, I obtain a result which seems to go in the
opposite direction than previously observed in the literature. Later, I shall
analyze this point more in depth.
Now I turn to the description of the regression’s results relative to firms’
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pricing behavior. I start with the regulated markets’ subsample (Table 3.4).
The first interesting point is that there are evident differences in pricing be-
havior among low usage time tariffs on the one hand, and middle and high
usage time tariffs on the other.24 Particularly compelling is the finding that
entry pressure (ENTRY) led to significantly lower usage tariffs only in the
lower market segment, whereas it did not affect prices for middle and high
usage times. Moreover, the only determinants of regulated prices for higher
usage, apart from the selectivity bias term, are some of the demand drivers
and, only partially, market structure variables. Surprisingly almost none of the
cost drivers is statistically significant in all specifications. The only exception
are WAGE in the second specification, which is unexpectedly negative, and
RENT in the third that is, instead, positive.
Demand drivers are more significant, though coefficients’ sign, size, and
significance vary widely across specifications as well. The population size
(POP) had a positive impact on prices which is significant only in the first
specification. In all specifications one observes a positive coefficient’s estimate
for BUSINESS, which is significant only for the middle usage segment. As
expected, the time trend (T) is negative in all specifications, since demand
should expand and become more price elastic with time, but it is significant
only in the middle usage and high usage specifications. The market growth
generated downward pressure on prices only in the business segment, which
was the fastest developing in the sample period.
Market structure variables are also partially significant in the regulated
market subsample. In the middle usage segment, the head start advantage
of the first license owner (LEAD) led to a small increase in cellular tariffs,
whereas it did not affect low usage prices. Low usage tariffs, instead, depend
significantly on multimarket contact (MULTIMKT) and on cross-ownership
(CROSSOWN), but the two effects go in opposite directions. While MUL-
TIMKT seems to have increased tariffs, as expected, cross-ownership seems to
24This is not surprising. The sample period corresponds to the very early phase of cellular
telecommunications in the U.S.. During that period, most of the customers were business
people who probably made a more extensive usage of cellular services. Firms’ pricing be-
havior, thus, is likely to have followed different paths in the different market segments.
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have decreased them.
Firm specific terms and firms-pair dummies are not significant at all in the
second and third specifications. Only in the low usage segment, the market
structure where a ROBOC entered a market with an independent incumbent
put some downward pressure on tariffs. In regulated markets, the kind of firms
pair operating in the market did not strongly influence the price level.
One possible interpretation of these findings is that regulated prices were
not set by firms but rather by the regulator. This is because firms specific
characteristics do not seem to have influenced regulated prices, while those
variables that should explain, at least partially, consumer surplus - like demand
drivers, and the selectivity bias correction to account for regulation- are the
main significant cellular tariffs’ determinants.
I now turn to the non-regulated markets’ subsample. Also in this case, one
observes some differences among the various specifications and this suggests
that firms adopted different pricing strategies in the different market’s seg-
ments. In the second and third specifications, prices depend very significantly
on firm specific effects. Not only are the firms’ dummies very significant,
but also the wireline/non-wireline pairs’ dummies present highly significant
coefficients’ estimates.25 In particular, it seems that markets where an inde-
pendent carrier owned the wireline license were more competitive, in the sense
that prices were lower with respect to the reference group, which includes the
BELLIND pair. While on the one hand, the presence of two baby Bells in
the same non-regulated market has considerably increased prices in the mid-
dle and high usage segments, meaning that two baby Bells could have been
better able to collude. On the other hand, this market structure led to more
price competition in the low usage segment (BELLBELL’s coefficient estimate
is negative and significant). Also, it is interesting to note that multimarket
contact (MULTIMKT) has a positive impact on tariffs but is significant only
in the first specification.
A last minor but interesting comment may be done with regard to the entry
25The most of firm-specific dummies are strongly significant in all specifications (PACTEL,
BELLSTH, AMERTECH, SWBELL, and MCCAW); USWEST, REST, GTE, and CONTEL
are significant only in some, while only NY NEX is not significant at all.
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policy. Competitive pressure imposed by the second firm entering the market
did not push downwards middle and high usage time tariffs. The negative and
significant impact of entry in the low usage segment could have been motivated
by a more aggressive pricing strategy by entrant firms, in order to enlarge the
non-business costumers base.
Before moving to the direct analysis of the price regulation’s effects on
tariffs, I statistically test whether coefficient estimates differ among the two
subsamples using a Wald test.26 I strongly reject the hypothesis that the same
coefficients apply to the two subgroups for all specifications at any usual con-
fidence level. This means that the explanatory variables in the two subgroups
have different effects on the firms’ pricing strategy, since they interact with the
fact of being regulated or not: firms’ behavior is influenced by price regulation.
Previous studies suggested that regulation should have increased cellular
tariffs, since the regulatory dummies had a positive impact on prices. To asses
more directly the regulation’s impact on cellular tariffs in my framework, I
ask which the prices in regulated markets would have been, had these markets






I use the consistent estimates of βi, ρi, and σi, i = 0, 1, and calculate
the predicted regulated and non-regulated prices for the regulated markets’
subsample. Table 3.6 reports the summary statistics for the predicted prices in
regulated markets (p̂1), in regulated markets had they not been regulated (p̂1,0),
and for the difference between the two. The predicted regulated prices are on
average lower than the predicted non-regulated prices in every specification.
This would mean that (on average) regulation has decreased prices by 14%,
10%, and 14% ca. for low, middle, and high usage tariffs, respectively. This
would reverse the results obtained with dummy variables models. However,
the standard deviation of the difference between the two prices is very large.
Hence, to reach a more precise conclusion, I test the null hypothesis p̂1 = p̂1,0.
I reject the null hypothesis at any usual confidence level for any of the used















distributed as a chi-squared with J degrees of freedom, where J is the number of restrictions
we are testing. See Green (1993).
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price measures.27
This finding would then mean that regulation, where it was applied, did not
have very evident effects on reducing prices: in some markets it was effective,
in other not. Yet, our main simplifying assumption is to consider regulation as
a single entity. This is indeed not the case. As I already mentioned regulatory
plans vary widely across States. There is then some heterogeneity in regula-
tory decisions that is not encompassed in my approach and that could be an
important element to explain the observed result that effective regulation did
not have a strong impact on prices.28
I do the same exercise for non-regulated markets and ask what the prices
in these markets would have been, had they been regulated (p̂0,1).29 In Table
3.7 I report the results. Predicted prices in non-regulated markets, had reg-
ulation occurred, would have been lower than predicted non-regulated prices
in all specifications (8.5%, 3%, and 8% for low, middle, and high usage tariffs,
respectively). I again perform a simple test of the null hypothesis p̂0,1 = p̂0.
Now I cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 10% confidence level for middle
and high usage tariffs, but I reject it for low usage ones. This means that
regulation would have significantly decreased prices for those customers who
made extensive use of cellular services in non-regulated markets. The second
line of Figure 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 represents the sample distribution for the price
difference in the non-regulated markets’ subsample. The positive effects, which
regulation would have had, are clearly evident in the middle and high usage
tariffs case. There is almost no observation above the zero line: in almost all
markets these prices would have fallen.
Summarizing, one the one hand regulation was not very effective in reducing
cellular tariffs in regulated markets, probably also because of the heterogene-
27In the first line of Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 I plotted the sample distribution of the price
differences in the different subsamples.
28A possible extension of this model, which would take this issue into account, would
be the use of a nested logit approach to explain regulatory choice, instead of the simple
probit analysis as I did. This would allow to consider that, once the regulator has chosen
to regulate, it must also choose which kind of regulation to apply. In this way one would be
able to account for the different regulatory choices that the authority has to take.
29I calculate E[p1ts |Rts = 0] = β̂1′x0ts + ρ̂1σ̂1 [−φ (α̂′zts) / (1− Φ (α̂′zts))] .
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ity of the regulatory schemes that we encompass under the label “regulated
markets.” Instead, it seems that cellular tariffs would have fallen significantly,
even if not substantially, if regulation had been adopted in non-regulated mar-
kets, especially for the business sector segment. Where the wrong markets
regulated?
To answer this question I estimate the structural probit by ML, where I
use as regressors the difference between predicted non-regulated and regulated
prices as well as other political and regulatory variables, as we derived in the
previous Section. I use the three estimated price differences simultaneously as
regressor to account for different firms’ lobbying intensity in different market
segments. The coefficient of the difference between the non-regulated and
regulated prices should help one to disentangle two effects: firms lobbying
activity, which would imply a negative coefficient, and consumers’ protection,
which would instead imply a positive coefficient’s estimate.
In Table 3.8, I present different specifications depending on the adopted set
of control variables. First, I use the exogenous variables alone. I then propose
a specification which controls for firms’ fixed effects and one which controls
for regional effects in order to capture, at least partially, possible market un-
observed heterogeneity.30 I then insert some interaction terms between the
price differences and the other exogenous variables, in order to control for the
interaction between firms, politicians, and the regulatory agency.31 Finally, I
try a richer specification where all control variables are used at once.
The main interest here is in the sign and significance of the price differ-
ence variables. In all specifications the three price differences are strongly
significant. This is a second compelling result of this study. However, both
consumer protection and firms’ lobbying activity seem to have played a role in
the regulatory regime’s choice. The first and third price differences’ parameter
30I could not exploit the panel component of part of the data set since one of the dependent
variables, the regulatory dummy, did not vary along the time dimension during the sample
period. The probit regression is thus run on a cross section.





















∗ ∆STAFF where i = 1, 2, 3. Precise results
about these variables can be obtained from the author upon request.
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estimates have, in fact, a negative sign, while the second has a positive sign.
This first set of results would suggest that firms concentrated their rent
seeking strategies in those markets where regulation would have hurt more,
i.e. those markets where most of the customers were long-time cellular service
users, and where competition was expected to be tougher because of the low
demand for low usage time. These findings are also consistent with the fact
that the regulator might have concentrated its action in those markets where
final consumers, and not intermediate customers such as business people, were
more important, since the positive sign on the middle usage prices difference.
One cannot say much concerning the magnitude of the coefficients’ estimates,
which represent the marginal effect with respect to the overall means of the
data set. The sign of the coefficient determines the direction of the effect
and the effect tends to be larger, the larger is the coefficient. In the last
two specifications, however, one should bare in mind that the overall price
difference’s effect should account also for the marginal effects obtained through
the interaction terms.
Turning to the other explanatory variables, almost each is highly significant
in every specification. If the State governor in 1984 came from the Democratic
Party, the probability to observe price regulation was lower. This result is
unexpected, given that the Democratic Party is supposed to pursue a more
consumer-oriented policy.32 Also, the probability of regulation was higher in
States that did not experience a political change during the sample period.
This fact might reflect the idea that States in which political changes occurred
were more open toward an innovative regulatory policy, such as full price lib-
eralization. The results concerning the political environment are quite robust:
both sign and significance level do not vary much across the different specifi-
cations. Only the direct effect of government stability disappears in the best
specification, though the interaction terms between GOVSTAB and the price
differences are all very significant in that specification.
Also, the regulator specific characteristics and regulation’s costs had signif-
icant impact on regulatory choice, but these results are less robust. Looking at
32This view is also expressed in Posner (1970) where Democratic amministrations are
assumed to be “pro-consumer” while Republican ones to be “pro-business.”
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the first column one observes that elected regulators increased the probability
of regulation compared to the reference group containing APPOINT, even if
not significantly. However, inserting firm dummies, this variable turns also out
to be significant. These findings would then be in line with those by Besley and
Coate (2000): elected regulators are supposed to be more pro-consumer, and
therefore should more often regulate, under the assumption that regulation
reduces prices. However, the effect of elected regulators on regulatory choice
is not very significant.33 The variable STAFF, which should proxy for regu-
lation’s costs, presents the expected positive and significant sign in the first,
third and last specifications. A regulator with higher resources (larger PUCs)
was expected to regulate more often, for its opportunity cost of regulating a
new market should be lower. This effect is anyway quantitatively very small.
Also, the negative and significant sign of ∆STAFF means that the larger were
the changes in the commission’s composition the lower was the probability of
regulation. A possible explanation for this fact is that large changes in the
commission’s personnel could have make less easy to capture the regulator,
because of the lacking of long standing relationships.
Furthermore, it is worth stressing the role of the different specifications.
First, the introduction of the interaction terms, which should more precisely
capture the “political game” among firms, politicians, and regulator has a very
significant impact on our results.34 Not only are almost all these terms highly
significant and the overall fit of the model greatly improves once one accounts
for them, but also some qualitatively new results appear. I believe that this is
an important issue, which calls for a more precise model of these interactions.
The introduction of firm-specific terms has an important impact as well.
Almost all firm-specific dummies are highly significant in the third and last
specifications.35 This finding reinforces the belief that lobbying for regulation
33This is also in line with the results by Teske (1991a) and (1991b) and Donald and Sap-
pington (1995) and (1997), who did not find the regulator’s appointed method to significally
impact regulatory decisions. On this issue see also Smart (1994).
34Spiller (1990) presents a multiple-pricipals theoretical model of the interactions among
politicians, interest groups and regulators, as well as some empirical evidence.
35USWEST and SWBELL are not significant in the second specification, while only
USWEST is not significant in the last one.
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by individual firms matters. Finally, also regional variables are partially sig-
nificant. This would suggest the need of a more precise econometric analysis,
since these dummies should, at least partially, capture some market unobserved
heterogeneity that seems to matter.
The last specification, which is also the richest one, predicts the right out-
come for the 92.21% of the cases that makes me quite confident about the
exactness of the adopted model.
3.6 Conclusions
This Chapter investigates the political economy of regulation bridging two dif-
ferent approaches of the empirical literature on regulation, and empirically an-
alyzing the simultaneity between the price regulatory choice and firms’ pricing
behavior. I used data from the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry be-
cause of its unique regulatory environment. The industry under consideration
is quite homogenous for product characteristics, firms’ technology and demand,
but heterogenous for the adopted price regulation. Some States adopted strict
price regulation, some loose price regulation, and others even banned price
regulation. The study had different aims. First, I wanted to prove that the
endogeneity of regulation is an important issue to account for because firms
do influence the choice of the regime under which they operate. Second, I
wanted to determine the impact of price regulation on cellular tariffs, after
correcting for the simultaneity bias. Finally, I wanted to identify the main
determinants of the choice of a regulatory regime. The econometric method I
adopted consists of the estimation of a endogenous switching regression model
(Maddala and Nelson (1975), Lee (1978)). To enrich the analysis I consid-
ered three measures for cellular prices, corresponding to different usage times,
which allowed us to take into account different firms’ strategies in the various
market’s segments.
We provided evidence that the selectivity bias problem, i.e. the endogene-
ity of regulation, is an important issue to account for. Controlling for the
simultaneity problem, I have shown that prices in regulated markets were, on
average, lower than the prices firms would have set, had these markets not been
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regulated. But the impact of regulation is not observed to be statistically sig-
nificant: price regulation, where applied, has not been very effective. On the
other hand, however, I observed that prices in non-regulated markets would
have significantly fallen, if regulation would have been adopted. My approach
enabled the explanation this unexpected result through the explicit modeling
of the regulatory policy. After controlling for other factors such as the polit-
ical environment, regulator specific characteristics, and the regulation’s cost,
I provided some robust evidence that firms’ lobbying activity against a regu-
lated environment was successful. Also, I provided evidence that regulator’s
characteristics, political variables, as well as the interactions between firms,
politicians, and regulators have very high explanatory power for the regula-
tory choice. Elected regulators, ceteris paribus, enhanced the probability of
regulation more than appointed ones. Furthermore, States where the governor
came from the Republican Party, whose government was politically stable in
the sample period, and where regulation’s opportunity cost have been lower
were more favorable to some kinds of price regulation. Finally, the more pro-
nounced the changes in the public utility commission’s composition, the lower
the probability of regulation, all other things being equal.
I can then conclude that my empirical approach, which allows the explicit
modelling of the political economy of regulation, leads to new results in com-
parison to those already observed in both streams of the related literature. I
do provide some evidence that price regulation, per se, did not worked in the
wrong direction, increasing cellular tariffs. Effective regulation, though, did
not have a significant impact, because of the firms’s lobbying activity to avoid
a regulated environment.
Some major caveats apply to this study. First, I limited the analysis to
the dichotomous regulatory choice, not considering that different kinds of price
regulation were actually adopted, that could have had very different impacts on
prices. In particular, this consideration might help to understand more clearly
which kinds of regulatory schemes did not work. Second, regulatory decisions
are not only related to the simple choice whether to regulate a market or not;
the regulatory commissions, in fact, must also decide on many other issues,
which are likely to have an influence on the choice of whether to regulate or not.
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These issues could therefore be simultaneously studied in a more general model
of regulation, but in this case new data and a different econometric modeling
approach would be necessary. Finally, in this study I adopted a reduced form
approach to the political economy of regulation as well as to firms’ strategic
behavior, whereas both issues could be approached in a more structural way.
In particular, one should try to provide a rigorous micro foundation for the
interaction among regulatory commissions, legislators, and interest groups.
Hence, the reported results have to be considered as the first step into a deeper
understanding of the political economy of price regulation.
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Variables Definition Source
p1, p2, p3 Monthly bill calculated for different monthly usage times (5, 500, 3000 minutes) Parker-Röller [1997]
ENERGY Average monthly cost per square foot ($ per kilowatt hour)
PRIME (lagged) One period lagged prime lending rate
RENT Average monthly rent per square foot of office space
WAGE Average weekly salary per employee for the cellular industry
OPERATE Average monthly general overhead and operating expenses per square foot
POP Market Population in millions
BUSINESS Number of high potential business establishments (divided by 100)
T Time trend in months
ENTRY Dummy=1 after the second carrier enters into the market
CROSSOWN Dummy=1 when the two competitors in one market are partner in any other market
MULTIMKT Total number of markets where the two competitors face each other
LEAD Length of the monopoly period in months
BELLBELL Dummy=1 if both wireline and nonwireline competitors are RBOCs
BELLIND Dummy=1 if the wireline is a BELL and the non-wireline is an independent carrier
INDBELL Dummy=1 if wireline is an independent carrier and the non-wireline is a BELL
INDIND Dummy=1 if both wireline and nonwireline competitors are an independent firm
Firm Dummies Us West Cellular, Bell South Mobility, Ameritech Mobile, Nynex Mobile,
South West Bell Mobile,Gte Mobilenet, Contel Cellular, Mccaw, Century Cellular, Rest
REG Dummy=1 if no regulatory ban was imposed in the market Shew [1994]
DEM84, DEM88 Dummy=1 if the State’s Governor was from the democratic US Statistical abstract
party in 1984 and 1988 respectively
REP84, REP88 Dummy=1 if the State’s Governor was from the republican party in 1984 and 1988 respectively
GOVSTAB Dummy=1 if in both elections in the sample period the Governor came from the same party
ELECT Dummy=1 if the regulator was elected The Book of States
APPOINT Dummy=1 if the regulator was appointed by politicians
STAFF Number of full-time employees in the State Public Utility Commission in 1984
∆STAFF Change in the number of full-time employees in the State Public Utility Commission (86-84)
Table 3.1: Variables’ Definition
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Full sample Sub-sample Sub-sample
Variables Regulation No Regulation
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
p1 17.223 10.600 16.908 11.927 17.543 9.061
p2 196.126 39.418 197.787 40.596 194.434 38.182
p3 1025.402 233.428 1029.426 220.473 1021.304 246.274
ENERGY 1.778 0.438 1.783 0.528 1.773 0.322
PRIME (lagged) 9.518 1.069 9.456 1.087 9.582 1.050
RENT 16.062 5.032 16.901 6.252 15.206 3.153
WAGE 519.598 119.172 521.617 101.292 517.534 135.197
OPERATE 6.724 1.724 6.825 2.181 6.622 1.072
POP 0.193 0.278 0.225 0.365 0.161 0.135
BUSINESS 2253.494 406.391 2227.075 457.181 2280.407 345.901
T 21.463 11.842 21.763 11.925 21.158 11.771
ENTRY 0.727 0.446 0.783 0.413 0.670 0.471
CROSSOWN 0.341 0.475 0.239 0.427 0.446 0.498
MULTIMKT 3.571 2.805 2.960 1.809 4.195 3.437
LEAD 10.696 8.047 9.798 7.310 11.611 8.653
REG 0.505 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
DEM84 0.733 0.443 0.658 0.475 0.809 0.394
DEM88 0.583 0.494 0.636 0.482 0.528 0.500
REP84 0.267 0.443 0.342 0.475 0.191 0.394
REP88 0.417 0.494 0.363 0.482 0.472 0.500
GOVSTAB 0.579 0.494 0.721 0.450 0.434 0.497
ELECT 0.200 0.401 0.154 0.362 0.247 0.432
APPOINT 0.800 0.401 0.846 0.362 0.753 0.432
STAFF 271.308 227.115 322.320 268.281 219.341 160.085
∆STAFF -27.410 161.857 -73.092 212.731 19.127 50.729
Obs. 539 272 267
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
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Regulatory Status States
Regulatory Ban AL, CO, DE, FL, GA, IA, IL, KS, MI, MN,
MO, MT, NE, NJ, OR, PA,TN, TX,WA, WI
Tariff Regulation AZ, CA, CT, HI, IN, KY, LA, MA, MS,
NV, NM, NY, OH, OK, RI, SC, VA
Not in the Sample AK, ID, ME, ND, SD, VT, WV, WY
Table 3.3: Regulatory Status by State
Dep. Variable Low Usage Tariff Middle Usage Tariff High Usage Tariff
(lnp1) (lnp2) (lnp3)
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
CONSTANT 2.700 ∗∗∗ 1.017 5.192 ∗∗∗ 0.435 6.665 ∗∗∗ .418
OPERATE 0.64E-01 0.41E-01 0.17E-01 0.23E-01 0.16E-01 0.23E-01
ENERGY -0.110 0.198 -0.65E-01 0.51E-01 -0.80E-01 0.56E-01
WAGE 0.18E-03 0.97E-03 -0.57E-03 ∗∗ 0.25E-03 -0.22E-03 0.27E-03
RENT -0.75E-03 0.14E-01 0.86E-02 0.58E-02 0.13E-01 ∗∗ 0.59E-02
PRIME (lagged) -0.76E-01 0.58E-01 0.58E-02 0.21E-01 0.17E-01 0.22E-01
POP 0.278 0.201 0.139 ∗ 0.82E-01 0.72E-01 0.90E-01
BUSINESS 0.99E-04 0.13E-03 0.10E-03 ∗∗∗ 0.37E-04 0.36E-04 0.34E-04
T -0.951E-04 0.53E-02 -0.55E-02 ∗∗∗ 0.18E-02 -0.46E-02 ∗∗ 0.21E-02
CROSSOWN -0.464 ∗∗ 0.205 -0.43E-01 0.73E-01 0.40E-01 0.85E-01
MULTIMKT 0.74E-01 ∗ 0.43E-01 -0.18E-01 0.20E-01 -0.21E-01 0.21E-01
LEAD 0.78E-02 0.81E-02 0.55E-02 ∗ 0.28E-02 0.41E-02 0.28E-02
ENTRY -0.476 ∗∗∗ 0.167 0.28E-01 0.65E-01 0.35E-01 0.69E-01
BELLBELL -0.685 0.648 0.136 0.174 0.187 0.162
INDBELL -1.478 ∗∗∗ 0.370 -0.24E-02 0.111 -0.163 0.137
INDIND 0.13E-01 0.558 -0.19E-01 0.153 -0.97E-01 0.138
Firms dummies ∗(3/9) (0/9)
∗
(1/9)
σ1 0.620 ∗∗∗ 0.31E-01 0.142 ∗∗∗ 0.11E-01 0.220 ∗∗∗ 0.14E-01
ρ1 -0.949 ∗∗∗ 0.41E-01 -0.641 ∗∗∗ 0.147 -0.932 ∗∗∗ 0.50E-01
Adj. R2 0.7913 0.5551 0.5960
Obs. 272 272 272
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively
Table 3.4: FIML Estimates: Price Equation - Regulated Markets
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Dep. Variable Low Usage Tariff Middle Usage Tariff High Usage Tariff
(lnp1) (lnp2) (lnp3)
Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err. Coeff. St.Err.
CONSTANT 4.071 ∗∗∗ 1.256 4.831 ∗∗∗ 0.278 6.545 ∗∗∗ 0.407
OPERATE -0.89E-01 0.75E-01 -0.14E-01 0.17E-01 -0.20E-02 0.26E-01
ENERGY -0.80E-01 0.226 0.30E-01 0.53E-01 0.33E-01 0.75E-01
WAGE 0.99E-04 0.18E-03 0.10E-04 0.12E-03 -0.27E-04 0.18E-03
RENT 0.12E-01 0.23E-01 0.17E-02 0.61E-02 -0.22E-02 0.90E-02
PRIME (lagged) -0.34E-01 0.78E-01 0.52E-01 ∗∗∗ 0.18E-01 0.49E-01 ∗ 0.28E-01
POP 0.502 0.583 0.263 ∗ 0.152 0.173 0.215
BUSINESS 0.20E-03 0.23E-03 0.37E-04 0.46E-04 0.45E-04 0.76E-04
T -0.72E-02 0.78E-02 0.23E-02 0.17E-02 0.35E-02 0.26E-02
CROSSOWN 0.28E-03 0.202 -0.14E-02 0.47E-01 -0.102 0.69E-01
MULTIMKT 0.97E-01 ∗∗ 0.45E-01 0.12E-01 0.84E-02 0.20E-01 0.14E-01
LEAD -0.95E-02 0.10E-01 -0.29E-03 0.22E-02 -0.83E-03 0.36E-02
ENTRY -0.392 ∗∗ 0.178 0.11E-01 0.48E-01 0.103 0.69E-01
BELLBELL -0.793 ∗∗ 0.346 0.375 ∗∗∗ 0.83E-01 0.235 ∗∗ 0.114
INDBELL -0.73E-01 0.392 -0.128 ∗ 0.87E-01 -0.344 ∗∗ 0.136






σ0 0.467 ∗∗∗ 0.30E-01 0.148 ∗∗∗ 0.11E-01 0.155 ∗∗∗ 0.17E-01
ρ0 0.835 ∗∗∗ 0.65E-01 0.245 0.485 0.445 0.372
Adj. R2 0.46127 0.6060 0.6172
Obs. 267 267 267
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels respectively
Table 3.5: FIML Estimates: Price Equation - Non-Regulated Markets
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Low Usage Tariff Middle Usage Tariff High Usage Tariff
p̂1 16.364 196.030 1020.101
(11.647) (33.346) (179.141)
p̂1,0 19.022 217.621 1188.160
(10.658) (69.706) (407.524)
p̂1,0 − p̂1 2.659 21.5909 168.059
(17.691) (66.651) (404.421)
Standard errors in parenthesis
Table 3.6: Predicted Prices With and Without Regulation - Regulated Mar-
kets
Low Usage Tariff Middle Usage Tariff High Usage Tariff
p̂0 21.269 200.979 1086.774
(10.439) (34.747) (205.602)
p̂0,1 19.456 194.976 997.696
(8.761) (34.202) (185.043)
p̂0,1 − p̂0 -1.813 -6.002∗ -89.078∗
(4.862) (4.276) (55.988)
Standard errors in parenthesis;∗ represents significance at the 10% level
Table 3.7: Predicted Prices With and Without Regulation - Non-Regulated
Markets
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Figure 3.1: The Metropolitan Areas
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Figure 3.2: Sample Distribution of the Difference Between Non-Regulated and
Regulated Prices: Low Usage Tariff
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Figure 3.3: Sample Distribution of the Difference Between Non-Regulated and
Regulated Prices: Middle Usage Tariff
3.7. Tables and Figures 106
Figure 3.4: Sample Distribution of the Difference Between Non-Regulated and
Regulated Prices: High Usage Tariff
Chapter 4
Lobbying and Collusion in a
Regulated Industry: The U.S.
Mobile Telecommunications
Market
A joint work with Astrid Jung
“Indeed, unless the number of individuals in the group is quite
small, or unless there is coercion or other special device to make
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self interested
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests”.
Mancur Olson (1965, p. 2)
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to empirically explore the relationship between mar-
ket collusion and industry lobbying in a regulated market. Using data from
the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry, we test whether the amount of
firms’ contributions to political parties has an influence on their product mar-
ket conduct and whether the latter has an impact on firms’ political decisions.
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We first analyze the case of exogenous firms’ lobbying expenditures and then
study the situation of endogenous lobbying, in order to jointly consider firms’
strategic behavior in the product and political markets. The idea is that in a
regulated market such as the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry, firms
interact along two dimensions: The product market and the political arena
where the policy decisions are made.1
Since Olson (1965), it has been recognized that there exists a coordination
problem in lobbying formation: Why should different self-interested individuals
participate in a pressure group? Even though these individuals might realize
their common interest - in our case a favorable regulatory environment - they
will, as a group, only achieve the optimal result if a mechanism that deters the
free-riding behavior is available. The same line of argument has been applied
to the coordination problem faced by firms in the product market in order to
sustain collusive agreements (see Porter, 1983 and Green and Porter, 1984).
Motivated by these observations, the question arises whether cooperation in
the product market is related to cooperation in the political arena thus to
firms’ lobbying activities.
Apart of the theoretical interest, the issue studied in this chapter is also
policy-relevant. The regulation of campaign contributions as well the role of
product market regulation are, in fact, hotly debated topics in many demo-
cratic countries, especially in the U.S. Yet, we are not aware of any study
that analyzed product market regulation’s impact on firms’ lobbying decisions
and, similarly, whether and how restrictions on campaign financing could af-
fect firms’ product market behavior. The empirical evidence delivered in this
chapter can thus shed some new light on this issue, particularly on the nature
of the link between the two kinds of markets.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any theoretical contribu-
tion that analyzed the relationship between collusion and lobbying decisions
in an industry where firms’ tariffs are regulated, and from which structural
empirical equations can be derived. Therefore, we employ a structural model
1For a theoretical discussion of the relationship between firms strategic behavior in prod-
uct and in political markets see for instance Baron (1999) and, more in general, Baron
(2001).
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only for the market interactions, while our methodology concerning firms’ po-
litical behavior is, in a theoretical sense, based on a reduced form approach.
However, since a reduced form analysis of lobbying requires a careful interpre-
tation of the underlying political game, we make use of theoretical arguments
to motivate and discuss our empirical findings. For this purpose, we parti-
tion the link between collusion and lobbying expenditures into two elements
that have been separately analyzed in the literature: the relationship between
firms’ coordination in the product market and firms’ coordination in the po-
litical arena on the one hand, and the connection between the latter and firms
lobbying expenditures on the other.
Insight on the first aspect, i.e. how cooperation in the product and political
markets is interrelated, is provided by the idea of multimarket contact (Bern-
heim and Whinston 1990). Applying their setting to our problem, we expect
that individual deviation from the collectively optimal lobbying contributions
would not only be punished by returning to the one-shot political equilibrium
but also by abandoning cooperation in the product market. Thus, as long as
market cooperation itself is sustainable, it might help to deter deviation in
the lobbying game. As a result one expects to observe a positive relationship
between product market collusion and coordination in lobbying formation.
Ludema (2001) analyzes the interrelation between collusion and lobbying
for a public good type regulation in a trade model. He shows that the profit
increase due to a favorable policy is greater for those agents who deviate from
coordination in the political market because the others bare the cost of lobby-
ing and detect cheating in lobbying with one period lag. Hence, if there is not
enough slack in the incentive compatibility constraint of collusion, collectively
optimal lobbying efforts may destabilize market cooperation. This extension of
the multimarket idea which, in its original version, does not allow cooperation
in one market to alter the gains from cooperation in the other, leads to am-
biguous predictions about the multimarket effect in situations where players
observe defection with a lag.2
2Damania and Fredriksson (2000) study the endogenous formation of industry pressure
groups in a environmental regulation model. They find that collusion in the product market
helps to deter deviation in the political market even when product market penalties for
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The second aspect, i.e. the relationship between coordination in the politi-
cal market and firms’ lobbying expenditures, has been analyzed in the political
economy literature. In the case of lobbying for a pure public good, an increase
in coordination among firms lead to higher contibutions because it alleviates
the free-riding problem in group formation. When, in contrast, firms within an
industry are asymmetric and a specific type of regulation hurts some of them
while benefiting others, lobbying may be interpreted as a way of acquiring a
private good. A general insight from the rent seeking literature is that total
lobbying expenditures increase with the number of competing individuals or
groups (see Nitzan, 1994). Since improved coordination among rent seekers
can be interpreted as a decline in the number of competing parties, it will trig-
ger a drop of rent seeking efforts.3 A similar result is derived also by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) for menu auctions: Firms that manage to align their in-
terests on policy choices limit the politicians’ ability to extract rents. Hence,
total lobbying expenditures diminish.
As the discussion above demonstrates, the conclusions from the theoretical
literature concerning the relationship between market conduct and lobbying
expenditures are intuitively appealing but ambiguous. Our empirical assess-
ment is aimed at providing evidence on the relevance of these countervailing
effects.
One first novelty of this work is that we explicitly analyze how campaign
contributions affect collusive behavior. We are not aware of any study that
poses this question. Second, in our full model we go one step further and ex-
plicitly take into account the simultaneity between firms’ product and political
market’s behavior, empirically implementing the ideas recently developed in
the theoretical literature (Damania and Fredriksson, 2000; Baron, 2001; and
Ludema, 2001)
A noticeable difference of our approach with respect to the existing empir-
ical literature is that we purposely analyze the role of collusion rather than of
lobbying deviation are excluded. Their result relies, however, on a very specific model of
regulation which can be the main driver of the obtained findings.
3This holds even if we take into account that, within a group of coordinated firms, the
rent has the character of a public good (Katz et al. 1990).
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concentration on firms’ campaigning activities.4 We do this because our focus
is on the firm not only as a production but also as a political entity, hence we
study firms’ strategic behavior in the market rather than market structure.5
This theoretical idea has repercussions on the empirical methodology that we
choose: Whereas previous studies have looked at the impact of exogenous
concentration ratio on campaign contributions in reduced-form one-equation
models, we estimate market conduct through a system of simultaneous equa-
tions and relate it to the firms’ endogenous lobbying. Thereby, this study is a
first attempt to take advantage of the structural empirical approach tradition-
ally developed in industrial organization in order to analyze political economy
issues.
The data we employ stems from the U.S. mobile telecommunications indus-
try during its early development phase in the second half of the 1980’s. The
structure of the data is uniquely suited to investigate the interrelation between
market conduct and lobbying expenditures because the U.S. cellular industry
is divided into many small geographical markets and the regulatory decisions
as well as the amount of firms’ political activities vary across states. Thus, the
data contains sufficient variation to identify and estimate the market conduct,
the firms’ lobbying behavior as well as their relation. At the same time, by
focussing on a single industry in one country, the unobserved heterogeneity
problem is minimized.
This study have two main results: First, we find a negative and significant
relationship between firms’ conduct and lobbying activities: high contributions
4A few studies find that concentration has a positive and significant effect on campaign
contributions (e.g. Pittman, 1988), others obtain a negative and significant relationship
(Salomon and Siegfried, 1977 , and Zardkhooi, 1985). The majority, however, do not find
any significant effect or mixed results (e.g. Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1991 and Grier and
Munger, 1991). Also, see Potters and Sloof (1996) for an excellent survey of the empirical
literature on interest groups.
Recently, a number of theoretical contributions have also accounted for endogenous lobbying
formation focusing on the role of market structure as a coordination device (e.g. Mitra, 1999;
Pecorino, 1998; Pecorino, 2001; and Hillman et al., 2001).
5Of course, market structure is an important determinant of firms’ conduct, which we
have controlled for in our empirical analysis.
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decrease collusion. Second, we show that a collusive market outcome signifi-
cantly decreases firms’ campaign contributions. The strength and significance
of these effects varies among the different specifications, but the qualitative
result is very robust to changes in the model’s specification. The theoretical
literature discussed above offers two possible interpretations for this result.
Either, following the multimarket argument, coordination in one market helps
to sustain coordination in the other. Thus, the negative link between lobbying
expenditure and product market behavior must be due to the fact that firms
perceive regulation as a private good and increased coordination in lobbying
reduces total rent seeking effort. Or, if regulation is perceived as a public good,
collusion and coordination in lobbying must indeed be negatively related since
increased coordination in the political market implies higher lobbying expen-
ditures.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the U.S. cellular
market and the data. In Section 3 we develop a structural model of market
interactions and present our empirical specification where we first consider
firms’ lobbying activity as exogenous. In Section 4 we present a reduced form
version of firms’ endogenous behavior in the political market and empirically
implement the lobbying equation. Section 5 discusses the main findings and,
finally, we conclude in Section 6 with some remarks and suggestions for further
research.
4.2 The Data
The regulatory and market environment in the U.S. cellular market in the
second half of the 1980’s are unique and constitute an excellent natural ex-
periment for the analysis of the relationships between lobbying and collusion.
On the one hand, we observe, for the production as well as for the political
decisions, many geographically separated markets within a single industry (for
the former the Metropolitan Statistical Areas and for the latter the states).
This fact guarantees enough heterogeneity - in the sense of statistical variation
- to investigate the empirical interrelation between market level collusion and
state level lobbying.
4.2. The Data 113
On the other hand, the product market is homogeneous, which justifies the
same functional specification of the demand and first order condition across
markets. Moreover, because of the homogeneity of the institutional environ-
ment across U.S. states, unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of the
lobbying equation is minimized.
Another important characteristic of the U.S. mobile telecommunications
market is that the market structure was exogenously determined during the
entire sample period. Each of the considered markets started at the beginning
of the 1980’s as a monopoly and was subsequently opened up to a second firm,
so that we can concentrate on market conduct in a specified market structure.
This peculiarity also allows us to rule out more complex games where firms
make their production decisions under the pressure of potential entry.
Without the described advantages in the data structure, it would be very
difficult to empirically model and analyze the relationship between market
conduct and campaign contributions.
The database that we use is remarkably rich. It contains product market
variables such as prices, output, demand, cost, and market structure variables
and it covers information about the regulatory and the political environment,
such as the structure of the regulatory body and the composition of the states’
governments and legislatures. Furthermore, it entails data on firms’ political
activity as measured by their campaign contributions to the political parties.
Part of the data has been already exploited in other studies. The market
data were collected and used by Parker and Röller (1997), and, as we will make
clear afterwards, we rearranged them in order to solve an aggregation problem
between market and state level decisions.6 The political data originates form
the Book of the States and from the U.S. Statistical Abstract . The data on po-
litical contributions were kindly provided by the Center of Responsive Politics
6The data originate from many different sources, such as Cellular Price and Market-
ing Letter, Information Enterprise, Cellular Business, Cellular Market Data Book, EMCI,
BOMA Experience Exchange Report, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of La-
bor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of commerce, and Bureau of Census. We
refer the interested reader to Parker and Röller (1997) for a more precise description of the
market data. We are very grateful to Phil Parker and Lars-Hendrik Röller for allowing us
to use their data.
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that elaborates figures stemming from the Federal Election Commission.7
Tables 4.1 4.2 report a brief description of the variables used in this study,
whereas Tables 4.3 and 4.4 contain the preliminary statistics. The first column
refers to the full sample, which corresponds to Parker’s and Röller’s original
data after a selection process. Observations in this sample do not follow a
specific periodicity. The aggregated sample represented in the second column
of the table, denotes the average observation for a given year calculated in
order to match the market variables to the lobbying data which is observed
on a yearly basis. As a result the new market data contains one to four
yearly observations for each of the considered 72 metropolitan markets. The
differences in the mean and standard errors of the variables between the two
samples are very small and not statistically significant.
Apart from market price (P) and quantity (Q), we have information on
demand shifters like the market population (POP), annual income per capita
(INCOME), population density (DENSITY), and the number of high potential
business establishments (BUSINESS). The data on cost shifters include the
cost of energy (ENERGY), office and operation costs (RENT and OPERATE),
labor costs in the cellular industry (WAGE), and cost of capital (PRIME).
The market structure variables are a dummy equal to one for the duopoly
period (ENTRY), a dummy indicating whether both licence holders were Bell
companies (BB), a measure of whether the two firms in one market are partially
own by the same organizations (CROSSOWN), and in how many markets the
two firms meet (MULTIMKT). A dummy equal to one indicates whether the
market was subjected to any form of price regulation (PREG).
In Table 4.4 we report statistics for the political variables, which consti-
tute a balanced panel with four yearly observations for each of the 40 states
included in our sample. The information covers the composition of legisla-
ture and government in the different states: a dummy equal to one if the
governor came from the democratic party (GOVDEM), the governor’s salary
(GSALARY), and a dummy equal to one if the democratic party had the
majority in both branches of the legislature (LEGDEM). Variables related to
7In particular, we thank Douglas Weber from the Center for Responsive Politics for
making available the unpublished data on political contributions for the sample period.
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the regulatory body are the Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) number of
board members (PUCMEM), the length of their office (PUCTERM), their
salary (PUCSALARY), and the number of PUC’s full-time employees (PUC-
STAFF). The dummy ELECT takes the value one if the PUC’s members were
directly elected by the citizens and not appointed by politicians. Indicators of
election years (PRESELECT, FEDELECT, LEGISELECT) and of the tight-
ness between the political parties at the state level (TIGHT) are also included
in the data set. Further potential controls for the lobbying process are the
population of the state (POPSTATE) and its average income (INCSTATE).
Finally, lobbying is measured by yearly aggregated campaign contributions by
mobile telecommunications firms to members of political parties in a given
state.
All political variables lag one year with respect to the market and lobbying
data because a newly elected government needs some time before being able
to implement policy changes.
4.3 Collusion and Exogenous Lobbying
As we pointed out in the previous section, we do not work out a complete
theoretical model for firms’ behavior in product and political markets when
the industry is subject to different forms of price regulation. Even though, in
a micro-founded model, regulation should be considered endogenous, because
firms’ political activity is aimed at influencing the regulatory environment, the
focus of this chapter is on the interrelation between firms collusion and lob-
bying. Hence, the chosen empirical approach is only partially derived from a
formal theoretical structure. In this section, we explicitly model firms’ inter-
action in the product market adopting an established approach in industrial
organization, which allows us to estimate firms’ conduct. In this first step,
we assume that lobbying decisions are exogenous and study whether and how
they shape firms’ market behavior.
In order to model the market interactions among firms, we specify and esti-
mate a structural oligopoly model at the industry level (see Bresnahan 1989).
This enables us to identify firms’ conduct in the market place through the
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simultaneous estimation of a demand function and of the first order condition
for the firms’ profit maximization problem. The structural model for the prod-
uct market was already specified and estimated by Parker and Röller (1997).
Let the inverse market demand be:
ptms = f(Qtms, X
D
tms). (4.1)
The price for cellular services ptms at time t, in market m within state s depends
on the market production Qtms and on a set of market specific demand shifters
(XDtms). We assume that the firm i’s specific variable costs Citms (qitms, ωtms)
are a function of firm-specific output qitms and on a set of exogenous market-
specific cost shifters ωtms. Each firm maximizes its profits with respect to the
produced quantity. Assuming symmetry among firms within each market we
derive the optimality condition at the market level by summing the individual












Equation (4.2) allows us to estimate market conduct using market data
instead of firm level data. The conjectural variation, or conduct parameter
θtms (·) measures the degree of market competitiveness. If, in statistical sense,
θtms = 0, the market is perfectly competitive; if θtms = 1/Ntms, firms behave as
Cournot-Nash competitors; and if θtms = 1, then firms’ behavior is consistent
with monopoly or cartel conduct.
We assume that the conjectural variation θtms (·) is not constant but a
market specific varying parameter:9
θtms = g (Lts, µtms) , (4.3)
where Lts are the total lobbying expenditures by mobile telecommunications
firms, as measured by their campaign contributions to political parties, and
8For a detailed derivation of this market specific first order condition we refer interested
readers to Parket and Röller (1997).
9See Mayo and Otsuka (1991) and Parker and Röller (1997) for the estimation of a
varying conduct parameter.
4.3. Collusion and Exogenous Lobbying 117
µtms is a vector of market structure characteristics, which further explains
firms’ conduct. Specifying θtms as a non-constant parameter is a convenient
way of addressing the relationship between the agents’ behavior in the product
market and in the political process without having a full structural model about
the choice of regulation, its influence on profits and campaign contributions at
hand.
The implementation of the model discussed above involves the empirical
specification of two simultaneous equations (4.1), (4.2) and the varying conduct
parameter (4.3). In order to identify the conduct parameter, we choose a
semilogarithmic specification for the inverse demand:
Ptms = b0 + b1 log(Qtms) + b2 POPtms + b3 TIMEtms+
b4 BUSINESStms + b5 INCOMEtms + b6 DENSITY + εtms,
(4.4)
where εtms is an i.i.d. stochastic term. Marginal costs are approximated as a
linear function in quantity and the cost shifters:10




a3 PRIMEtms + a4 WAGEtms+
a5 RENTtms + a6 OPERATEtms.
(4.5)




due to the semilogarithmic specification of the
inverse demand function, the empirical version of the firms behavior (4.2)
reduces to:
ptms = MCtms − b1θtms + νtms, (4.6)
where νtms is also an i.i.d. error.
For the sake of identification, we allow the conduct parameter to vary across
monopoly and duopoly periods.11 We use the information gathered by the
10Intuition might suggest that there are economies of density in the provision of cellular
services, because antennas can be used more efficiently in densily populated areas. In this
paper DENSITY is excluded from the cost shifters because, quantity is proxied by the
number of antennas and we would not expect the costs of an additional antenna to decrease
in population density.
11Note that, allowing the conduct parameter to vary across regimes, we also take into
account that market structure has an influence on market conduct.
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unique market structure also to perform a specification test, since our model
should correctly predict the hypothesis θtms = 1 during monopoly periods. For
these periods and for the functional forms assumed in (4.4) and (4.5), we could
not reject this hypothesis at the 5% confidence level.12
In order to increase the efficiency of our estimates, we then impose this
result as a restriction and set θtms equal to one during monopoly periods. For
the duopoly period, we assume that the conduct parameter is a function of
several structural characteristics such as market structure variables, regulation,
and lobbying expenditures that, at this stage, are taken to be exogenous. To
check the robustness of our main results, we adopt two different specifications
for the conduct parameter. The first assumes a linear approximation for the








where θ̃tms = d0 + d1MULTIMKTtms + d2CROSSOWNtms + d3BBtms +
d4PREGts + d5LOBBYts.
Yet, since our theoretical model predicts values for the conjectural variation
parameter ranging from 0 to 1, we compare the specification above to one
which maps the linear approximation of θ̃tms into (0,1). We do this by means
of the logistic distribution function that is a strictly monotonic transformation
mapping values from the interval (−∞, +∞) into the interval (0, 1). The









12In order to fully exploit the available information, the test was carried out using the
original, non-aggregated data.
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We also impose the second order condition for a profit maximum:13
b1 =
a1 Qtms
θtms ENTRYtms + 1
− exp(e). (4.9)
The empirical implementation of the model developed in this section im-
plies the simultaneous estimation of equations (4.4) and (4.6), with the second
order condition (4.9) and the varying conduct parameter (4.7) or (4.8) depend-
ing on the chosen specification.
4.4 Endogenous Lobbying
In this section, we further develop the previous model in order to account for
lobbying endogeneity. We do not have a structural model for the firms’ political
decision, hence we use insights from the theoretical literature discussed above
to derive a lobbying equation. The key idea is that lobbying expenditures
depend on firms’ ability to coordinate in the political market. Since we do
not have a measure of this coordination and since there exists a relationship
between coordination in the political and in the product markets, we use the
empirically estimated measure of firms’ conduct in the product market to proxy
for firms’ conduct in the political arena. Hence, the lobbying at the state level
depends first on an aggregation of conduct in each market within a state. The
lobbying equation is the following:
Lts = h (θt1s, ..., θtMs, πt1s, ..., πtMs, λts) , (4.10)
where m = 1, ..,M are the product markets, πtms is a measure of market prof-
itability, and λts is a vector of exogenous state-specific characteristics, such
as the government’s political orientation and the structure of the state regu-
latory body. We control for the impact of market profitability on the choice
to contribute, because one might argue that the firms’ incentive to contribute
in order to achieve a favorable regulatory environment increases with the ben-
efits, which can be gained in such an environment. Regulatory and political
13This is the empirical implementation of the second order condition derived by differen-
tiating equation (4.2) with respect to the total market quantity Qtms.
4.4. Endogenous Lobbying 120
factors are taken into account, since these shape firms’ ability and the cost to
effectively influence the policy maker.
The empirical specification of the lobbying equation is then a linear combi-
nation of exogenous political and regulatory variables, the conduct parameter,
and an endogenous measure of firms’ profitability:
LOBBYts = c0 + c1
M∑
m=1






+ λts c3 + ηts,
(4.11)
where c3 denotes a vector of coefficients for the political and regulatory control
variables in λts and ηts is an i.i.d. stochastic term. Note that, since the
lobbying equation is estimated at the state level, market specific variables
must be aggregated to match this observational unit. An intuitive procedure
is to construct a weighted average of the market variables with the weights
γtms reflecting the “relative importance” of a market within the state, which
we proxy using the ratio between market population and the total population
of the markets belonging to the same state POPtms∑
m∈s POPtms
.
The main challenge in investigating how firms’ political activity is influ-
enced by their ability to coordinate in the product market is that the latter is
usually not directly observable. From equations (4.6) and (4.11) it is apparent
that we address the simultaneity between market conduct and lobbying by
inserting the variable parameter θtms, which is to be estimated in the first or-
der condition, into the lobbying equation as if it were observed. Consequently
the estimates of d0 to d5 result from a parameter constraint over (4.6) and
(4.11). This raises the obvious question whether our approach biases d0 to d5
and hence θtms. Such a bias would indeed occur if the exogenous variables
that are used to explain conduct had themselves a direct effect on lobbying,
which is not accounted for. In order to avoid this problem, we control in equa-
tion (4.11) for PREG and POPSTATE, because they are correlated to those
variables used in the construction of the aggregated measure of collusion and
both are expected to influence lobbying beyond their effect on collusion. It
is much more difficult to justify why the non-aggregated, market-level vari-
ables MULTIMKT, CROSSOWN and BB should affect state-level campaign
contributions and thus we omit them from equation (4.11).
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The empirical implementation of the full model implies the simultaneous
estimation of equations (4.4), (4.6), and (4.11) with the varying conduct pa-
rameter specified in (4.7) or (4.8) and the second order condition (4.9).
4.5 Results
In this section we analyze the results of the non-linear 2SLS estimation of the
empirical models developed above. Before presenting the results for the full
model, we shortly discuss a preliminary estimation of the market model where
we assume a constant conduct parameter and exclude the lobbying equation,
with the aim of testing hypotheses about market behavior.
Table 4.5 reports the results of the non-linear 2SLS estimation where we
impose θtms = 1 for the monopoly period as well as the second order condi-
tion (4.9), in order to enhance efficiency.14 The table shows that most of the
estimated coefficients in the marginal cost equation are significant and of the
expected sign. The effect of quantity is not significantly different from zero,
which suggests the presence of constant returns to scale.15 In the inverse de-
mand equation the per capita income and population density have a significant
impact, which is positive as expected. This means, in fact, that cellular prices
were significantly higher in rich and densely populated metropolitan areas.
The point estimate for the constant conduct parameter is equal to 0.93. At
any usual significance level cartel behavior cannot be rejected, while the Nash
as well as the competitive equilibrium are ruled out at type-I errors of 10% and
5%, respectively. This result suggests that, on average, firms in the U.S. mo-
bile telecommunications sector colluded during the sample period, such that
their conduct cannot be distinguished from monopoly or cartel behavior even
after the second firm had entered the market.16
14As a robustness check, we estimated the same model without imposing the second order
condition and verifying, ex post, that it was satisfied.
15Note, that it might be crucial for this result that quantity is approximated by the number
of cells, i.e. antennas, in the market.
16This result was originally obtained by Parker and Röller (1997). The adopted specifi-
cation is, though, slightly different, which explains the deviations in the point estimates for
some of the parameters.
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4.5.1 Exogenous Lobbying
The results from the estimation of the market model with a varying conduct
parameter when lobbying expenditures are taken to be exogenous are reported
in Table 4.6. As we discussed in the previous section, we present two speci-
fications depending on the functional assumptions we impose on the conduct
parameter. Qualitatively as well as quantitatively the new findings reflect
those derived from the previous model. Some minor differences among models
and specifications can however be noticed.17
In the marginal cost equation, energy and operational cost drivers lose sig-
nificance. Also, in the first specification of the demand equation population
density is not significant, while population has now a significant and positive
coefficient estimate as expected. The major divergences between the two spec-
ifications pertains to the coefficients’ estimates in the conduct equation. This
was expected given that the functional restrictions enter at this stage of the
estimation procedure. When we assume a linear specification for the conduct
parameter, all coefficients are significant. In particular, the key result is that
lobbying expenditures have a negative and significant effect on firms’ conduct.
This finding, however, does not hold in the second specification where most
of the other coefficients’ estimates also lose significance. We will discuss this
result and its interpretation in the next section. In both specifications, the
constant is positive and significant and the cross-ownership parameter has a
negative and significant impact on firms’ conduct. The variable multimarket
has a negative parameter in both specifications but this is significant only in
the first one, while the parameter’s estimate of the regulatory dummy is nega-
tive and significant in the first specification and not significant in the second.18
17Yet, the sample on which we run this regressions is different than the one we used before.
We choose, in fact, to employ the same sample that we will use for the full model also for
the market model with varying conduct parameter, in order to make the two models directly
comparable. Very similar results were obtained using the full sample.
18These results differ considerably from the one obtained by Parker and Röller (1997).
However there are many differences between the two analyses. First, we run the regression on
a aggregated sample and, second, the adopted specifications differ in several points especially
concerning the conduct parameter: Whereas they tested different set of variables separately,
we use all exogenous variables together. The major difference is, however, that we control
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4.5.2 Endogenous Lobbying
We can now turn to the results from the simultaneous estimation of the full
model: the inverse market demand, market supply and lobbying expenditures
including the varying conduct parameter and the second order condition (4.9).
The findings for the two specifications are presented in Table 4.7. Among
cost shifters the office and operational costs as well as the cost of capital
are significant and positive as expected in both specification, while energy
costs and the constant are significant only in the first one. The estimates are
comparable to those presented above. In the second specification of the full
model, the estimators in the demand equation perform much more satisfactory
in terms of significance and sign. Not only are income and population density
significant and positive as seen before, but also the population size is now
positive and significant and the time control is significant and negative. These
two new results are also in line with intuition, since cellular tariffs are expected
to increase with population size and to decrease in time as competition among
firms becomes more effective.
One key result that we observe in the full model is that lobbying expendi-
tures do have a negative and highly significant effect on market conduct in both
specifications: Higher total contributions offered by the industry to political
parties reduce collusion among firms. This might suggest that coordination in
the product market and in political activities are perceived by firms as sub-
stitutes. A more thorough interpretation of this result will be provided below
when we discuss the impact of collusion on lobbying. Notice that the coeffi-
cient’s size is 8 to 10 times bigger than in the model with exogenous lobbying
efforts, meaning that endogeneity matters.
Turning to the other structural characteristics, which are expected to influ-
ence market conduct, the divergences between the two specifications are now
less sharp than in the previous model. In both specifications cross-ownership
structures enhance collusion among firms, while we do not find a significant
multimarket effect. Furthermore we observe that Bell companies have an ad-
vantage in coordinating relative to independent firms, even though this effect
for firms’ lobbying activities while they do not.
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is only partially significant in the second specification and not significant in the
first. Regulation is found to have a significant and negative impact on firms’
ability to collude but only in the first specification, while it is not significant
in the second. This implies that firms’ ability to sustain collusion was lower
in regulated states. The coefficient estimates for the second order condition is
significantly different from zero in both specifications, which means that the
imposed second order condition is not binding.
As discuss above, our first important finding is that high lobbying expen-
ditures apparently hinder collusive agreements. The second main result of this
chapter is that firms in collusive states are less willing to contribute to politi-
cal parties: The coefficient’s estimates for θ are negative and highly significant
in both specifications.19 If we believe, based on Bernheim’s and Whinston’s
(1990) multimarket argument, that coordination in the product market im-
proves the firms’ ability to coordinate political actions, the observed negative
relationship linking product market collusion to the actual lobbying expendi-
tures must be due to the substitutability between political coordination and
lobbying. Interpreted in the light of the rent-seeking literature quoted earlier,
this suggests that the contested rent is private. Therefore, the reduction in the
number of competing players – which is a consequence of coordination – leads
to a lower degree of rent dissipation. Similarly, we would expect such a result
from the menu-auction approach, were the auctioneer’s profits increase with
the level of conflict among the bidders. Coordination can be seen as a device
that reduces the firms’ heterogeneity in valuations about the feasible political
decisions by equalizing their payoffs under alternative regimes. As a result of
more homogeneous interests, firms spend less money or effort to avoid policies
that, without coordination, would have weakened their own strategic position
relative to their competitors’. In other words, coordination among conflicting
parties reduces the costs of buying a particular policy decision.
As it becomes clear from these arguments, the observed negative relation-
ship between lobbying and collusion cannot be explained if fighting regulation
were a pure public good for the firms. This would be the case if tacitly colluding
19However, the coefficient’s size varies due to the fact that, in the first specification, the
conduct parameter is defined between -∞ and +∞, while in the second between 0 and 1.
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firms shifted themselves into a situation were collusion is no longer incentive
compatible, by contributing the collectively optimal lobbying expenditures as
pointed out in Ludema (2001). This effect, however, relies on the existence of
an observational gap which unveils deviation in lobbying only one period after
the market game has finished.20
In explaining lobbying expenditures, current market profitability measured
by the price-cost margin is found to have a slightly significant negative impact
only in the second specification, while it is not significant in the first one. The
interpretation of this result follows the same argument presented above, i.e.
the substitutability between market power and lobbying activities, since the
price cost margin is expected to increase with market power. Also the future
attractiveness of the markets within a state positively affects the political ac-
tivity: While a greater size of the population clearly shifts lobbying upwards
in both specifications, the coefficient of per capita income is not significant.
However, we can exclude a negative effect on lobbying at the 10% level. The
fact that future market profitability seems to be important for the firms ten-
dency to lobby politicians can be explained with the lag between the payment
of campaign contributions and the actual policy decision.
About the political and regulatory variables which were used as controls in
the lobbying equation, we observe the main differences in the coefficients’ size
and significance between the two specifications. In the first one, the governor’s
salary and the number of full time employees in the PUC have a negative and
significant impact on lobbying expenditures. The former can be attributed to
an income effect: The higher the salary a governor earns from his or her posi-
tion, the more difficult it is for rent seekers to advance their interests by means
of monetary contributions. As a consequence interest groups might simply find
it too costly to pursue their political goals or switch to nonmonetary lobby-
ing which we exclude in this study. Regarding the second result, a possible
interpretation is that politicians have less influence on larger bureaucratic in-
stitutions than on smaller. Thus, large PUCs reduce the degree of efficiency to
20This limitation substantially reduces the attractiveness of Ludema’s point, especially
because it is empirically difficult to identify the existence and the length of this observational
gap.
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which firms campaign contributions affect regulatory decisions in the cellular
market. However both effects disappear in the second specification.
Interestingly, campaign contributions decrease with regulation, but this
finding is only significant in the first specification. While, at first glance, this
is surprising given the negative impact regulation had on the firms ability to
collude, it might reflect an asymmetry in the cost of influencing regulatory
decisions. This would imply that it is less expensive to prevent regulation
than to abolish it once it has been adopted, such that firms eventually find it
unprofitable lobbying in order to return to the non-regulated scheme. Finally,
we find that political contributions have been higher in federal election years
echoing the needs of candidates to finance their elections campaigns. In an
attempt to estimate a parsimonious model, we omitted the control variables
GOVDEM, LEGDEM, PUCMEM ,PUCTERM, PUCSAL, ELECT, PRES-
ELECT, LEGISELECT and TIGHT from the final estimation because their
effect was not significant in any model that could be obtained by including
some or all of these variables into the specification of Table 4.7.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter empirically investigates the relationship between market collu-
sion and lobbying expenditures. We explicitly model that firms’ conduct in
the product market influences firms’ decisions about contributions to the po-
litical system and, simultaneously, that their lobbying activities shape their
product market behavior as well. Our intuition is that cooperation in the
product market, by affecting cooperation in the political market, can be ex-
pected to have an impact on lobbying expenditures. Depending on the nature
of the contested rent, the effect can be positive or negative. The Aim of our
study is to analyze its existence and sign. Because of its unique regulatory and
market environment, we used data from the U.S. mobile telecommunications
industry that guarantees enough variation in all relevant dimensions to identify
firms’ market and political behavior. In order to estimate market interactions,
we adopt the conjectural variation approach, which we have modified in order
to allow for a varying conduct parameter across markets and augmented by
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the estimation of the endogenous lobbying decisions. Since regulatory deci-
sions are made at the state rather than at the market level, we estimate the
lobbying equation using the states as the observation unit, whereas the market
game is structurally estimated using the Metropolitan Statistical Areas as the
observation unit. The different models are estimated by non-linear 2SLS.
We find a strong, robust, and significant relationship between our measure
of collusion and the industry’s lobbying expenditures. In both directions, this
relation is negative, implying that higher lobbying expenditures foster a more
competitive industry and that collusive conduct reduces firms’ willingness to
contribute to the political system. Our interpretation of this result relies on a
multimarket contact type of argument. If product market collusion acts as a
coordination device in lobbying formation, firms in collusive markets achieve
a reduction of the degree of conflict among themselves through coordination.
Thus, they are better able to extract rents from the interactions with the
political system and therefore campaign contributions are reduced.
Our results, pointing out the existence of this strong relationship, are a
first step into a deeper comprehension of the political economy of industrial
organization. In order to fully understand firms’ behavior in a regulated in-
dustry, one should be aware of the fact that they interact not only in the
product market but also in the political arena, and that their conduct in the
two markets is interrelated. This consideration has important policy implica-
tions. Assume that the regulatory authority has instruments to successfully
fight collusive behavior in order to enhance consumers’ welfare. If product
market cooperation is positively related to firms’ cooperation in the political
arena, then a regulatory intervention that reduces collusion will also decrease
coordination in lobbying. In the case of a private good type of regulation, this
implies an increase in campaign contributions, which amounts to a welfare
reduction, since lobbying expenditures are partially wasteful.21 Although this
argument does not cover all welfare aspects, it illustrates that ignoring the
indirect impact of competition policy on firms’ political activities might bias
the evaluation of its benefits. Similarly, limitations on campaign contributions
21We thank Johan Lagerlöf for pointing out to us this possible mechanism.
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might have unexpected welfare effects by influencing firms’ behavior in the
product market.
We think that the advantages of structural modeling as developed in the
industrial organization tradition might be also used to improve empirical anal-
ysis in the field of political economy. Our study is a first step in this direction.
A challenging task for future research is to extend the structural analysis
used to model product market interactions to the firms’ political behavior.
Beyond that, the interactions between firms and policy makers should also be
considered in a political economy model of regulation. Thus, a full structural
empirical model, where regulation and firms’ behavior in the product as well as
in the political markets are endogenously considered, seems to be the natural




p Monthly bill for 500 minutes usage (if consumers chose the
least expensive plan)
Parker-Röller (1997)
Q Quantity proxy: Total number of cells in a given network
TIME Time trend in months
POP Market (MSA) Population in million inhabitants
INCOME Market (MSA) annual income per capita in 10.000 $
BUSINESS Number of high-potential business establishments (busi-
ness, health care,professional and legal services, contract
construction, transportation, finance,insurance,real estate)
divided by 1000
ENERGY Average monthly cost per square foot of office space (in $)
PRIME One period lagged prime lending rate
WAGE Average weekly salary per employee for the cellular indus-
try (in 100 $)
RENT Average monthly rent per square foot of office space
OPERATE Average monthly general overhead and operating expenses
per square foot of office space
ENTRY Dummy=1 after the second carrier enters into the market
BB Dummy=1 if both competitors in the market are RBOCs
CROSSOWN Dummy=1 when the two competitors in one market are
partner in any other market
MULTIMKT Total number of markets where the two competitors face
each other
Table 4.1: Definition of Market Variables
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Variables Definition Source
PREG Dummy=1 if no price regulatory ban was imposed
in the market
Duso (2001)
GOVDEM Dummy=1 if the State’s Governor was from the
democratic party
The Book of States and
GSALARY Governor’s annual salary in 10.000 $ The U.S. Statistical Abstract
LEGDEM Dummy=1 if the Democrats had a majority in both
branches of the legislative
PRESELECT Dummy = 1 if year of presidential election
LEGISLELECT Percentage if the state’s legislature that was up for
election in a given year
FEDELECT Dummy = 1 if year of federal election (Senate and
House)
TIGHT Absolute value of the difference between Republi-
cans’ and Democrats’ seats in the state´s legislature
PUCMEM Number of Members the State Public Utility Com-
mission (PUC)
PUCTERM Length of term of the PUC members (years)
PUCSTAFF Number of full-time employees in the State Public
Utility Commission
PUCSAL PUC members’ annual salary in 10.000 $
ELECT Dummy=1 if the regulator was elected
POPSTATE State Population in million inhabitants
INCSTATE State annual income per capita in 10.000 $
LOBBY Total industry annual campaign contributions in
10.000 $ (without AT&T)
Center of Responsive Politics
Table 4.2: Definition of Political and Regulatory Variables
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Full sample Aggregated sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
p 1.972 0.393 1.952 0.400
Q 15.665 17.346 15.097 16.976
TIME 49.240 12.342 51.309 13.879
POP 0.186 0.266 0.172 0.251
INCOME 2.825 0.375 2.809 0.371
DENSITY 0.502 0.398 0.479 0.372
BUSINESS 2.247 0.413 2.226 0.426
ENERGY 1.760 0.372 1.764 0.376
PRIME 9.456 1.107 9.363 1.150
WAGE 5.197 1.285 5.239 1.342
RENT 16.247 4.904 16.526 4.884
OPERATE 6.704 1.683 6.622 1.688
ENTRY 0.680 0.467 0.699 0.449
BB 0.121 0.327 0.115 0.318
MULTIMKT 3.589 2.890 3.580 2.804
CROSSOWN 0.347 0.477 0.337 0.473
Observations 478 287
Table 4.3: Preliminary Statistics - Market Variables
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ENERGY -0.130 0.050 ***
PRIME 0.086 0.037 **
WAGE 0.023 0.016
RENT 0.020 0.005 ***
OPERATE 0.046 0.016 ***
Demand




INCOME 0.158 0.073 **
DENSITY 0.298 0.068 ***
Second Order Condition
e -0.850 0.269 ***
Conduct Parameter
θtms 0.928 0.405 **
Non-linear 2SLS; 478 Observations; Second order condition
(4.9) imposed; *** and ** denotes respectively significance
at the 1% and 5% levels.
Table 4.5: Market Model - Constant Conduct Parameter
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First Specification Second Specification
(linear approx. for θ) (restricted θ)a
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Marginal Cost
constant 0.748 0.227 *** 0.221 0.314
Q -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004
ENERGY -0.082 0.055 -0.049 0.067
PRIME 0.786 0.019 *** 0.834 0.024 ***
WAGE -0.008 0.016 0.017 0.018
RENT 0.024 0.005 *** 0.023 0.007 ***
OPERATE 0.028 0.016 * 0.026 0.021
Inverse Demand
constant 1.749 0.236 *** 1.849 0.309 ***
POP 0.820 0.271 *** 0.379 0.370
TIME -0.0001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
BUSINESS 0.004 0.065 0.080 0.059
INCOME 0.143 0.079 * 0.248 0.080 ***
DENSITY 0.134 0.109 0.355 0.096 ***
Second Order Condition
e -2.081 0.342 *** -0.753 0.284 ***
Conduct Parameter
constant 2.320 0.585 *** 2.793 1.514 *
MULTIMKT -0.203 0.053 *** -0.161 0.189
CROSSOWN -0.964 0.385 ** -1.948 1.180 *
BB -0.835 0.375 ** - -
PREG -0.160 0.078 ** 0.278 1.016
LOBBY -0.055 0.027 ** -0.090 0.114
Nonlinear 2SLS; 287 observations; Second order condition (4.9) imposed; ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels respectively. In the second specification we eliminate BB form the conduct parameter becuase it causes
convergence problems in the estimation..
a
By imposing the logistic distribution function as a specification’s restriction, θ is bounded to (0,1)
Table 4.6: Market Model - Varying Conduct Parameter - Exogenous Lobbying
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First Specification Second Specification
(linear approx. for θ) (restricted θ)a
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Marginal Cost
constant 0.536 0.259 ** 0.293 0.251
Q -2e-04 9e-04 8e-04 0.001
ENERGY -0.107 0.064 * -0.098 0.064
PRIME 0.092 0.021 *** 0.105 0.020 ***
WAGE 0.021 0.017 0.018 0.017
RENT 0.023 0.007 *** 0.022 0.007 ***
OPERATE 0.038 0.020 * 0.038 0.020 *
Inverse Demand
constant 1.787 0.208 *** 1.745 0.211 ***
POP 0.167 0.120 0.304 0.151 **
TIME -0.006 0.002 *** -0.004 0.002 **
BUSINESS 0.051 0.053 0.062 0.052
INCOME 0.105 0.065 0.150 0.066 **
DENSITY 0.265 0.083 *** 0.290 0.082 ***
Second Order Condition
e -3.335 0.383 *** -1.878 0.278 ***
Conduct Parameter
constant 2.346 0.338 *** 3.610 0.359 ***
MULTIMKT -0.055 0.034 0.037 0.044
CROSSOWN 0.157 0.051 *** 0.828 0.309 ***
BB 0.253 0.169 0.466 0.269 *
PREG -0.466 0.051 *** 0.230 0.206
LOBBY -0.489 0.049 *** -0.335 0.070 ***
Lobbying Equation
constant 3.795 0.664 *** 19.272 4.719 ***
θts (conduct parameter) -1.610 0.164 *** -17.684 4.619 ***
Price cost margin -0.075 0.350 -0.746 0.422 *
GSALARY -0.190 0.069 *** -0.088 0.078
PUCSTAFF -0.002 0.001 ** -9e-04 7e-04
INCSTATE 0.532 0.410 -0.441 0.449
POPSTATE 2.327 0.327 *** 2.799 0.340 ***
PREG -0.883 0.177 *** -0.305 0.240
FEDELECT 0.751 0.193 *** 1.271 0.211 ***
Nonlinear 2SLS; 287 observations; Second order condition (4.9) imposed; for parsimony, the political control variables GOVDEM,
LEG DEM, PUCMEM , PUCTERM, PUCSAL, ELECT, PRESELECT, LEGISLELECT, and TIGHT were omitted from the final estimation
because their effect was not significant in any model that could be obtained by augmenting the above specification by these variables.
***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
a
By imposing the logistic distribution function as a specification’s restriction, θ is bounded to (0,1)
Table 4.7: Full Model - Varying Conduct Parameter - Endogenous Lobbying
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
This thesis proposes a new approach to the empirical analysis of the political
economy of the regulatory process, which bridges the political economy and
industrial organization traditions. Throughout this study, I argue that it is
necessary to explicitly model the entire political process that constitutes regu-
latory decisions in order to correctly understand how these are made and how
they impact on the market. The regulatory process is, in fact, the product of
interactions among different agents in the political as well as in the product
markets. Firms interact with each other in order to determine the market
outcome, but also to shape the regulatory environment in which they operate,
which develops out of the interplay among firms, politicians, and bureaucrats.
The adopted empirical approach consists of different methodological steps.
In the first part of the thesis, which is more in line with the empirical political
economy literature, I concentrate on the role of the state. I ask how the
structure of the policy maker and its institutional environment shape policy
choice and, in particular, the ability to implement policy change such as a
reform of the regulatory environment.
In order to do that, I exploit the cross-sectional and time-series variation
observed in the deregulation of the mobile telecommunications industry among
OECD countries and estimate an one-equation reduced-form model of regula-
tory intervention with panel techniques. This first step, which perhaps is the
least innovative from a methodological point of view, is nevertheless necessary
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to understand the role of political forces - in particular political and regulatory
institutions - in influencing policy outcome or, in other words, to endogenize
the political process behind policy making. The richness of the available po-
litical data allowed me to test predictions stemming from various theoretical
approaches developed in political economy and political science.
The first essay illustrate that political considerations significantly matter
in explaining regulatory policy: Regulation is the product of a political process
which must be modeled. I show that a country’s political constitution has an
impact on its regulatory policy decisions. Political institutions, in fact, shape
agents’ incentives to take part in the political process. So, for instance, among
OECD states majoritarian countries were better able to implement policy re-
form than countries with proportional electoral rules or with a consensus-type
of democracy. Also, the types of governments and their ideological and pro-
grammatic positions shaped their ability to implement the deregulation of the
cellular markets, even though they seem to have affected more the speed than
the organization of the regulatory process. The independence and accountabil-
ity of the regulatory agency had a strong impact on the regulatory decisions. A
more independent regulator seems to have reduced the degree of liberalization
in the mobile telecommunications industry. However, the lack of data did not
allow me to make clearer predictions about this issue, which surely deserves a
much deeper analysis. I also found evidence that firms take part in the policy
making process and showed that strong incumbent firms limited the extent of
entry deregulation in their industry. Although this result is a first step into the
analysis of the private interests theory of regulation, I point out the need of
modelling the interactions between product and political markets for a correct
assessment of determinants and effects of regulation.
The second and more innovative step, which methodologically is strongly
connected with the modern empirical industrial organization tradition, consists
of studying firms’ behavior, their strategic market and non-market interactions,
and the interactions between firms and the policy maker in the political arena.
To address this issues, I move from the simple estimation of one-equation
models towards the development of more complex systems of equations, which
allow me to simultaneously study the strategic behavior of the different agents
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interacting in the markets.
The two essays that constitute the second part of this thesis follow this
approach. In Chapter 3, I analyze price regulation’s impact on firms’ pricing
behavior, taking into account the regulatory choice’s endogeneity. I do that
by estimating an endogenous switching regression model that allows me to
study how the political and regulatory environment, as well as the lobbying
activities of firms shape the choice of regulatory regime while simultaneously
considering firms’ strategic behavior in the regulated product market. In this
second essay, using data from the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry,
I showed the importance of considering the endogeneity of regulation when
questioning its effects on firms behavior: Regulation must be considered en-
dogenous because of the firms’ lobbying activities. The data strongly support
this hypothesis. Taking regulation’s endogeneity into account, I showed that
its effect on cellular tariffs has been limited. In those markets which were
regulated, cellular tariffs would not have been significantly lower with than
without regulation. Yet, I also showed that this would have been the case in
non regulated markets, if regulation had been implemented. The explanation
for this phenomenon, stemming from my empirical analysis, is that firms man-
aged to avoid a regulated environment exactly in those market were regulation
would have been tough. Moreover, I also showed that the political and regula-
tory environment played a central role in the determination of this particular
policy. The political affiliation of states’ governments as well as the structure
and characteristics of the regulatory authority shaped their price regulatory
decisions.
In Chapter 4, together with Astrid Jung we focus on the interactions among
firms not only in the product market but also in the political arena. The
idea is that firms behave strategically when they make production decisions
as well as when they make non-market decisions such as exerting lobbying
efforts. Moreover, these choices are interrelated, since they are two aspects
of the same maximization problem. In this chapter, the connection with the
empirical industrial organization literature is even stronger. We adopted the
conjectural variation approach, which is an established tool in the empirical
analysis of firms’ behavior and which allows us to identify firms’ conduct by
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simultaneously estimating a demand function and a first order condition for
the firms’ profit maximization problem. This standard methodology has been
augmented in order to encompass also endogenous firms’ political decisions.
Therefore, we were able to address the question of whether and how firms’
collusive conduct in the product market and their lobbying expenditures are
interrelated. We showed that firms’ lobbying expenditure have a strong and
significant negative impact on firms ability to collude, and that a high degree
of cooperation in the product market reduced firms lobbying expenditures.
The interpretation for this result is that cooperation in the product market,
by acting as a coordination device in the lobbying formation, reduced the
conflict among competing firms, hence increasing their ability to extract rent
from the political process. Also, we showed that the political and regulatory
environments shaped firms lobbying decisions.
The development of databases which allow us to implement the proposed
econometric models and to test theoretical predictions, is one important ele-
ment of an empirical study. In this thesis, I worked out two new databases by
merging information from various sources. The first database focuses on the
deregulation of the mobile telecommunications industry in OECD countries
during the 1990’s. Specific data on regulatory policy and regulatory insti-
tutions stemming from different OECD data banks, have been merged with
information about the member state’s political and institutional environment.
The second database, which was used in Chapters 3 and 4, is about the
U.S. mobile telecommunications industry during the second half of the 1980’s.
The basis is constituted by a unique data set on market’s characteristics that
has been kindly made available by Phil Parker and Lars-Hendrik Röller. For
the second essay, I enriched it with information stemming form the Book of the
States and the U.S. Statistical Abstract about the state’s regulatory policy and
the political and regulatory environments. For the third essay, Astrid Jung
and I rearranged the data used for the previous work and added additional
political variables as well as information about firms’ lobbying expenditures as
expressed by their campaign contributions.
I believe that the two data sets constitute an excellent basis for analyses
of the political economy of regulation since both contain market information
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that are necessary for studying the firms’ market interactions and the policy
incidence, and political, regulatory, and institutional variables, which allow a
careful study of the policy making process. Both databases, whose develop-
ment I consider one of the contributions of this thesis, will surely be valuable
for further research. Especially the database on OECD deregulation can still
be widely exploited, since the study presented in the second chapter constitutes
only a preliminary analysis of the political side of the data, which was useful
for fully understanding the importance of political considerations, but that can
be enriched to encompass the relationship between market and politics.1
I consider this thesis as a first step towards an empirical approach to the
political economy of industrial and competition policy. In fact, the method-
ology that I used in this work is not limited to the analysis of regulation but
rather it can be applied to the analysis of other forms of economic policy such
as merger control, the allocation of infrastructure investments, the allocation
of state aid.2 The main point I made in this work is that, in order to cor-
rectly analyze policy incidence (both from the empirical and theoretical point
of views), it is necessary to recognize the endogenous nature of the policy de-
cisions, which must be explicitly modeled. Moreover, I point out the need
for considering that firms operate in many different dimensions that influence
each other. Particularly, the link between firms’ product market conduct and
their lobbying behavior play a central role when analyzing regulated markets.
1Duso and Röller (2001) propose a first analysis of the interactions between product and
political markets using the database on OECD deregulation and making more extensive use
of the market side of the data.
2See for instance Duso, Neven and Röller (2002) for an empirical analysis of the political
economy of merger control procedures that uses European data.
Bibliography
Alesina, A. (1987). Macro-economic policy in a two-party system as a repeated
game. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102:651–78.
Alesina, A. and Drazen, A. (1991). Why Are Stabilizations Delayed? American
Economic Review, 81:1170–88.
Alesina, A. and Rosenthal, H. (1995). Partisan Politics, Divided Government
and the Economy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Austen-Smith, D. (2000). Redistributing Income under Proportional Repre-
sentation. Journal of Political Economy, 108:1235–1269.
Baron, D. (1988). Regulation and Legislative Choice. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 19:467–477.
Baron, D. (1995). The Economics and Politics of Regulation. In Banks, J. and
Hanusheck, E., editors, Modern Political Economy, pages 10–62. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Baron, D. (1999). Integrated Market and Nonmarket Strategies in Client and
Interest Group Politics. Business and Politics, 1:7–34.
Baron, D. (2001). Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority
Rule and Executive Institutions. Journal of Economic and Management
Strategy, 10:47–89.
Baron, D. and Myerson, R. (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown
Costs. Econometrica, 50:911–930.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 142
Becker, G. S. (1983). A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98:371–400.
Becker, G. S. (1985). Public Policies, Public Pressure, and Dead Weight Loss.
Journal of Public Economics, 28:329–347.
Bergman, L., Doyle, C., Gual, J., Hultkrantz, L., Neven, D., Roeller, L.-H., and
Waverman, L. (1998). Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting Priori-
ties. Monitoring European Deregulation. 1-Telecommunications. CEPR,
London.
Bernheim, D. B. and Whinston, M. D. (1986a). Common Agency. Economet-
rica, 54:923–942.
Bernheim, D. B. and Whinston, M. D. (1986b). Menu Auctions, Resource
Allocation, and Economic Influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
101:1–31.
Bernheim, D. B. and Whinston, M. D. (1990). Multimarket Contact and
Collusive Behavior. Rand Journal of Economics, 21:1–26.
Besley, T. (2000). Political Institutions and Policy Competition. Technical
report, mimeo, London.
Besley, T. and Case, A. (2000). Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the
Incidence of Endogenous Policies. The Economic Journal, 110:F672–F694.
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An Economic Model of Representative Democ-
racy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108:85–114.
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (2000a). Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: The-
ory and Evidence. Working paper 7579, NBER.
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (2000b). The Public Choice Critique to Public Eco-
nomics: An Exploration. Technical report, mimeo, London and Ithaca
NY.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
Besley, T. and Coate, S. (2001). Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative
Democracy. Review of Economic Studies, 68:67–82.
Boylaud, O. and Nicoletti, G. (2000). Regulation Market Structure and Per-
formance in Telecommunications. Economics department working paper,
no. 237, OECD, Paris.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1989). Empirical Studies in Industry with Market Power.
In Schmalansee, R. and Willig, R., editors, Handbook of Industrial Orga-
nization, pages 1011–1057. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Buchanan, J. M. and Tullok, G. (1962). The Calculus of Consensus. University
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour.
Budge, I., Klingelman, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., and Tanderbaum, E.
(2001). Mapping Policy Preferences. Estimates for Parties, Electors and
Governments 1945-1998. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Cadot, O., Roeller, L.-H., and Stephan, A. (1999). A Political Economy Model
of Infrastructure Allocations: An Empirical Assessment. Cepr discussion
paper 2336, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fr Sozialforschung.
Chang, H.-J. (1997). The Economics and Politics of Regulation. Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 21:703–728.
Crandall, R. W. (1991). After the Breakup: U.S. Telecommunications in
a more Competitive Era. Technical report, The Brookings Institution,
Washington D.C.
Cusack, T. (1997). Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public
Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989. Public Choice,
91:375–95.
Damania, R. and Fredriksson, P. G. (2000). On the Formation of Industry
Lobby Groups. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 41:315–
335.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 144
De-Soto, H. (1990). The Other Path. Harper and Row, New York.
Dixit, A. (1996). The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Costs Poli-
tics Perspective. MIT Press, Cambridge.
Dixit, A., Grossmann, G., and Helpman, E. (1997). Common Agency and
Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy
Making. Journal of Political Economy, 105:752–769.
Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., de Silanes, F. L., and Shleiler, A. (2002). The
Regulation of Entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117:1–38.
Donald, S. G. and Sappington, D. E. (1995). Explaining the Choice Among
Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry. Journal of
Economics and Management Strategy, 4:237–265.
Donald, S. G. and Sappington, D. E. (1997). Choosing Among Regulatory
Options in the United States Telecommunications Industry. Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 12:227–243.
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic theory of Democracy. Harper, New York.
Duso, T., Neven, D., and Roeller, L.-H. (2002). An Empirical Analysis of
Merger Control. Wzb discussion paper, forthcoming, Wissenschaftszen-
trum Berlin fr Sozialforschung.
Duso, T. and Roeller, L.-H. (2001). Toward a Political Economy of Industrial
Organization: Empirical Regularities from Deregulation. Wzb discussion
paper fs-iv 01-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fr Sozialforschung.
Estache, A. and Martimort, D. (1998). Transaction Costs, Politics, Regulatory
Institutions, and Regulatory Outcomes. Edi regulatory reform discussion
paper, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
Faulhaber, G. R. (1997). Lobbying, voting and the Political Economy of Price
Regulation. Insead working paper 97/85/eps, INSEAD.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 145
Faure-Grimaud, A. and Martimort, D. (2000). Regulatory Inertia. mimeo,
London and Montreal.
Figuero, J. M. D. and Tiller, E. H. (2001). The structure and Conduct of Cor-
porate Lobbying: How Firms lobby the Federal Communications Com-
mission. Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, 10:91–122.
Fiorina, M. P. (1982). Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process
or Administrative Process? Public Choice, 39:33–66.
Gawande, K. and Bandyopadhyay, U. (2000). Is Protection for Sale? Evidence
on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 82:139–152.
Goldberg, P. and Maggi, G. (1999). Protection for Sale: An Empirical Inves-
tigation. American Economic Review, 89:1135–1154.
Gonec, R., Maher, M., and Nicoletti, G. (2000). The Implementation and
Effects of Regulatory Reform: Past Experience and Current Issues. Eco-
nomics department working paper, no. 251, OECD, Paris.
Gormley, W. (1981). Non-electoral Participation as a Response to Issue-specific
Conditions: The Case of Public Utility Regulation. Social Science Quar-
terly, 62, 3:527–539.
Green, E. J. and Porter, R. H. (1984). Noncooperative Collusion under Im-
perfect Price Information. Econometrica, 52:87–100.
Green, W. (1993). Econometric Analysis. McMillan, New York, 2nd edition.
Grier, K. B. and Munger, M. C. (1991). Committee Assignments, Constituent
Preferences, and Campaign Contributions. Economic Inquiry, 29:24–43.
Grier, K. B., Munger, M. C., and Roberts, B. E. (1991). The Industrial
Organization of Corporate Political Participation. Southern Economic
Journal, 57:727–738.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 146
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for Sale. American Eco-
nomic Review, 84:833–850.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1996). Electoral Competition and Special
Interests Politics. Review of Economic Studies, 63:265–286.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (2001). Special Interest Politics. MIT Press,
Cambridge MA.
Gruber, H. and Verboven, F. (2001a). The Diffusion of Mobile Telecommu-
nications Services in the European Union. European Economic Review,
45:577–588.
Gruber, H. and Verboven, F. (2001b). The Evolution of Markets under En-
try and Standards Regulation - The Case of Mobile Telecommunications.
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 19:1189–1212.
Hausman, J. A. (1995). The Cost of Cellular Telephone Regulation. mimeo,
MIT.
Hausman, J. A. (1997). Valuing the Effects of Regulation on New Services
in Telecommunications. Technical report, Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Microeconomics.
Hazlett, T. W. (1996). Cable Television Rate Deregulation. International
Journal of the Economics of Business, 3:145–163.
Heckman, J. J. (1976). The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Trun-
cation, Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple
Estimator for such Models. Annals of Economic and Social Measurement,
5:475–492.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econo-
metrica, 47:153–61.
Helpman, E. and Persson, T. (2001). Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining.
Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 1:Article 3.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 147
Hibbs, D. A. (1987a). The Political Economy of Industrial Democracy. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hibbs, D. A. (1987b). The American Political Economy. Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Hillman, A. L., Long, N. V., and Soubeyran, A. (2001). Protection, Lobbying,
and Market Structure. Journal of International Economics, 54:383–409.
Irwin, D. A. and Kroszner, R. S. (1999). Interests, Institutions, and Ideology
in Securing Policy change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberal-
ization after Smooth-Hawley. Journal of Law and Economics, 42:643–673.
Joskow, P. and Rose, N. (1989). The Effects of Economic Regulation. In
Schmalansee, R. and Willig, R., editors, Handbook of Industrial Organi-
zation. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Kaestner, R. and Kahn, B. (1990). The Effects of Regulation and Competition
on the Price of AT&T Interstate Telephone Service. Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 2:263–377.
Kahn, A. (1988). The Economics of Regulation: Principles and Institutions.
MIT Press, Cambridge,MA.
Kalt, J. P. and Zupan, M. A. (1984). Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics. American Economic Review, 74:302–22.
Kaserman, D. D., Mayo, J. W., and Pacey, P. L. (1993). The Political Econ-
omy of Deregulation: The Case of Intrastate Long Distance. Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 5:49–63.
Katz, E., Nitzan, S., and Rosenberg, J. (1990). Rent-seeking for Pure Public
Goods. Public Choice, 65:49–60.
Keefer, P. (2001). When Do Special Interests Run Rampant? Disentangling
the Role of Elections, Incomplete Information, and Checks and Balances
in Banking Crisis. Technical report, Development Research Group, World
Bank.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 148
Kenny, L. W., fei Lee, L., Maddala, G., and Trost, R. P. (1979). Returns to
College Education: An Investigation of Self-Selection Bias Based on the
Project Talent Data. International Economic Review, 20:775–789.
Kridel, D. J., Sappington, D. E., and Weisman, D. L. (1996). The Effects
of Incentive Regulation in the Telecommunications Industry: A Survey.
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 9:269–306.
Kroszner, R. S. and Strahan, P. (1999). What Drives Deregulation? Economics
and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114:1437–1467.
Krueger, A. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 64:291–303.
Laffont, J.-J. (1996). Industrial Policy and Politics. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 14:1–27.
Laffont, J.-J. (1999). Incentives and Political Economy: 1997 Clarendon Lec-
tures. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Laffont, J.-J. and Martimort, D. (1999). Separation of Regulators against
Collusive Behavior. RAND Journal of Economics, 30:232–262.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1990). The Politics of Decision-Making: Regula-
tory Institutions. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 6:1–32.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1991). The Politics of Government Decision-
Making: a Theory of Regulatory Capture. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 106:1089–1127.
Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement
and Regulation. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Lee, L. (1978). Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equation Model
with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables. International Eco-
nomics Review, 19:415–433.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 149
Lee, L. (1979). Identification and Estimation of Binary choice Models with
Limited (Censored) Dependent Variables. Econometrica, 47:977–996.
Levin, R. (1981). Railroad Rates, Profitability, and Welfare under Deregula-
tion. Bell Journal of Economics, 12:1–26.
Levy, B. and Spiller, P. (1996). Regulations, Institutions and Commitment.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Li, W., Qiang, C. Z.-W., and Xu, L. C. (2001). The Political Economy of Pri-
vatisation and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the Telecom-
munications Sector. mimeo, World Bank and Virginia University.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Yale University Press, New Haven
and London.
Limdep (1999). User’s Manual, Version 7.0. Australia. Econometric Software.
Lizzeri, A. and Perisco, N. (2001). The Provision of Public Goods under
Alternative Electoral Incentives. American Economic Review, 91:225–239.
Long, S. J. (1997). Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent
Variables. SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Ludema, R. D. (2001). Market Collusion and the Politics of Protection. Eu-
ropean Journal of Political Economy, 17:817–833.
Maddala, G. (1987). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econo-
metrics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Maddala, G. and Nelson, F. (1975). Switching Regression Model with Exoge-
nous and Endogenous Switching. In Proceeding of the American Statistical
Association, pages 423–426. Business and Economics Section.
Mathios, A. D. and Rogers, R. P. (1989). The Impact of Alternative Forms
of State Regulation of AT&T on Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone
Rates. RAND Journal of Economics, 20:437–453.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 150
Mayo, J. W. and Otsuka, Y. (1991). Demand Pricing and Regulation: Evidence
from the Cable TV Industry. RAND Journal of Economics, 21:396–410.
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., and Weingast, B. R. (1989). Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Polit-
ical control of Agencies. Virginia Law Review, 75:431–482.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.-M., Perotti, R., and Rostagno, M. (2002). Electoral Systems
and Public Spending. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 67:609–658.
Mitra, D. (1999). Endogenous Lobbying Formation and Endogenous Pro-
tection: A Long Run Model of Trade Policy Determination. American
Economic Review, 89:1116–1134.
Morrison, S. A. and Winston, C. (1986). The Economic Effects of Airline
Deregulation. Technical report, The Brookings Institution, Washington
DC.
Morrison, S. A. and Winston, C. (1991). The Dynamics if Airline Pricing and
Competition. American Economic Review, 80:389–93.
Neven, D., Nuttal, R., and Seabright, P. (1993). Mergers in Daylight. The
Economics and Policy of Merger control in the EC. CEPR, London.
Nicoletti, G. (2001). Regulation in Services: OECD Patterns and Economic
Implications. Economics department working paper, no. 278, OECD,
Paris.
Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling Rent-seeking Contests. European Journal of
Political Economy, 10:41–60.
Noll, R. (1989). Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation. In
Schmalansee, R. and Willig, R., editors, Handbook of Industrial Organi-
zation. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Noll, R. (2001). Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries. In
Krueger, A. O., editor, Economic and Policy Reform: The Second Stage.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 151
OECD (2000). Regulatory Reform in Network Industries: Past Experience
and Current Issues. In OECD Economic Outlook No. 67. OECD.
Olson, M. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Parker, P. and Roeller, L.-H. (1997). Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multi-
market Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry.
RAND Journal of Economics, 28:304–322.
Pecorino, P. (1998). Is There a Free Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous
Tariffs, Trigger Strtategies, and the Number of Firms. American Economic
Review, 88:652–660.
Pecorino, P. (2001). Market Structure, Tariff Lobbying and the Free-Rider
Problem. Public Choice, 106:203–220.
Peltzman, S. (1976). Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal
of Law and Economics, 19:211–240.
Peltzman, S. (1989). The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of
Deregulation. Brookings papers in Economic Activity: Microeconomics,
Special Issue:1–41.
Persson, T. (2001). Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy? Econo-
metrica, forthcoming.
Persson, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G. (1997). Separation of Powers and
Political Accountability. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112:1163–1202.
Persson, T., Roland, G., and Tabellini, G. (2000). Comparative Politics and
Public Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 108:1121–1161.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1999). The Size and Scope of Government:
Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians. 1998 Marshall Lecture.
European Economic Review, 43:699–735.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 152
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics. Explaining Eco-
nomic Policy. MIT Press, Cambridge MA.
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (2001). Political Institutions and Policy Out-
comes: What are the Stylized Facts? mimeo, Stockholm and Milan.
Pittman, R. (1988). Rent-Seeking and Market Structure. Public Choice,
58:173–185.
Pommerehne, W. W. (1990). The Empirical Relevance of Comparative Insti-
tutional Analysis. European Economic Review, 34:458–469.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1993). The enduring nineteenth-century battle
for economic regulation: the Interstate Commerce Act revisited. The
Journal of Law and Economics, 36:837–860.
Poole, K. T. and Rosenthal, H. (1997). Congress: A Political-Economic His-
tory of Roll Call Voting. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Porter, R. H. (1983a). Optimal Cartel Trigger Price Strategies. Journal of
Economic Theory, 29:263–367.
Porter, R. H. (1983b). A Study of Cartel Stability: the Joint Executive Com-
mittee, 1880-1886. Bell Journal of Economics, 14:301–314.
Posner, R. (1970). A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement. Journal of
Law and Economics, 13:365–419.
Posner, R. (1974). Theories of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science, 5:335–358.
Posner, R. (1975). The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation. Journal of
Political Economy, 83:807–827.
Potters, J. and Sloof, R. (1996). Interest Groups: A Survey of Empirical
Models That Try to Assess Their Influence. European Journal of Political
Economy, 12:403–442.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 153
Potters, J. and van Winden, F. (1996). Model of Interest Groups: Four Dif-
ferent Approaches. In Schofield, N., editor, Collective Decision-Making:
Social Choice and Political Economy., pages 337–362. Kluwer Academic,
Amsterdam.
Pryor, F. L. (2002). Quantitative Notes on The Extent of Governmental Reg-
ulations in Various OECD Nations. International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 20:693–715.
Rohlfs, J. H., Jackson, C. L., and Kelly, T. E. (1991). Estimate of the Loss
to the United States Caused by the FCC’s Delay in Licensing Cellular
Telecommunications. Working paper, National Economic Research Asso-
ciates.
Romer, T. and Rosenthal, H. (1987). Modern Political Economy and the Study
of Regulation. In Bailey, E., editor, Public Regulation, pages 73–116. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Ruiz, K. L. (1995). Pricing Strategies and Regulatory Effects in the U.S.
Cellular Telecommunications Duopolies. In Brock, G., editor, Towards
a Competitive Telecommunications Industry, pages 13–45. Lawrence Erl-
baum Associates, Mahwah, NJ.
Salomon, L. and Siegfried, J. (1977). Economic power and Political Influence:
The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy. American Political
Science Review, 71:1026–1043.
Shew, W. B. (1994). Regulation, Competition, and Prices in the U.S. Cellular
Telephone Industry. Working paper, American Enterprise Institute.
Smart, S. R. (1994). The Consequences of Appointment Methods and Party
Control for Telecommunications Pricing. Journal of Economics and Man-
agement Strategy, 3:301–323.
Spiller, P. T. (1990). Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-
Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, or ‘Let Them Be Bribed. Journal
of Law and Economics, 33:65–101.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 154
Stata (2001). User’s Manual, Version 7.0. STATA Press, College Station,
Texas. Econometric Software.
Stephan, A. (2002). Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastructure to
Private Production and its Political Economy. Humboldt-University dis-
sertation, Berlin.
Stigler, G. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. The Bell Journal of
Economics, pages 3–21.
Tardiff, T. and Taylor, W. (1993). Telephone Company Performance Under
Alternative Forms of Regulation in the U.S. National Economics Research
Associates, 7.
Teske, P. (1991a). Interests and Institution in State Regulation. American
Journal of Political Science, 35:139–54.
Teske, P. (1991b). Rent-Seeking in the Deregulatory Environment: State
Telecommunications. Public Choice, 68:235–243.
The Council of State Governments (1984). The Book of the States 1984-1985,
volume 25. The Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky.
The Council of State Governments (1986). The Book of the States 1986-1987,
volume 26. The Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky.
The Council of State Governments (1988). The Book of the States 1988-1989,
volume 27. The Council of State Governments, Lexington, Kentucky.
Trillas, F. (2000). The Political Economy of the Access Pricing Problem.
Working paper, mimeo.
Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Muliticameralism and Multipartyism.
British Journal of Political Science, 25:289–325.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 155
Tsebelis, G. (1999). Veto Players and Law Production in Parlimentary Democ-
racies: An Empirical Analysis. American Review of Political Science,
93:591–608.
Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Cost of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft. West-
ern Economic Journal, 5:224–232.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient Rent Seeking. In Buchanan, J., Tollison, R. D.,
and Tullock, G., editors, Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking society,
pages 77–112. Texas A and M University Press, College Station, TX.
U.S. Bureau of Census (1989). Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1989
(109th Edition). U.S. Bureau of Census, Washington D.C.
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. Free Press, New York.
Winston, C. (1993). Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for Microe-
conomists. Journal of Economic Literature, 31:1263–89.
Woldendorp, J., Keman, H., and Budge, I. (1998). Party government in 20
democracies: an update (1990-1995). European Journal of Political Re-
search, 33:125–164.
Zardkoohi, A. (1985). On the Political Participation of the Firm in the Elec-
toral Process. Southern Economic Journal, 51:804–817.
